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
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
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
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THE EFFECT OF THE
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OF
FAMILIAR WORD
ON THE
CHARACTER OF MEN
AND THE
FATE OF NATIONS.

By DAVID URQUHART.

LONDON :
TRÜBNER & CO., 12, PATERNOSTER ROW.
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ERRATA.

Page 31, *dele* 5th line from bottom.

73, line 2, *for* 1854, *read* 1844.

95, *insert* N. B. After the publication of these two articles the project of intervention in South America was abandoned.

165, *passim*, *for* Wheatley, *read* Whately.

116, note.—*for* 1849, *read* 1847.

186, line 22, *for* know, *read* know not.

248, note, *read* "Tenenda non Tollenda."

PREFACE.

SOCRATES AND THE SOPHISTS.*

“Σόφος μὲν, ὃ πολλὰ ξίδως φυῖ,
Μάθοντες δέ, λάβροι παγγλωσσιῶ,
Κόρακες ὥς ἄκραντα γαρῦμεν
Δίος πρὸς ὄρνικα θεῖον.”

CHILDREN do make inventions to play withal. Men are the sport of the inventions they make. Thus children make cats' cradles—men make philosophy. Children take off the threads from their fingers and wind them into another shape, and again another, and the game is ended, and the string is untied. But men when they tie knots do never untie them, but bind themselves and their children from generation to generation.

In Greece first was known the art of tying knots,† and the Sophists made nets to catch men, who, when they went forth to walk, stumbled and fell. Then the people said, “Let us, too, catch men;” and they went to the Sophists, and said, teach us to catch men even as we are caught; and the Sophists taught how two men could play with nets, both making nets, and

* Adopted as preface from the *Portfolio*, in 1844.

† 'Αναλύειν, whence our *analysis* is “to untie.”

both being caught in each other's net, and his own, each catching the other, and each catching himself. Then when they fell, they made more nets, and every man who came by fell and made more nets, and those who saw from afar were caught, for the net went round and round the city. And those who fled were taken in another city, and those only escaped who fled into another country,—that is, another tongue. For, lo ! Words were the nets.*

And men praised greatly the Sophists for teaching them the nets, and rewarded them with great rewards.

And the Sophists did knit ; yea, and they did net.

And they called the nets after their names, and the new nets after his own name.

Then came a cunning man named Socrates, and he did handle the nets, and did see how they had been tied, and he did pick out the meshes, and he did untie the knots, and he cried aloud, " Oh foolish people, the spider maketh nets, but catcheth not spiders ; and the spider spreadeth her web, but she catcheth not herself." And some he set free, and he taught them how they too could untie the knots.

And the Sophists, when they saw that he too had disciples, came all with their nets, but Socrates did untie every net, and some he took and threw on them their own net, and he said unto the people, " Behold the spider is caught in his web, and the flies are free ; be ye not now more foolish than the

* The *silence* of Pythagoras, the *questions* of Socrates, the *inventions* of Plato, Aristotle, &c.

flies, for the flies weave not webs to catch themselves for the spider." Nevertheless they would not be free, for they made more nets out of those Socrates had untied, and when he came again and set them free, they cried, "This man hath destroyed the work of our hands, and the glory of our works, and the teachers of our children."

And they killed Socrates, and his disciples fled.

Then were they in trouble because of the nets, and they mourned for Socrates, and they called to his disciples "Come and teach us how Socrates did untie the nets."

Then one of his disciples said, "Thus did Socrates untie the nets." And that disciple made the nets of the Sophists, and said, "Thus did Socrates net;" and the people rejoiced, for they loved the nets; albeit they mourned for Socrates.

And this disciple was by name called Plato.

And Plato was worse than the Sophists, for the people knew not that they were nets; for the voice of Plato seemed to them as the voice of Socrates. And the nets were greater than those of the Sophists, and every way that Socrates took to untie them Plato made more nets of the untying; and they are called after Plato.

But after Socrates nothing was called.

Then arose a disciple of Plato, and said, "I will untie the nets of Plato, and I will shew how Socrates untied the nets." And his name was Aristotle. And Aristotle untied some of the nets of Plato, and of them made new nets. And he died; but his dis-

ciples made more nets of the nets of Aristotle than did the disciples of Plato of the nets of Plato.

And they remain unto this day, both of Plato and Aristotle, and they are called after their names; but those of their disciples are greater, but they, too, are called after Plato, and after Aristotle: and they are unto this day.

And new people arose, and new tongues, and the confusion was greater, and the nets were over all: for into the new tongues they brought the knots of the old tongues, and the nets of the old; and there was no untying the nets, for the old were brought into the new, and they were tied one with the other, and when they tried to untie with the old, as they thought Socrates did untie, they made greater in the old. And it was pulling hither, and pulling thither; and one strong man did pull many one way, and one strong man did pull many another way. Then came fightings, and wars, and overthrowings which they call revolutions, and they fought because of the nets, and with the nets, and no one untied them, but they fought. For, lo! the knots were in their hearts, and therefore did they hate each other.

And they called them "Philosophy," and "Systems," and "Doctrines," and "Schools," and "Sects," and "Principles," and "Ages," and "Eras," and "Light," and "New Lights," and "Progress," and "Developements," and "March of Intellect," and "Civilization," and "Diffusion of knowledge," and they called them all also after men's names, and after each man's name, they called them "*Isms*," and

"*Ites*," and great was the confusion, and every man's hand was against every man, because of the crying aloud of the "Isms" and the "Ites" against the "Isms" and the "Ites," for all were called after men's names.

And great was the uproar, and the crying aloud, and the striving, and the ill-speaking of the Isms and Ites against the Isms and Ites; and it was the "this question," and "that question," and "this cause," and "that cause," and the "rights of this," and "the wrongs of that," and "justice for this," and "justice for that," and the "this in danger," and the "that in danger," because of the pulling and the striving, and the falling and the fighting of the Isms and the Ites. But Socrates had none called after his name, for he was a witness to the truth.*

But the knots were in men's hearts, because they were on their lips, and so it was, that by asking men "What mean ye when ye say this idle thing," that Socrates shewed unto them that these words were idle; but they who knew not that the thing was idle, how could they ask such questions? Nevertheless, they saw, that it was by putting questions that he untied knots, and they said, "Let us, too, put questions;" and then said they, "We have possessed a great treasure," and they called it "Process," and this was "*the Socratic mode of reasoning*," being in the Greek tongue *Ερωτική*. But it profited not to them to ask questions, for Socrates was a wise man,

* "*The Witness of God*," so is Socrates named in the early fathers.

and asked questions that were wise, and they being foolish men, asked questions that were foolish. Then scoffed they at their own invention, and in latter times they called it "Irony."*

* Η του Σωκρατους Ειρωνεία—the putting of men back upon their words,—had in Socrates' own time received the sense which we convey by "Irony."

N.B.—Part I of the subjoined Essays were written and published in 1844, and were made applicable to the events of that period. Part II, in like manner, refer to those of 1855.

FAMILIAR WORDS.

I.—PRELIMINARY.

IN no point is the contrast so striking and direct between a state in its rise, and a state in its decay, as in the estimation of speech. In the first the word of man is of all things the most solemn and sacred :* it is reverently dealt with and sparingly used. In the last, it is devoid of power, it is a by-word of reproach,† and poured forth with endless volubility. By the condition of the language we may estimate the period of the nation.

It is by thoughts that States are built up. It is by thoughts that States are brought down. But thoughts pass through speech, and speech is a matter of habit. Just thoughts require a simple tongue : fallacious terms must bring erring thoughts. Thought cannot undergo change in itself. Speech undergoes change in itself. Nations then are changed by their speech. The soul of man is in his words ; the fate of a nation in its sentences, and yet the change as it occurs is not the result of will.

To bend the mind of a nation verging to decay, to

* In Greek and Latin "word" is singularly coupled with justice and glory—Dico, Δικη—Lex, Δογος—Fama, φημι. In the Slave tongues, "language" and "glory" are synonymous.

† "Words, words, words."—*Shakespeare*.

observe its speech, is the only chance for its recovery. To effect this in the whole people is beyond the reach of human enterprise, but some individuals may be found at once inclined to, and capable of the effort. These, by this acquired superiority, may come to direct it in the sense which it would itself follow if its vision were not confused. Whether or not, at least this is possible, that some may be benefited, and a chain of witnesses preserved for future times.

If a man be stopped by a body of running water, he does not merely wonder at the phenomenon, but forms to himself the idea of a river, rising in the summits of the earth, speeding by descent, enlarged by time, and finding no goal short of the abyss of ocean. Speech too is a running stream, descending from the generations of old; shall we not ask what lands it has traversed—what leaps it has taken—what changes undergone?

We drink language as we do water: on the purity of the one depends the health of the mind, as that of the body on the purity of the other. Our natural senses warn us against the impurity of the latter, but we have to create for ourselves the senses by which to detect the impurities of the former. When language is corrupted it intoxicates, and it is corrupted by the putrefaction of perished races which have been cast into it. All the history of the past flows in upon us in our speech—not by lessons, but by symbols. If it were not so, could nations perish? Their hour of death is the rich accomplishment of experience.

Every sentence depends on two distinct processes; the syntax of the language; the operation of the mind. To distinguish the part that belongs to each is an operation of such difficulty, that it is only in the course of many generations, that we find evidence of

the existence of an individual who has so much as thought of the distinction Syntax, which is wholly distinct from ourselves, having been taught us together with the use of words, by means of which, we think, we identify our phrases with the operations of the human mind.

Mutations arise chiefly from the introduction of new terms. These are derived from dead languages and falsely applied. They are moreover abstractions, that destroy the sense of living agency, and give to men's acts the character of vicissitudes, in which their will has no part, and over which their reason has no control.

I propose to trace the history of some of the most common words, which indeed is no less than the history of the nation in its mind. They may be classed under three heads. Those derived from the learned languages, and used in a sense in which the Romans or Greeks could never have employed them—those representing confused ideas—those applied to known things, but rendered confused by change in the objects represented.

II.—GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.

FROM having spent much of my life in the East, I remark in ourselves, important matters which, by being common, escape observation. That which strikes me most is the reflection which an educated man gives utterance to when any particular fact is mentioned. As an Eastern I should have to infer that he wanted to get rid of the subject, but as a European I know that he is conversing upon it. In the one capacity I must conclude that he is ingeniously contriving to prevent a listener from understanding the value of the fact, but in the other I know that he is showing how dexterously he is discussing it. This process is called "*accounting for things*," and it is effected by uttering a GENERAL PROPOSITION.

General is the antithesis to particular, and to propose anything generally in reference to that which is specific, is not to explain, but to obliterate. A general proposition may be asserted or denied: consequently when any fact is merged in a generality, the discussion then proceeds to the total exclusion of the facts out of which it arises. Conversation so conducted, must be a practice, conducive to the sharpening of the wits, but fatal to sense. It is dictionaries that converse, not men.

Soon after returning for the first time from the East, in conversation with a distinguished political economist, I mentioned to him, the reflections which the hospitality there practised had suggested to me, and pointed out the social, political, and commercial effects which flowed from it, effects which we vainly

sought amongst ourselves to realize by legislation. Whilst I was expecting to see these thoughts take possession of his powerful and reflecting mind, and with some tremor anticipated the series of searching inquiries to which I should be exposed, I was confounded by "*Hospitality is an effect of Barbarism.*" Recovering however, I made a second attempt. His great field was the Poor-laws. I therefore gave him a home-thrust and said,—“In these countries pauperism is unknown.” Quick as lightning came his reply: “*Pauperism is a concomitant of Civilization!*” I then said “ye are slaves” in my heart, for my lips had not then gained sufficient courage.

According to Aristotle “generalities are the refuge of weak minds.” According to Lord Coke, it is the deceitful that have recourse to them. Both propositions are true. They are invented by the designing, and are used by the weak. There would be little art in being fallacious if not to purpose, and a nation that has allowed itself to be so imposed upon must in the end become absolutely idiotic.

Müller remarks that our ideas of what we call civilization disqualify us for judging of any ancient people. But alas! it is from judging of ourselves that we are disqualified by our modes of speech. Suppose that it was not our habit to utter general propositions what would be the effect of hearing that the blot of pauperism was not a general condition of humanity? An effort would be called for to comprehend its causes, and to devise a remedy. By the habit, we exclude the fact, and what is worse, falling into details and into statistics, give to our mental atrophy the fence of figures and the mask of science.

When the habit of uttering propositions, containing

the names of fanciful beings, has taken possession of a man, his thoughts become the domain of mere Chance, and his brain is left at the mercy of the accidental movements of his lips.

Civilization and Barbarism are not terms for agents, and therefore cannot account for results. Civilization is an abstraction of the things observed around us; we might as well say "Englandism," but as it is not yet used, those who do account for the absence of Pauperism by Barbarism, would perceive the absurdity of accounting for the Affghan war by Englandism.

In like manner we speak of the childhood, manhood, and old age of a nation, and so unconsciously refer its good or bad conduct to natural causes. No man refers to infancy the growth or to necessity the bankruptcy of a mercantile firm. If merchants conceived that profits or failure came by a law of nature, there would be an end of care and industry. General propositions are the refuge of ignorance from study, or of guilt from scrutiny, and can never be uttered regarding things that are understood.

An animal is born into the world without its knowledge; its increase is not of its will; its organs and its powers are not of its own making; its decay no care can prevent, and its dissolution no power avert.

The aggregation of men into one nation exists by its will; its functions are adjusted by its sense; its fortune depends on its deserts; its dissolution is brought about by its acts, not because the men die, but because the requisite attention is not given.

The childhood of man is ignorant and helpless: the early period of a nation is energetic and cognizant. The last years of a man, breaking through age, are feeble and sluggish, seeking only repose, con-

temptuous of the present, and living only in recollections of the past: the last years of a nation present vehement agitation and contention; it lives only in the present, and is forgetful and contemptuous of all that has preceded it.

The infancy and old age of nations are then the reverse of the same periods in individuals. How could they be confounded?—by the habit of General Propositions; whence it follows that the notion was absurd that it was the virtues of the fathers which built up the State or that it is the vices of the sons that bring it to decay.

Pascal makes the performance of every duty, civil and religious, to depend upon the accuracy of our terms. This is to say, that all things, human and divine, being taught by speech, are known to us only in words; if we may connect his reasoning with the doctrines of his sect, his meaning is, that error is so deeply imbedded in us that to attempt to draw distinct lines between right and wrong is an absurdity or a pretence.*

The Scripture tells us that it is that which goeth forth from a man that defiles him. His *first* defilement is, therefore, from that which goeth forth, for if already defiled, he would not be to be defiled. This defilement lies not in his will, for then would he be already filthy. Something proceeding from a man not yet impure returns on himself to pollute him.

Ask the teachers of the land to interpret these

* Sir Graves Houghton, in his 'Prodromus,' (a work in which, by the assistance of Brahminical philosophy and Sanscrit terminology, a modern European is exhibited endeavouring to clamber by words out of the sphere of words), says, that he is conscious that he is subdued by the words he uses, but that in each particular case it requires a great effort to see how it is so.

words, and they will say, "it is a slander or falsehood." A man can only speak as he knows, and only read what he thinks in the words that are written. How can the stream defile its source? An impure source is not to be defiled by its own stream. False and lying words are but the external symbols of the internal wickedness; before falsehood could have passed the lips, the man must have been altogether a lie within. This then is not the meaning of Christ; nor can this defilement be comprehended by those who are defiled. His words ascend to the causes of the darkening of the understanding; they refer not to things done wilfully, but to that which misleads the will, and point to the mist raised by the breath which abuses the mind of its sight.

Against conscious sin we have protections from within and from without; against unconscious error denunciation is of no avail; conscience is asleep; here we can only appeal to man's own use of his judgment, where its functions are not perverted; taking his habits of reasoning where he is right (which had never been observed by him) and contrasting them with the process he has followed where he has erred. This is what Christ has taught us to do—this is what He has done Himself, when He reproves the Pharisee for not succeeding in one mental operation when he had succeeded in another. They could not read the signs of the times, they *could* discern the face of the sky!

But men smile at connecting "duty," or "sin," with a mode of expression. They say, "If you examine your words—if you are captious about terms, you must give us a new dictionary." They say, "Our terms are intelligible, and that is enough; they are what every one uses, and what more can we want?"

Language is a source of original as well as of representative error, whenever it is itself accidentally corrupted by the introduction of foreign words. Listen to any argumentation in English, and withdraw terms of Latin and Greek origin—replace personifications by the equivalent *verb*, and it will then prove not easy to disagree. An error may be the result of a fallacy introduced yesterday, or of an erroneous expression introduced a thousand years ago. So soon as the error arises, it is reproduced in language, and the tongue of the nation which renders it perpetuates it. At each period the terms in use pass to the child before a conscious mental operation is performed; once accepted, no further mental operation is in his power, except as flowing from and dependent upon them.

The child brings into the world the disposition qualifying him to belong to the best and noblest times. But he is taught down to the times in which he is born. The Child is as the simple man. We connect the idea of simplicity with that of integrity—we could not connect simplicity with fallacy, no more than we could connect it with loquacity. Instruct the simple man in the verbal superfluity of the times, and the qualities we admire in him will disappear. The young generation as it rises has transferred to it the contamination of the adult generation, and thus are the sins of the fathers accumulated upon the children.

Let us take one illustration more from the fallacy already noticed. There is no law of existence for a nation, no finite dimensions for its limbs, nor limited epoch for its life, yet by a merely habitual sentence, we personify a nation, as a living animal, destined to grow and condemned to perish. This personification is the

infraction of no law, yet it brings the violation of all law, by destroying in each man who utters it all appreciation of his people's character and conduct. It shuts out from his own conscience the sense of his own responsibility,* and debars him, if self-consistent, from the reflections the most elevating as well as the most solemn, the most necessary as well as the most attractive.

A true citizen knows the State only in his own breast—sinking in his failings, and flourishing in his good qualities, and nothing can tend more to recover that lost sense than by reflecting on the rise and fall of states, and connecting therewith their cause—the character of the men.

What a rare occurrence is the rise of a State. For many thousand years the earth has been inhabited; many hundreds of millions of human beings live upon it at each moment, and are rapidly substituted in generation for generation. Amongst these myriads of millions how few have arisen to sway, to mould the minds of their fellow-citizens, and to create nations by instituting laws! It is by units that they are to be counted. Look again from East to West, and from North to South, and search over the annals of times, and see how many nations there are who in reference to subsequent expansion, may be said to have had a childhood. Again, you will have to count by units! And how diverse in character these pre-eminent nations. For instance, the Hindoos, Romans, Anglo-Saxons, Moguls, Chinese, Peruvians, Russians. The Roman just, the

* There is no man brought to the gallows who is not deplored as being unfortunate, because he has been ill-taught and led away. That does not alter the commandments of Heaven, or the laws of man.

Mogul ferocious, the Chinese meek, the Hindoo obedient, the Anglo-Saxon rapacious, the Russian insatiable, and all great. Some governed by a king, some by a republic, some by an oligarchy, some by a priesthood—each most diversified form of government, beside each most diversified character of man. It is not then courage or cowardice—it is not honesty or villany—it is nothing in fact of the things we speak of as constituting *individual character*, that is the cause of a nation's rise; neither is it the form of government—since nations have arisen equally under every form. The characters which raise and preserve a state, are knowledge of its business, care of its interests—the sense of responsibility of each for each and of each for the state. The Roman, the Hindoo, &c. is different in the way that animals belonging to distinct genera differ. Their differences too were no more known to themselves or each other than the differences of animals. In the age of activity and of progress, when the causes of their greatness were chiefly in operation, did any one of these people explain what he was or endeavour to interpret the cause of his advancement? No—words are only used after the thing has expired. The classical age is the age preceding decay, when words come in—the symptom and the aggravation of the disease. Man can know what HE IS, only by comparison with dissimilar things. The character of a nation is universal, otherwise it would not be that of the nation, and being universal it cannot be observed. It is not the Englishman who can describe or understand the Englishman or the Russian. He must be a Russian as well as an Englishman before he can know anything of either. But that which pertains to his own duties requires from the honest man no reasoning on human

character, he has only to understand the business in which *his own people is engaged*, and this every man does who can distinguish right from wrong.* Then has he the key, and understanding affairs he can understand the actors. Whoever then indulges in vague speculations regarding character, where he has to deal with matters of justice, is no more a citizen than a man designating a mistake of figures a concomitant of clerk-hood, a merchant. A nation can recover only by curing itself of GENERAL PROPOSITIONS. Remove them and then of necessity each man applies himself to facts. Then comes knowledge,† then affection for the commonwealth, because its concerns are understood, and the inducements to labour both because of light and love.

Past times exhibit (and even the present are not without examples‡) what great things small strength can do in a just cause, and how power is unavailing to effect the smallest purposes, when it is opposed by upright and able men. Individuals may fail when they deserve to succeed, and suffer when they are blameless; but nations ever meet with their deserts. For a great number of men congregated together so as to constitute a nation, no human strength can put down, if they are worthy, and however great they may be, no power of theirs can long sustain them, if they are not.

* See the first dialogue of Socrates with Alcibiades, where the science of government and the knowledge of justice are shown to be one and the same thing.

† The centralization of power within—secrecy in respect to the great concerns of every nation called diplomatic;—the multiplication of internal laws,—the overthrow of all law in international conduct, have extinguished knowledge, and therefore integrity. Thence the habit of speaking and writing on subjects not understood.

‡ *E. g.* Circassia, Serbia.

But I do not say worthy in an absolute sense. Nations have long flourished in injustice, but then they have possessed capacity. In their capacity they have been greater, or in their injustice they have been less, than their competitors. Who would suppose that a foolish man, because he was honest would succeed? But there is no integrity where there is not capacity. The upright man will qualify himself for his duties.

It was said to Phocion, "How can justice build up states, since Athens is a great state and has been often unjust?" Phocion replied, "If those against whom Athens had to struggle were still less just than she, is not the greatness of Athens the best of testimonies to the value of justice?"

It seems strange to have to tell things so simple as discoveries on which depends the safety of a country; but truth is always simple, and has no value in itself.

Supposing a great delinquent brought to the bar of justice, charged with breaking the law and betraying the state, would the defence be admitted that his acts were but the signs of old age in the community? But a nation that has admitted such a fallacy *into its common speech* will never have the opportunity of observing the absurdity of its own propositions as reduced to practice because it never will call a great criminal to account. But, indeed, crime against such a state can no longer be perpetrated.

The picture of declining ages has been drawn by master hands. Their words ought to have for us who see the end an authority which they could not have with their contemporaries. These great metaphysicians referred to no ideal causes, they go home to the *character* of their fellow-citizens. "You," each of you

“do so and so,”—“You Romans!” “you Athenians shame the name of your fathers.” “*You* are not just,”—“*you* respect not what is lawful,”—“*you* are attached to your factions and not to your country,”—“*you* have lost knowledge of affairs.”—“The true names of things.” The men who so spoke were a Tacitus, or a Demosthenes, a Cato, or a Thucydides. Base and degenerate as were the Athenians and the Romans, still they felt that the words did apply to themselves, and never dreamt of diverting reproach on an abstraction. They neither put the crime of some, nor the sin of all, upon the name that belonged to a faction, or of an entity applicable to any and every spot of the universe,—“civilization,” “progress,” “reform,” or the like. Therefore these words did find entrance into the hearts of some, and did retard the downward course of events and morals.

But the modern will say, “Nowadays we are more advanced: they narrowed their sympathies to the spot—we extend them to the human race; they were vindictive and blood-thirsty—we are benevolent and unsuspicious. If we efface the individual it is to obtain the unity of the State. If we lose sight of the part, we absorb it in the personification of the whole.” Yes, you do make progress, you advance in knowledge, leaving wisdom behind. If your fathers shed blood, they did it with a motive. You perpetrate the same acts on the objects of your enlarged sympathies whilst ignorant of what you do. In your Freedom you have forgotten Law; in your Civilization, Patriotism, Justice, Integrity and Conscience. In your Factions you have lost the men.

The civilization of the Modern European, and the Christianity of the Modern Briton, are dispensing charters to sanction acts which they would execrate

if-committed by Infidels and Barbarians. Each individual denies his share of guilt without holding by law responsible those to whom he has confided power for the purpose of preventing, not committing crimes, and all this not for profit's sake, nor for a purpose, but because bewildered in a chaos of hazy speech.*

* The following is a specimen of the replies made to the earnest appeals of the few in England who sorrow and labour.

"You are fortunate in having the inclination and the time to devote to political matters, but I am so situated that my own immediate affairs engross all my time and attention. I am not disposed to take any interest in politics, for the course pursued by the public men in this country during the last few years, has been so void of principle (being disposed to sacrifice every thing to party), that I have become utterly disgusted, and have come to the conclusion that it is almost impossible to be a public man and an honest man. I am willing, therefore, to let things take their course, without any interference on my part."

III.—THE CONNECTION OF RELIGION AND POLITICS.

THE words "Religion" and "Politics," call up ideas most dissimilar; the one removed from temporal errors and passions, the other from plain and simple dealing. Is this antagonism inherent in the subject, or is it created by the term? A man to *know what he means* by either word, must dive into himself for the impressions there treasured up, and of the origin of which he is no longer able to render account. He does not, however, take this course, nor does he even think on the subject, consequently these images are supposed to be not in us, but without us. We may put on religion as a vesture, we may take up politics as an avocation, they are to be at our choice accepted or rejected. Should these images not be correct,—should these two justly understood, not be without us but *within us*,—should they not be dissimilar and opposed, but similar and necessary to each other,—then shall we have made *our* religion and *our* politics false. Yet this mistake will not have resulted from failure in a conscious effort, but from traditions which we have received before we used our reason, and the origin of which is lost to us in the dark antiquity of our childhood. It is our part therefore to ascend beyond the period of our individual existence, if we would know ourselves.

We have taken fresh words from other and ancient tongues. Borrowing of words is incurring the most serious of all liabilities. A word representing a

tangible object or a conclusion arrived at by a scientific process, may be borrowed without hazard, not so those that have no antecedently known representative. There are no new discoveries to be made in morals, so is there no occasion for new terms. When a nation borrows such a term it only confuses its own idea, for it cannot take the thought which it represented in the other language. The new term must be applied in the first instance viciously, to mask fallacies or misdeeds, that could not be presented in plain terms. Take a recent instance "Expediency." In the Latin it conveys no such meaning as that we have attached to it, indeed there is no such word. Its power in English is that of a common denominator for right and wrong. It could not have been invented by those who sought to assist the right, and must owe its origin to the purpose of maintaining the wrong. It has facilitated public immorality, and degrading the English tongue has degraded every Englishman. It is a word that would be abhorrent to a virtuous people, and nonsensical either to a simple or a logical one. The form is no more Latin than the sense is Roman, yet this accumulation of solecism and error, only serves to render it the more available.

Thus it is that in course of time, whatever corruption drops into the stream of language flows ever after therein. A fraud practised, a forgery committed by one man in one age remains thereafter, and for ever after, a constituent part of each human being born into that tongue.

But it may be objected, that a term may be used in one sense in one age, and in another sense in another, and that it may be used in the qualified sense without injury, because without design or

fraud. The original falsification *did not injure* the man who was guilty of it—*it injured those who did not detect it*. It is not the Minister of State who speaks of “expediency” that is deceived, but it is the Nation who endures it. The fraud was the instrument only of the man who deceived, it is the cause of stumbling to the nation that is deceived. The change of the sense of a borrowed term, or the introduction of a false term was, whenever made, and by whoever made,—a perversion of the truth. There must have been a man who did this, and a period when it occurred; that lie will not be attenuated in space, or absorbed by number, but it will be reproduced from generation to generation, and will live anew in each man; it will flow with time, and expand with multitude.

Religion and Politics are words of this class: they do not represent things visible to the eye, and therefore their value resides in the sound; which creates *in the child* the idea to which it is applied *by the man*.

“Religion” coming to us from the Romans, we must seek first its Latin sense. We would say *the “religion,” of Rome* was “paganism,” ours is “Christianity;” their religion was a false religion, ours a true one; and in this consists the difference. This is not so; the word Religion in Latin is derived from the verb “*to bind*,” and it designates the earliest of bindings, the binding of man by his faith to the performance of those duties that in modern English language are political.

“Politics” comes from the Greeks. We would say “the politics of Greece was their form of government and their public affairs, and the politics of England is ours, and therefore the term ‘politics’ can be

equally applied to England and to Greece, the difference being the difference between Athens and England." But it is not so. The word "Politics" in Greece had reference to the laws by which men were brought and then bound together. It did not represent either constitution or acts. Its root is *πολις* a city, thence *πολιτεια* or the state, thence *τα πολιτικα*, which we translate "politics," that is the knowledge of what it was proper and fitting that the state should be.* It was the knowledge of justice, to enforce which, law was ordained. Politics was the highest of terms, the justest of things. It represented whatever was excellent in the state, whatever was dutiful for the men. It stood above the law, giving to law both its essence and its power.

To the Roman "Religion" presented not worship, not faith, not abstractedly duty to his fellow-men in private concerns and in individual dealings, but with all these it signified the binding of man to do justice to and by the State, as a member of the community, and thus was it that to a religious body the power of peace and war was confided.†

In Greek the word "Politics," in Latin the word "Religion," was equivalent to wisdom and justice. In the Latin or the Greek language it would have

* Laws among the Greeks were "regulations."—*νομοι*.

† It is singular that the Romans, who, in the origin constituted themselves for warlike purposes, with a determination and a science which has never presided in the same degree at the formation of any other state, should at the same time have imposed upon themselves restraints in the exercise of that power to which there is no parallel instance. The great Legislators of the East have indeed imposed such restraints, but in Rome a band of armed men tied itself down so as to withdraw from its secular Government, not only the power of declaring war but the negotiations which might have a tendency thereto.

been impossible to represent the meaning that is conveyed by the terms as borrowed by us—"Religion and Politics are opposed,"—nor could we in English say this, had we not borrowed and falsified foreign words. Man was by them considered a "political," as we now call him a "reasoning" being. The irreligious man was not a "politician" but a bad man. The non-political man was not a "religious" but a faithless one. There was no religion that could be adopted as a vesture, there were no politics that could be worn as a mask. Politics was the knowledge of what was right, Religion the obligation to perform it. In their verbal origin the thoughts so far from being opposed, are inseparably connected, and being separated both are destroyed. Religion is conscience, Politics duty; the first is to comprehend, the second to do our duty. Can a man understand his duties and not perform them? Can a man perform the duties that he has not understood? The things in their very nature, the terms in their grammatical value, are inseparably connected. How can they for us separately exist? When we speak of policy we exclude the obligations of justice, and with practice not just, religion can have nothing to do. Religion is fruitless faith, and policy is lawless practice.

Politics, we understand, as designating *whatever is done*. The people from whom we took the term used it to designate that which they *ought to do*. It is with us the accidents that happen; it was with them the service that had to be performed: it is with us news that is heard; it was with them the science that was taught. We have taken their word to represent our condition—the term that designated health we apply to corruption; masking from our-

selves health on the one hand, and malady on the other. We are all sufficiently careful of our fleshly existence, and we are perfectly certain that if we breathe impure air and nourish ourselves with deleterious food, ignorance will not bring impunity ; and yet we will take no care to prevent the entrance into our mental existence of breath that is corrupting, and food that is destructive. False terms, as poison, once admitted, work their way in us ; our will is then no antidote. But if each man would rejoice to see Religion and Politics existing in their true sense, then it follows that we are not misled by desire to do wrong, and not naturally indisposed to what is just and dutiful. But noxious weeds have been sown, and have flourished in the richness of the abandoned mould, a harvest covers the earth which exhausting the soil, pleases the eye without supplying the wants of man. Whoever would be the husbandman of his own breast, will examine before he sows the seed. Discriminating between useful plants and weeds, he will labour with profit, in the vineyard which God has given him to till.

Religion is of three kinds, revealed, natural, and imposture.

Revealed religion teaches justice. The observance of the law, and prevention of crime and sin, are for the church a duty and therefore a character. As it is by the fruit that the tree is known, it is he only who does what is just who is a Christian, whether in his individual capacity—whether as member of a community.

Natural religion teaches in like manner that man must do his duty to his fellow-men, and it is from the supremacy of one law of right that it argues to the existence of one Creator and Ruler of the world.

Whoever then professes natural religion, admits the obligation to do justice ; and if he does not perform it, he belies the doctrine he teaches, and falsifies the argument upon which it rests.

The four great religious systems of antiquity and the East—that of Confucius, Zoroaster, Menu, and Mahomet, coincide with the requirements of revealed, and the arguments of natural religion. They impose upon their followers, not only to do justice, but to love mercy. These systems not separating religion from politics, establish in various forms spiritual and religious checks over those who are put in possession of temporal power.

Justice then, and religion, of whatever character and form, are inseparable. Religion, of whatever form or denomination, adds its authority to the instinct of justice already within every man's breast, and from which it derived its first sanction and its original form.

The world has not yet witnessed the phenomenon of a religion that did not enforce justice. Religious, as political bodies, when they become great, do unjust things, and thus the original impress is effaced, but their power has been derived from their real value and their use—not from their abuse.

Those who having cleared away the mist of terms have seen into the heart of man, and distinguished what was there first and indelibly engraven, have become lawgivers, and founders of systems and of faiths. No commandments were required until mists had gathered over and obscured the tracing of God's fingers. He was a lawgiver, who could best discern those bright lines, and he became a king when power was requisite to curb wild desires which the conscience of man himself reproved. The lawgiver,

supported conscience by the sanction of justice, the king supporting law by the power of the state. By declaring the right when obscured by doubt, by enforcing it when assailed by violence, authority has been conquered over men, the authority raised on high reimposed the obligation to do that which was right, and this obligation became the basis of the double allegiance which they owe, temporal and spiritual. The first authority arose from domestic charities; the second from the fear of God; the third from the passions of men; the fourth from their danger or their crimes. The first was the patriarch; the second the priest; the third the judge; the fourth the king. The first kings of our race, when they occupied by conquest and settled by robbery, were war rulers, and became requisite in peace, because our modern societies did not grow from the mere increase of families. Not so those more ancient, and not less majestic personifications of regal dignity. The first kings of primeval societies were judges, and the sovereigns of the state were the high-priests of the people. As the power was one in the state, so was duty in the breast of the citizen. But when man considered it one thing to be just and another thing to be pious, or rather when he considered it not impracticable to be unjust and superstitious, then was the judge and the priest driven forth from the breast of the ruler, and the patriarch became a monarch. Then were two governments established, the one temporal the other spiritual; and at first the decrees of rulers coincided with the commandments of God,—the church, controlling the acts of those rulers, prolonged the connection of politics and religion. By the gradual growth of error, of system, growing out of error,

Religion and Politics decayed and diverged, and the Church either losing strength as a body, or justice as a faith, became powerless or fanatic. The agreement that reigned, whilst the two authorities coincided, degenerated into dissension and conflict, or into still more fatal unanimity, by the domination of fanaticism over law, or by the subserviency of bigotry to despotism.

Such has been the history of the rise and fall of States, until the appearance of Christianity, which divides time into two epochs. The Christian religion came in the midst of a wreck, and chaos of the past,—chaos of forms not of elements, of institutions not of matter. Christianity came at once to struggle with men and princes; it entered the world suffering and combating,—suffering from power and blindness, combating with guilt and sin.

Thus from the earliest record of organic institutions, down to the time in which we live, through all fluctuation of decay and recovery, of conquest and subjugation, all men in all ages have had at once a faith and a government; and every man that is now born into the world is bound in indefeasible allegiance to the one as to the other. As there are laws of men, as there are commandments of God, visible administrators of either law or service have been raised up, because men have judged this requisite for their maintenance, interpretation, enforcement, and permanency; and they have bound themselves in obedience to these authorities. But this double allegiance which we owe, is not to the man, but for and by the law,—the law of the land to the King, and the law of God to the Church; and there is not amongst us one man who can by ignorance escape from the penalties of the infraction of the law by his rulers;

nor is there one man that does his service to his God or his country, who in such matters is ignorant.

These two laws, and this double allegiance, coincide in the graver matters that are enjoined by them,—as for instance, in respect to theft and murder. Supposing theft and murder to be committed with impunity, all law is set at naught; and if the law is altogether broken where it is broken in one point, how much more when it is broken in the highest? these crimes are not only commissible by individuals, they are so also by communities; if we suppose the case of a community committing murder and robbery, we have the same consequences as if these were the habitual practice of each individual. A community that commits murder, and that robs in its corporate capacity, has set at naught the laws of the land and the commandments of God, it has rebelled against all things that are sacred to man—his instincts within—the bonds which unite him to his fellow-men—the laws which are in common instituted—the allegiance which he owes to his sovereign and the profession which he makes of his creed. A community composed of such men is expressly accursed by its Maker: for he is accursed who sheds his fellow's blood; and he also is accursed who removes his neighbour's landmark.

Religion and Politics are thus inseparably connected, by the fact that he who perpetrates a crime violates both laws, they are one in that they enjoin, and in what they forbid; infraction of the one cannot take place without rebellion against the other. The King that violates the Law, the people that make an unjust war, politically sins against its faith, as much as the Priest sins against his allegiance, who has not taught such sins against God are crimes against the State,

and who does not repudiate and denounce them when committed. The Statesman who despises the obligations of religion, the Churchman who disregards the business of politics, are as guilty in the very abstinence as any crime can make them, because acts are only the symptoms; guilt is in the condition. What is commanded to each is commanded to all. It is commanded to the State as to the individual. Punishment is decreed no more against those who commit crimes than against those who instigate others to their perpetration, be they private men or men in authority, be they subjects or princes. Vengeance is denounced against the State as a State, against the men as men; punishment temporal upon the community, spiritual and eternal upon its members.

By the language of the laws of England, as well as by its whole tenor and enactments, is identity, and not disunion, established between Religion and Politics. In the Statute of Appeals this definition occurs:—“*That part of the politic body, now usually called the English Church,*” afterwards, “*that other part of the said body politic, called the Temporality;*” and it is said that “*both their authorities and jurisdictions do conjoin together in the due administration of justice, the one to help the other.*”

We have in the original of the term Religion,—in its application among the nation when it was first used,—in the faith of Christ to which we have applied it,—in the doctrine of the church which sprung from that faith,—in the constitution of England with which that church is associated,—in the laws of the land which establish alike Church and Constitution, the clear, distinct, emphatic recognition of the connexion of religion with the duties of men.

Turning now to the word "Politics," in the language from which it is derived,—in the thought of the people who used that tongue,—in the practice of the state, composed of those men, we have that term as the definition, not merely of the duties of man to the state, but the qualification of a reasoning being.*

Supposing the case of a nation violating their laws and yet professing to believe in their religion, would there not be a necessity to make its religion consist in abstractions, and not in duty,—their citizenship in maxims, and not in law; Would not such a people, each separately, disassociate himself from the acts of the community, profess to have nothing to do with them, and to be irresponsible? But such a man, would he not be the personification of that reprobate and lawless being, that lives an outcast without God in the world?

This condition is now realised in England.† A Roman so placed speaks as follows of the laws, of which he had learnt, from the lawlessness around, the beauty and the power:—

"There is, indeed, a true law, a right reason, congruent to nature, diffused in all, constant and eternal, which ordering, calls to duty, which forbidding, deters from fraud; which neither orders nor forbids the upright in vain, nor ordering and forbidding moves the unjust. From this law can no man be absolved, either by Senate or people. Nor have we to seek any

* The epithet "politic," was equivalent to the word as at present used "civilization;" living in a State in which there were laws instituted and obeyed, duties recognized and performed, as distinguished thereby from savage nature. Further, "reasoning" and "political" were convertible terms. Thus Aristotle—*ανθρωπος φυσει πολιτικον ζων.*

† Referring to the Affghan war.

expounder or interpreter of it to us. Nor is there one law of Rome, one of Athens, one now and hereafter another. But it is of all nations, and of all times,—one and eternal, as is God,—the master and ruler of all. He is the author, dispenser, and giver of this law, and whoever obeys it not, flies himself, and despises the nature of man, and in this endures the gravest of penalties, even should he escape what men esteem punishment.”*

“No nation,” said James Akenside, “ever suffered in its liberties at home, without having first violated the laws of justice against its neighbours.” Every consideration of prudence as of honesty, requires from a people the utmost care that the government they have instituted shall not itself become, and cause them to become, the violator of the public laws of nations. When such a contingency arises, then the last appeal is to the church, and it belongs to its dignitaries to arouse guilty consciences from their slumbers. Such was wont to be the case formerly in Christian lands,—it has ceased for awhile. The knowledge of public affairs, being thus obliterated in each nation, no restraint remains over the aberrations of one government by the sense of justice in another government of the people.† Then the refuge is indifference, or the dogma that ignorance shields

* Cicero De Republica fragment.

† “History,” says De Maistre, “has been for three centuries a grand conspiracy against truth.” The historian of the ‘Revolutions of Europe,’ puts it more intelligibly when he says, that “the disregard of nations for law and justice, during the last hundred years, has made History more difficult.” But then, on the other hand, the organ of the late administration of England (the Edinburgh Review) consoles the world with the assurance, that “the folly and wickedness of war is now recognized by all civilized communities!”

from responsibility. The government becoming base, the church becomes submissive.

Let us take an instance, to show that these are no vain images or fears. What has England, a *Christian* people, done in China? There was neither that which made war legal, nor was there that which made it necessary and just; nor were there steps taken to obtain reparation; nor were the prescribed forms of the law obeyed in England; yet was blood shed and land-marks removed. This Christian people robbed and murdered. This people had a Church. That Church is very powerful. To its members and representatives, and to its head, place and station are given,—the very highest. Prelates sit in the great council of the realm, in the privy council of the monarch, and to the chief of that Church the Sovereign makes oath to maintain the statutes of the realm. Yet from that Church no withering denunciation has come forth, no excommunication is hurled. As citizens, as chiefs, as prelates, as barons, as members of the privy council, they are silent and consenting. From no man, teaching the religion of Christ, in England, has there proceeded, by act or word, either an attempt to prevent, or an attempt to punish. What then is the Church of England? Is it the Church of Christ? Yet it is for these purposes it is instituted—that these preachers are ordained—that its authority is possessed—and that its wealth is conferred. But whilst this Church renounces the commonest duties of Christian, it ceases not thereby to be fanatic. When, to teachers of that Church, their guilt has been shown, they have answered as follows:—"We sift not the inscrutable decrees of Providence; no doubt what is suffered is for a wise purpose, and these events have opened a door for the

Gospel in China.”* Having separated religion from Politics, they knew not what human acts were. To them, the crimes of salaried assassins from Christian England, are the acts of the God of justice and of mercy. and the guilty men who sent them forth are the ministers of *Providence*. The abhorrence for the name of Christian is to them the preparing of the way for a religion, of charity, and faith.

“The old English could express most aptly all the conceits of the mind in their own tongue, without borrowing from any; as, for example, the holy service of God, which the Latins called *Religion*, because it kindled the minds of men together, and most people of Europe have borrowed the same from them, they called most significantly *can-fastness*, as the one and only assurance and fast anchor-hold of our souls’ health.”—*Camden*.

* So the politicians in their walk cry out, “We will do evil that good may come.”

“We do not mean to justify,” says the *Times*, speaking of Scinde, “those aggressions, because of the success that has attended them; but at the same time we do not hesitate to affirm, that *as things have turned out*, it is the duty of the Indian Government to make the best use they can of this new acquisition.” Since you have robbed, it is your *duty* to lay out the money profitably! It is for this we shall hold you responsible! Such are the politics of the *wise*—such the religion of the *pious*!

IV.—WAR AND PEACE.

SIR H. BRYDGES concludes his pamphlet on the Affghan war with these words:—"In my humble station I agree with the great Roman orator—" *Iniquissimam Pacem justissimo bello antefero.*"

He had shown that just, beneficial, and prepotent peace had been exchanged for covetous, cowardly, mismanaged, and injurious war: and quotes, in support of his position, words, which would imply it the authority of the writer that gave weight to idle words? Was that authority increased by that of an English statesman of the last generation, who specially loved the phrase, and found it of use in the House of Commons in the labour of his vocation?—a vocation the reverse of that of Sir H. Brydges, who seeks to restore a nation, not to strengthen a party.

"They (events in France) have convinced me," said Mr. Fox, in 1794, "of the truth of an observation of Cicero—one of the most common which is early taught in our grammars, but from which, when a boy, my heart revolted—'*Iniquissimam pacem,*' &c. In the ardour natural to youth I thought this a most horrid and degrading sentiment. When I came to maturer years I thought the sentiment at least doubtful; but I am now ready to confess that the *events of the French Revolution* have made the wisdom justice *in the war*, and iniquity *in the peace*. Was of the sentiment clear and manifest to my mind."

The maxim here is quoted not as applying to *War* but to *Revolution*!

"The more I think," says Mr. Fox on another

occasion, "the more convinced am I of the philosophy of the maxim '*Iniquissimam pacem, &c.*' This appears to me to be one of the wisest sayings of that wise man; and it expresses my opinion upon the point of *prudence* in the present case."

Here the maxim is quoted, not as applying to *war*, but to an *internal measure*!

Mr. Fox was combatting the Treason and Sedition Bill to prevent meetings without the sanction of a magistrate, and to empower him to dissolve such meeting at his free will. Fox calls this bill a conspiracy against the people, and the repeal of the Bill of Rights. He will not condemn the people if they rebel against it, but he will not join them. He denounces the bill as against law, and as the destruction of it, yet he does not resist it on the law and by the law. He admits lawless law, and sanctions revolt against law, but has not the courage to dare what he has the sophistry to commend. To such a man such a sentence was indeed a treasure.

The "sentiment" was to Fox first "*horrid*," then "*doubtful*," then "*wise*." He marks three periods—youth, adolescence, and manhood: sophistry being detestable to the first, indifferent to the second, and pleasing to the last. His words mark at once the difference between the integrity and elevation of the youth, and the degradation of the man in a corrupt age, and the contrast that had been effected in England in the period intervening between his boyhood and manhood.

But let us ascend from the quoter to the quoted—from the change of England during the lifetime of Fox, to the change of Rome during the lifetime of Cicero. It is indeed astounding, and it may appear incredible, that a sentiment such as that quoted,—

one so elaborately vile, could have proceeded from lips that have been almost sanctified by the glowing strains which they have poured forth, painting the duties of man in their beauty, describing the misery of man, and the ruin of states in their neglect. But Cicero lived in the crepuscal of freedom—in the twilight of Rome; his glory comes as that of a planet, not from the excess of its light, but from the darkness through which it lightens. The bright surface of his powerful mind caught the images of surrounding things, as a cloud hanging on the horizon, gilded on one side by the last rays of the descending sun, and shaded on the other by the gloom of advancing night: so have his pages reflected downwards through ages, at once the light of departing freedom, and the darkness where it had ceased to shine. Side by side, distinguished only by a slight inflection, are presented to our admiration and contempt, thoughts that ennoble—fallacies that betray.

The poison of such a sentence is so subtle that it is necessary to render the exposure complete. It must be shown that it is not for such thoughts that Cicero is *Cicero* to us,—that it is not in such doctrines that Rome is *Rome* to us; his conduct in his better days, his words in his nobler works, not only coincide not with the doctrine of this quotation, but are to it the most perfect antithesis that the mind can conceive.

The great event of Cicero's life was the quelling of the conspiracy of Catiline: then he was ready to risk all—not his life only, but *that* of the community, to save its dignity and honour. In the words of Sallust, he might be imagined saying "*Malo periculosam libertatem quam tutam servitutem.*"

Cicero, in describing the Roman state, has laid down as an incontrovertible law of its existence, that

“the republic could not be governed, save by the highest justice.” To which nothing can be more opposed than an iniquitous peace.

Such, as a citizen, was the conduct of Cicero—such, as a lawyer, his doctrines of the constitution of Rome. But Cicero was a philosopher—he was the follower of a school, which above all other things required the practising and the enforcing of justice. It made all virtue in men depend thereon, and indeed placed the character of *man* in the sense of justice.

The Academicians held justice to reside in the mean, less or more than justice being equally unjust; they held injustice to consist not less in enduring than in committing it. It is not here understood, that the man who endures evil which it is not in his power to resist is thereby rendered guilty. The weight of chains afflict a man, but do not enslave him. There is no slavery but error; and the man is the slave of himself. The Academicians held the suffering of injustice to be baser than its perpetration. The latter case supposes some passion that obscures and prostrates, for a time, the reason; in the former suffering and disgrace accompany the wrong to arouse the faculties and to clear the sight. In the eyes of the masters of Cicero, as in the eyes of every man who has possessed character or deserved to have authority, an iniquitous peace was not better than a just war, but on the contrary *more base than an unjust one*.

War is an accident, peace a condition. War is produced by crime—which laws are established to prevent and punish; when they live in the breast of a people, resists criminal designs on the part of other nations. If it were not so, might would be right, and the round world one fold of slaves.

When a war takes place crime is indeed attempted, but also it is—*resisted*.*

Peace is our ordinary existence, but an iniquitous peace is an iniquitous condition, it is the abandonment of all that just wars protect or unjust wars assail. It is the prostration of the innocent—it is the triumph of the wicked; of the first without a struggle, of the second without an impediment. If peace be vitiated, what can there be further to preserve? what further to vitiate? It is iniquitous peace that brings unjust wars, and that causes them to triumph. Why was it ever said, “he is trebly armed whose cause is just.” To teach, that iniquitous peace is endurable or desirable, to invest in epigrammatic form, and to present in authoritative garb, the atrocious dogma, is to spread over the world, and through all times, the poison that killed Roman freedom. The fall of Rome and the desolation of the world are explained by this very sentence: the simple uprightness of the heart suffices to teach that the people amongst whom it could be uttered, must perish. If we would think of Romans as they ought to be thought of, and so that the thought of them shall be useful to ourselves, let it be in those majestic words—

“FIAT JUSTITIA RUAT CÆLUM.”

* The blood shed in Affghanistan and in Algeria, proves virtues as well as crimes, and it raises the character of man to see such constancy, such daring, such fidelity, against such odds. Such deeds are a consolation much required in the times in which we are, and the people amongst whom we live. Lord Ellenborough and General Bugeaud, if the Scindians or the Arabs were classical scholars, would find “*iniquissimam pacem justissimo bello antefero*,” a useful maxim; that is to say, if it was conquest for their country that they unjustly desired, and not excitement and distinction for themselves.

V.—FREEDOM AND CONSTITUTION.

IF one word more than another could be esteemed free from error and incentive to good, it would be "Government." By Government we secure repose from trouble, protection against danger, punishment for guilt, and the enjoyment of all physical* and mental fruits; lest these should bring sloth, cowardice, and decay, care is also required at our hands, discipline imposed upon us, and anxiety; so qualifying us, by the necessity of protecting it, for the enjoyment of the happiness that we possess.

We give to this condition an abstract name, and from that moment the condition itself depends upon the name. England may be said to exist in the word FREEDOM.†

The clearness of thought is contingent both upon the regularity of the order and upon the accuracy of the terms of a language. Freedom is a term involving the confusion of both. It is so pre-eminently mystical, anomalous, incoherent, and contradictory, that the brain is rendered dizzy by attempting to fire it. Alas! for the nations that use it, thinking it has sense.

* The beggar in Greece asks alms thus—*κηβερνησε μου*—govern me!

† "The *best* (meaning the most successful) verbal fallacies are those which consist not in the ambiguity of a single word, but in the ambiguous syntax of many put together."—*Hamilton's Maxims of Parliamentary Logic*.

Here is implied the use, or rather misuse, of a language—not the clarity of syntax of one language as contrasted with another.

This word is formed of an adjective and a suffix. There is no other word so formed in the English tongue. The adjective implies a negative and the suffix a condition. We say "free from sorrow, pain, guilt, death, contagion," implying the absence of undesirable things. But we do not say "free from joy, virtue, health," and yet out of this negative adjective applicable only to what is objectionable, we create a positive substantive to represent all that is desirable. No wonder then, that there should be failure in operations undertaken in practice subordinate to such process of thought.

If we were to project for ourselves the transformation of an adjective into the substantive the operation would be abandoned as too wonderful to be conceived. Yet the achievement is performed by our lips a thousand times a day. The man who has gone as a boy to school has been told and absolutely believes that he has a process for doing this, which process he calls abstraction, consisting in the taking out of many dissimilar things the part that is common to them all, which part then becomes an offence and subsists independently of subject matter, he knowing all the while that this is impossible, but he nevertheless making that impossibility the nominatives of all his verbs and the pivots of every sentence. Henceforward he steps out of existence into an ideal world, and expends the life given him to observe and act, on a false one of his own creation, consisting of entities, pseudo-substantives, which he dresses and works like marionettes on a pigmy stage, meanwhile worshipping his own ingenuities, as if they were, as indeed they are, the rulers of his destiny.

If any one is startled at the results, he contents himself with reviling the faculties which God has

given him, and speech itself, the chief instrument supplied for his use.*

Almost all such words are derived from the dead languages : the cheat would have been too glaring in our native tongue. Let any one fix his thought upon a modern sentence and search for its contents, he will find that he can discard every metaphysical substantive of Greek or Latin origin, without loss of any idea it contains. Such a process would leave, however, few modern sentences extant. But alas ! to us a language is commendable in its richness, not in its simplicity, in its volume, not in its power. The glossy surface of the turbid and sluggish stream is dearer to us than the purity of the highland source ; we treat so differently the sight of the body and the mind, that we labour to obtain for the one, what we should labour to cure in the other. "But the Greeks and Romans—had they not the self-same images?" What ! is there such a thing as "populatio" in Latin—is there "educatio," or "deitas," or "qualitas"? †—No, "to people"—"to teach"

* "If any one shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes and confusion, that are spread in the world by an ill use of words, he will find some reason to doubt whether *language*, as it has been employed, has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of *knowledge* (!) among mankind."—*Locke*.

"When we ask ourselves what we mean by these terms, 'Constitution, Principle, &c.' we shall at once be brought to see how much we are swayed by mere words. Not one of them designate anything that has a real existence, except as a sound ; still we are ready to sacrifice our lives for them at a moment's notice. Indeed a consideration of this question will lead to the belief, that language itself is a main part of what we call by the name of mind. *Without language* not one of these conceptions would have an existence ; nor could one drop of the torrents of blood that have flowed from such causes have been shed."—*Sir Graves Haughton*.

† *Quality* is itself perhaps the most singular illustration of this prurient creativeness, coming from a word used in asking a question,

"to bring up" was a *verb*; there were, therefore, no theories of peopling, and no doctrines about bringing up. "But what is all the philosophy of the ancients, if not abstraction, as virtue, truth, &c.?" They spoke of "the beautiful," "the good," "the true"—or that which was beautiful—good—true. They used the advantage given them over us in the structure of their language—the neuter of the adjective, *καλον, αληθειον*. "But did they not say also *αληθεια*?" Yes, but that was a *goddess*! There was no ambiguity—it *was* personation, and it is as idolaters that we despise them! The idolatry of the ancients was an aid to the imagination—ours, fetters to the mind. "There is no *goddess*," says Polybius, "equal in nature to truth;" he is conscious of what he says, he uses his words—they do not use him. Idolatry indeed! Their night was clearer than our day.

If the process of abstraction can give us "goodness" or "badness,"—to make a substantive out of free you must abstract something from *nothing*. You have already "nothingness:" with which "*freedom*" must be synonymous—since free and nothing are so. But perhaps there may be some latent sense in the adjoined letters d, o, m. These are suffixes implying an inherent condition, as the adjective subjoined expresses a predicated quality; *e. g.* "*kingdom*," "*princedom*," "*popedom*," &c. In *German*, "*Fürstenthum*," "*Königthum*," &c.; these express the state of prince, the power of king, and so on.* *Dom* is

—*Qualis*, it would be in English—whatism, whatishness. In Latin it was invented by Cicero to render the Greek *ποιονης*.

* "In Sanscrit abstract terms are formed by the terminations TWAM, TA, YA and ZIS. From the first comes the English *dom* as in *freedom*. From Ta has sprung the Greek *της* and Latin *tas*. *Zis* is evidently corrupted into the Greek *σις* as is *σασις, ποιησις*. Not one of these terminations can be traced to any word having a

joined to a substantive, never to an adjective. It is added to those substantives only which represent real and known things, not to those which represent abstractions. It could not be connected with *happiness*, *goodness*, *virtue*, *truth*; you could not say *excessiveness-dom*, or *sensitiveness-dom*, any more than you could add it to the mere adjective, and make it *excessive-dom* or *sensitive-dom*; yet excessive and sensitive are words of the same character and quality as free, and if *dom* added to them would constitute a non-sense, so must it in the other case. Thus, "freedom," in grammar, is a solecism,—in etymology, a contradiction; no wonder that it should prove a stumbling-block in sense and a failure in practice.

"The king, and the kingdom," was the earliest designation of the British state,* as that of "the emperor, and the empire," was of Germany. Herein is conveyed the dignity of the head, and the functions of the body. The king, representing the state, could do nothing save for it and by it. Each of the communities out of which the state was composed (not into which it was *divided*) did deliberate, and must have assented, before a measure could be executed; and the whole of that weight of thought and will was placed against the infraction of rule in the conduct of business, as much as against the infraction of law in the exercise of violence. This was the *kingdom*; and the difference of that word then, with what it stands for now—being but a term of geo-

meaning. In the Arabic abstract terms are formed by adding *İYAT*, as *KABILİYAT* *ability*, from *KABIL* *able*. Yet we are *certain*, from the genius of the language, that this termination never was significant, but purely artificial."—*Prodromus*, *App. No. 1*.

* The term *Monarch* is an instance of the falsehood of foreign forms.

graphy—is shown in this, that where so used in an old writer, it has to be *translated* into our tongue.* And how changed on the other hand the “king,” when we speak of him as—an *estate of the realm*!

There was formerly a word intervening between king and kingdom, “*kingship* ;” and as “there was no distinction in law between kingship and the exercise of it,” so was there in the common judgment no doubt, “that to take away the *exercise* is to take away the *thing*.”† It would have been impossible for the common sense even of that period to have conceived subjects, not in open rebellion, but professing redundant loyalty, barring a king from the exercise of his functions ; or a king, not in durance, submitting to the deprivation. No wonder that the words of the two ages should no longer coincide, where the change has become such that our forefathers could not believe our state possible, and we are powerless to comprehend theirs.

Freedom, having a real and ancient value, we cannot, as in the case of words derived from Greek and Latin, expose its present perversion through these tongues. This at least we can do : show that it is superfluous for “freedom from tyranny,” “freedom from danger,” is just as much, and no more than “free from tyranny,” “not in danger.”

A modern writer says, “It is liberty that is ancient—it is despotism that is new.” Whilst what they mean by freedom did exist—it had no name. Liberty came after slavery, and is known only in

* “Those words of Grotius, ‘Rex and Regnum,’ I should translate into English, ‘King and *Parliament*.’”—*Pleadings in Campbell v. Hall* ; *Lof’s Reports*.

† Polfexen in conferences of the Convention Parliament on the vacancy of the throne, 1688.

contrast as health is by disease. After subjugation by a domestic or a foreign tyrant, men sought to free themselves. Having done so, the word had no longer sense. A child under tutelage may look to become free, but when it is emancipated it is not then said to be possessed of freedom; the fact of the freedom achieved is not substituted in lieu of duties. If however, instead of saying the child has arrived at man's estate, we said he has arrived at the state of freedom, we should, as in the case of the community, destroy the sense of duty. From the moment he ceases to have a master to control him and a parent to correct him, the child has to cultivate his own reason, to protect himself against the new master under whom he may fall—and that is himself—through the weakness of his judgment, or the passions of his temperament. It is not, therefore, into a state of freedom that he passes, but, on the contrary, into one of care. If he succeeds, he is not said to be possessed of freedom from error, any more than of freedom from tutelage, but simply to be a good citizen. There being no confusion in the terms, there is integrity in the practice.

In the origin, a child is nothing, it is moulded into the form of those around it: not so nations; in their origin, they possess those characters which give them a distinct name and a subsequent history. There are living nations, specimens of that original condition.*

* Montaigne regrets that the Red Indians were not discovered or made known to the European world, while there yet lived men capable of appreciating such a fact as that of a people existing without laws, and points to them as a reality, beyond the dreams of Plato.

Of the Circassians, future times may have to speak, when they contemplate the real worth displayed in their solitary stand in arms, and in mind, against the power whose weapons or whose arts have

They have no laws, nor even a written language ! Laws have only sprung where differences have arisen, and these have arisen among nations as among individuals, by the misuse of terms. Such races ascend to a period and represent the condition of communities, anterior to laws, nor can you say of them that they had a founder ; there might arise amongst them some one who by his military prowess and capacity might save his countrymen from danger, or who by his art and dexterity might frustrate the designs of neighbours ; he might thereby concentrate power in himself, or make one spot predominant over the rest, but he will not have formed his community, he will be exactly like the rest, only he will have been the first to have commenced their perversion.

The machinery of government so constructed becomes active and aggressive, the other portion endures—it may dislike, but not sufficiently to prevent. The courage or clear-sightedness of the fathers is impaired, the children commence where the parents left off ; in each successive generation there is less sense of injury and wrong in change, and less strength and spirit to resist it ; a nation falls into an unhappy condition, which is described as the slavery which it *endures*.*

But while the sins of the people, during this first period, have been those of endurance, of an opposite character are those of its rulers—and in this perhaps the people are not the less guilty. Concurrence on the part of the sufferers is more heinous than tyranny

triumphed over and laid prostrate all other eminence, whether of power or intelligence.

* “As the blindness of mankind has caused their slavery—in return their state of slavery is made a pretence for confirming their state of blindness.”—*Burke*.

on the part of the despot, or his instruments; for his acts are of his will, and for his benefit, and they are consciously committed. He is exposed to vengeance from others, to remorse and repentance in himself; they endure only when *they know not their rights*,—that is, when they have lost the sense of right and wrong. When at length a people arouses itself, it is not because it abhors wrong,* but because it can no longer endure it. They rise in passion, and pass to the possession of power more dangerous than slavery. Left a second time to themselves, will they revert to the social structure which had sprung from their early thoughts, and which had empowered them to live well during many generations? No! in the past they only see the nearest point—the ruin, not the edifice. They will only seek to avenge, to change the government, or to expel the prince. Having associated wrong with weakness, now they confound freedom with power. No wonder that there should be great contention in respect to the designation of their condition.

Since the power of monarchs has ceased to oppress the nations they have been lost in a sea of trouble, the more they have reasoned, the wider has been the field of discussion, and the further it has extended, the more intense the contention. The most approved definition of freedom is “WHERE THE PEOPLE IS GOVERNED ONLY BY THE LAWS WHICH ITSELF HAS MADE”† In other words, that the people are at liberty

* “All governments are founded in truth and justice, and the founders of them are generally honest men; by length of time and corruption, men come to look upon those frauds *as necessary* to government, which their fathers abhorred as destructive of it.”—*Lyttelton*.

† ALGERNON SYDNEY;—yet the same writer thus speaks of England’s free or representative will: “In all preceding ages, par-

to do just what they like; *Power* is put for freedom while *will* is put for right.

Power and will are to each man what he himself is. That a man should be able to do what he pleases, may be the greatest of happiness, or the last of curses. A benefactor of and an outcast from the human race, must equally have been able to do what he pleased, before the one could be venerated for his wisdom, or the other detested for his crimes.

Resolve *Power*—that knot of fallacies, into its verb *potere* “to be able”—and how simple does it become? Then indeed it is equivalent to those maxims which are held to govern its operation. “The power of the King is to do justice.”—“*Rex nil aliud est quam lex agens.*” “The Royal prerogative is nothing else save the extra judicial exertion of the law for the benefit of the subject.” “*Rex non potest injuriam facere.*” “*Actus legis nemini facit injuriam.*” “No wrong without a remedy.” “*Quod Rex contra leges jubet pro injussu reputabitur.*”

According to these legal definitions, no man has power to do what he has not the *right* to do. What the king has a right to do, that only *can he do*, and what it is his duty to do, that *must he do*. Such is the clear-sightedness of a nation that uses *verbs*.

Thus does the word *freedom*, like all the other

liaments have been the pillars of our liberty, the sure defenders of the oppressed. They, who formerly could bridle kings, and keep the balance equal between them and the people are now become the instruments of our oppressions.”

At the time the struggle was going on between the “court faction” and “the country,” a successful parliamentary definition was the following:—“My notion of free Englishmen is this, that they are ruled by laws of their own making, and tried by men of the same condition with them.”—*Sir Francis Winnington on the Proceedings against C. J. Sir William Scroggs*, 1680.

fallacious terms, include a contradiction ; the original sense of *right* being interlaced and commingled with that of *might*. Frenzy and presumption—the gratification of the unbridled will of millions—is cloaked under a dutiful respect for the laws of God and the feelings of men.

But why this definition? Every nation is ruled by itself. “Such as the people are, so will its rulers be.” “The folly of a people is represented in the injustice of its prince.” The question then arises, what laws? That not answered, nothing is said. The definers were those who had begun to think about forms of government, and the quality of the law was to them nothing—they only considered *its source*.

The will of the people is exerted, only after it has been driven to desperation by bad laws, and is therefore unfit to make good ones. Where the government is well conducted, where the ten commandments are obeyed, the people is free, although it has not made the laws.*

Had to them law meant justice, they would have said “a free people is an upright people;” therefore law means something distinct from justice, and if so opposed to it.

It is this definition that has been the theme for two hundred years of disputation, and the pivot of revolution. Every devoted effort of ingenious capacity, to relieve the sufferings or arrest the guilt of their fellow men, has been so seduced into the augmentation of the wrong, justifying the counter proposition,

* “Oh! that I could see in men that oppose tyranny in the state, a disdain of the tyranny of low passions in themselves. I cannot reconcile myself to the idea of an immoral patriot, or to that separation of private from public virtue, which some men think to be possible.”—*Dr. Price, Revolution Sermon.*

which made right whatever *is*, and reared against the phantom of the *sovereignty of the people*, the cognate, phantom of the *right divine of kings*.

A people make its laws, as well might you say that its language is made by it! Whence are laws, except in language, their strength are in terms, whether written or unwritten. If no nation has made its tongue, or constructed its grammar, how shall it have made that essence of its being by which it judges and acts—the consciousness of right and wrong? If so then a people makes itself. Law, if lawful—is just and true; truth is of God; our share in laws is the guiltiness that makes law needful, or the craft that perverts law to cover guilt.

Let us suppose a people “free” from those evils which have prompted in us political speculation; for instance from monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, church, court, church rates, poor rates, customs, excise, passports, public debt, currency laws, standing armies—from all pressure that enervates, all intricacy that confounds, and where the management of the community is plain, simple, intelligible, and business like:—can you suppose it possible that such a people questioned as to the origin of their well-being would answer, “because we are governed only by the laws we ourselves have made”? They would not understand what you meant by the question. But they would understand what you do not, that to attempt to impose on them new laws was a violence and a wrong, even as our ancestors exclaimed “*Nolumus leges Angliæ mutare.*” Wherever laws are good; men have sense enough to desire to keep them. Longevity lies in the immutability of law.

The fundamental or common law of England is unwritten and established by applications alone, that

is precedent. To this day the enactments of parliament do not receive the sanction of publication,* without which they are not laws. There never was established in England a legislating power. Our government is altogether judicial.† True, we have slipped from adjudication into legislation, and when modern legal writers are struck by the fact, they explain it according to the present ideas. Blackstone tells us that the non-publication does not invalidate acts of parliament because they *are published*, “being enacted by our representatives, every man is supposed to be present in the Legislature!”

“When I use the word LAW,” I have said elsewhere, “I mean that rule of ancient justice which has been preserved in our COMMON LAW, and not the *Statutes of Parliament*. There was a time when Parliament was the servant of the laws, their expounder and enforcer; now Parliament has desecrated Law, by pretending to be its source.‡ Parliament

* There is an exception, which proves the rule, the Magna Charta: it was but a restoration and confirmation of rights.

“This was a law promulged and established to the English, with a terror and solemnity inferior only to that of the Holy Commandments of God himself to the Jews. They enacted transcripts thereof to be carefully preserved in all the cathedrals; that it should be four times a year carefully read before the people; that twice in a year the prelacy should thunder out the greater excommunication against the infringers thereof; The bishops, holding lighted candles in their hands, extinguished them and threw them on the ground, every one present crying out, “Thus let him be extinguished and stink in Hell who violates this charter.” That it should be allowed as the common law by all officers of justice; that *all statute laws or judgments, in opposition thereto*, should be null and void; nay, that the very priests and confessors should frame the consciences of the people to the observance thereof.”—*Case of the Bankers*.

† “The judge administers, but does not make the law.”

‡ The terms “*Ordonance*,” “*Statute*,” “*Adjuggements*,” “*Establishments*,” and the expressions, “*it is ordained*,” “*it is assented*,”

first rendered judgments, as a Court of Law, it then proceeded to *declare* the law (Edward II), then to *limit it*, and lastly to give, as Sallust remarks of the Senate of sinking Rome, "the force of law to the decisions of their own order." The Parliament in England could not enforce their decrees, but we accepted them. We gave the *title* of law to abuses which could not have prevailed if known by their proper name. This usurpation the nation continues to enforce upon itself, by speaking of the *omnipotence* of Parliament; a word which reveals not that Parliament has usurped, but that the nation has surrendered. There remains, however, upon the bench and at the bar a tradition of better things: no age has been without a witness to testify that the law is the only mistress of England, and to protest against any power in Parliament, or any binding in its statutes, beyond that which is derived from that very law that is set at nought. No man will deny that the *unwritten* and the *written* laws of England are the two systems the most opposed that can be imagined; and as all will admit that the unwritten law is the best that any nation has possessed, so must it follow that the written is the worst. This is no theoretic antagonism. These systems are bodily represented in our Government by the Judicatories and the Parliament; and now that schism and faction have destroyed even the

are not such as would have been used had Parliament been considered a lawgiver: so also the terms still in use—as "BILL" equivalent to Petition and "ACTS of Parliament." These are not even promulgated which must have been specially provided for, had they been considered as laws. The old form of enactment leaves no ambiguity (13 H. IV.) "By the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and at the request of the Commons, it is ordered and assented that, &c."

thought of resistance to the Commons, either by the Crown or the Church, or the Peers, now that betrayal can be no more resented by its constituents, than usurpation by its superior, or its co-ordinate estates,* there remains but one only check—the law. And what is the law save the knowledge of the past—the study of their thoughts, and the adaptation of their common practice to the present times?”†

Let us but understand what government is, and then no discussion can arise. “Crimes,” says Sharon Turner: “are the express objects of all human legislation, it is against them that laws are more especially made, and to repress them is the primary cause of all human government.”

We have greatly departed from this simple rule. Moreover, the method and the integrity which are evinced in all matters of science or private interest are laid aside in politics. Doubt, darkness, and insecurity do not on that field prompt to efforts to escape from so alarming a condition; on the contrary, they are looked on with satisfaction and pride, and in many new questions they see “freedom of debate” and “science of government.”‡

* There is the most deadening fallacy included in the word “*Commons*.” It is held to be in contradistinction to noble, and therefore the lower house is held *in itself* as equivalent to an estate of the realm. The word Commons, means the Communes, as used to-day in France—that is the burghs, thus (2 H. IV, 1432) “*Be-sechen mekely the Communes*.”—The Communes petitioned, the King answered, and then the Parliament advised and ordained.

† Wealth and Want, or Pauperism and its Cure. p. 91.

‡ “The wisdom of the ancients, as to the government of life, was no more than certain precepts, what to do, and what not; and men were much better in that simplicity; for as they came to be more learned, they grew less careful of being good. That plain and open virtue is now turned into a dark and intricate science; and we are right to dispute rather than to live.”—*Seneca*.

"No Rulers," says Judge Story, "on earth are called to a more difficult and delicate task than our own. In the interpretation of constitutional questions alone a vast field is open for discussion and argument. The text, indeed, is singularly brief and expressive; but that very brevity becomes of itself a source of obscurity, and that very expressiveness, while it gives prominence to the leading objects, leaves an ample space of debateable ground upon which the champions of all opinions may contend with alternate victory and defeat. *Nay, the very habits of free inquiry, to which all our institutions tend, conduct us, if they do not urge us, to a perpetual renewal of the contest; so that many minds are unwilling to admit any thing to be settled, and the text remains with them a doubtful oracle, speaking with a double meaning, and open to glosses of the most contradictory character. How much sobriety of judgment, solid learning, historical research, and political sagacity are required for such critical inquiries?"*

This brings the simplicity of the source into contrast with the confusion of later stages, only to declare simplicity incomprehensible and impossible. "The very habits of free inquiry, to which all our institutions tend, conduct us to a perpetual renewal" of—idle differences! In this sentence, there is intended to be conveyed the highest commendation of the institutions which tend to and promote this "free inquiry;" how can institutions be excellent of which the result is the perpetual renewal of contest, and which require unattainable conditions for the conduct of this complicated machinery? Nor is it two or three men selected from the whole nation, but every American citizen who must possess

all this knowledge and all these qualities, "to enable him to exercise his own rights, to protect his own interests, and sustain the just operations of public authority!" Will no one think of returning to simplicity?

Tacitus marks the twelve tables as the conclusion of just law; and *free* discussion as the period of corruption.

"Pulso Tarquinio adversum patrum factiones multa populus paravit tuendæ libertatis et firmandæ concordiæ: creatique decemviri et accitis, quæ usquam egregia; compositæ duodecem tabulæ, FINIS ÆQUI JURIS; nam secutæ *leges*, etsi aliquando in maleficos ex delicto, sæpius tamen dissensione ordinum, et apiscendi illicitos honores, aut pellendi claros viros, aliaque ob prava, per vim latæ sunt.—Jamque non modo in commune sed in singulos homines latæ *quæstiones*; et CORRUPTISSIMA REPUBLICA PLURIMÆ LEGES."

Judge Story on the contrary commends his times for this very freedom of inquiry. Did the founders of the Gothic States dread or prevent inquiry? Was there not in those days all means taken to render it certain, and conclusive, but that inquiry was into facts not speculation. Then men looked for in government only its object, namely, the prevention of crime; because they had the sense of the law. We require not the Record which the Roman Historian has left us to know that in "*GREAT AFFAIRS the whole people consulted*" and assented, just as to-day the people of Circassia or the tribes of the Indians consult and assent. On the other hand, Rome, when she took to speculating, speculated much in our fashion, only they *did* observe the contrast between their fathers and themselves. "*Our fathers*

took care that that should be lawful which their rulers did—WE TAKE FOR LAW WHAT OUR RULERS DO."

The wise men of Greece questioned in their time on what we should call the "best form of government," confined themselves in their replies to those characters which indicated a healthy state, not a word on forms, not a proposition of any kind do they utter. For instance, "Where the laws have no superior."—Bias. "Where the people are neither extremely rich nor extremely poor."—Thales. "Where virtue is honoured and vice detested."—Anacharsis. "Where dignities are always conferred upon the virtuous."—Pittacus. "Where men fear blame more than punishment."—Cleobulus. "Where laws are more regarded than makers of speeches."—Chilo. "Where an injury done to the meanest is treated as an injury to all."—Solon. Whenever one of these characters was to be found, none could be wanting. Let us take the converse of these—"where the laws have superiors—where the people are both extremely rich and extremely poor—where virtue is not honoured nor vice despised—where dignities are not conferred because of virtue—where men fear punishment rather than blame—where leaders of faction can dispense with (or make) laws—where each man is not injured, when any fellow-citizen is so." But here we have the exact description of our own condition, that condition which we call freedom.

The true statesmen of England—the great men of Greece and Rome—from Pythagoras to Demosthenes, in the one country—from Numa and Servius to Tacitus in the other, equally ignore what we call metaphysics and politics. The great founders of the wondrous systems—politico-religious—of the East, have not troubled themselves with such mat-

ters. Definitions have been the property of the angry disputants of modern times, whether Philosophical Sages, Jacobin Clubs, Parliamentary Patriots, Royal or Republican Experimentalists. True that Machiavelli, Algernon Sydney, Spinoza, Hobbes, and Locke possessed great faculties: into great minds the canker first entered; then the canker alone was great.

From the genus we descend to the species, and among freedoms there is, "*Constitution of England.*" Grasp this, and see what is left in your hand, "state of England;" that is—England. But England, morally and politically, is her laws. Yet laws cannot be meant, for if so they would be expressed. Then there is something not law placed in lieu of law; again a phantom, again a cloud, that without body deceives by a form, and without substance covers with a shade. But it is Latin. How did the Romans use it? Did they, who knew Latin and had laws, call them the "*Constitutio Romæ?*" No; they spoke of *things*, and said, "S. P. Q. R." But "*Constitutio*" is not Latin. Where then are we, and from what abyss has this froth come up? The first words of our early enactments, as translated from the Anglo-Saxon into Latin, were "*constitutum est,*" equivalent to "*done.*" The thought was then—it is right, therefore be it established or constituted. Right and justice fading from sight, men grasped at the idea of firmness, and "*constitutum est,*" became "*constitution.*" Now, we take our stand lower; we refer to will and purpose, and say "*Resolved.*" At a future day, when even the will is lost, we may be talking of the "*Resolution*" of England as now of her Constitution.

The word Constitution came in by a process of abstraction of a peculiar kind, one not of quality but

of number. It was first used in the plural—"The Constitutions"—"The fundamental Constitutions,"* as if they said, The Laws—The fundamental Laws. Not, however, that the word was synonymous with law, for in that case it would not have come into use; it expressed Parliamentary enactments, in fact *statutes*, at a time when these were more valued than now, but when they were not confounded with laws. The expression "Rogare Leges," whence the term, "Rogation of the Commons," was clearly (as transferred from the Roman to our practice), a claiming or requiring the law, that is, its execution. When the terms Wittenagemote, or Mikelgethaecht, or Commune Consilium Regni, or Curia Regis, were applied to the public assembly, a weight must have attached to its acts which could not belong to them after they were designated by a word signifying *talk*. When the plural number was dropped, the word was not placed alone; it was, "The Constitution of *Govern-ment*," or "The Constitution of *English* (sic) Government,"† at one time it was distinct from *law*;‡ at another opposed to *statute*|| and that not merely in common or parliamentary talk, but in the severer language of the judicatories.

Finally in the diplomatic settlement of Europe in 1815, all turned on the word "CONSTITUTION" (of Poland), and all was thereby upset.

Right has been made law—law has become statute

* As, for instance, "The Constitutions of Clarendon."

† Protest in the Lords, on impeachment of Fitzharris, 1685.

‡ "The question was, whether not only the English laws passed to the island, *but* the English Constitution."—*Pleading in Grenada Case*, 1774.

|| "Not even an *Act of Parliament* is sufficient to warrant any proceeding contrary to the spirit of the *constitution*."—*Recorder of London in the Case of Wilkes* 1763.

—statute, resolutions—resolutions have become constitutions—constitutions have become “the constitution;” then we speak of “the *spirit* of the constitution,” “the power of the constitution;” nay, we have “a vitality,” or “elasticity” of the constitution. We labour, indeed, and we mount up; we toil as culprits on a wheel, bringing down what we tread upon, and driving backwards what we move; but, unlike the culprit, our toil is not by its infamy salutary to our country, but fatal by its renown.

Another word has grown into use, and that is Common-wealth; it is a parody of Republic, but not a contrast to monarchy. *Common-wealth!** Why, such might be a fitting title for an association of pirates.†

It was not that any man did invent, the mean and vulgar word commonwealth. It came by degrees,

* Blackstone italicises this word differently. He says:—“For the end of his coming thither is not particular, but general: not only to advantage his constituents, but the *common-wealth*.”

† “Commonwealths would be eternal, if they could contain themselves within reasonable bounds, and rule with wholesome laws, piety, and justice. But how have these errors, public and private, taken their rise? In all appearance it is from hence—we have given wrong names to things, *and have allotted to vice the stamp and attributes of virtue*. We term avarice prudence and economy; we think none wise who abound not in wealth, and none honest but whom fortune favours; we call the false arts of statesmen, and the evil faith, perjury, and dissimulation, of princes, wisdom and deep policy; temerity, we style courage; ambition, we call noble thirst after glory; and they who vex, rob, and disturb the world, we dignify with the names of conquerors and heroes.”—*D’Avenant on Universal Monarchy*.

This approaches, but does not reach the evil. It is but the repetition of Cato’s *nos vera rerum vocabula amissimus*: he has not been stopped by forms of government, or theories of decay—he has gone to the man; but he has marked the symptom only, not the cure.

partly from confusion of thought; partly from similarity of sound. There was a good English word in use before, and that was *Public weal**—public slipped into common, weal into wealth, and then we had a designation of contrasts, the converse of which was preposterous; *common* is the antithesis to *rare*, not private, *wealth* to *poverty*, not wrong.

From the decay of law, has sprung a new science, "*Political Economy*." Here at least the words are pure uncorrupted Greek; and what are they? *οικονομία πολιτική*. But these words stand in antithesis to each other, and while each term is Greek, in Greek the two could not be conjoined. As well might you say in English, "Common-wealth, domestic cookery;" for the one represents domestic, the other public concerns; the one means the *law* of the household, the other the *duty* of the state; terms equally contemptible and worthless in the eye of modern science, yet united to designate its most vaunted parturition. The great work originally expounding the so-termed science is designated, "The *Wealth* of Nations." It would puzzle a Roman, whether such a race was more to be pitied for its science, than detested for its sordidness.

But that Roman form thus disfigured and misapplied, what was it? Republic! *RES-PUBLICA*—public affairs. What volumes are not condensed in that single term! Public affairs! That is what societies have to attend to; that is the work to be done.

Freedom is not a modern fabrication. Let us then trace it to its original source, it meant and had

* "— as the exchange is the thinge that eatts ought all princes, to the wholl destruction of their comon well."—*Sir Thomas Gresham's Letter to Queen Elizabeth*.

exactly the same value in reference to the borough as kingdom, in reference to the state.

This weed has then multiplied itself. The Latin term for *Freed-man*, *libertus*, has been brought forth as a double to freedom, and with the assistance of a Greek termination, we have constructed *liberalism*. To this the antithesis is slavery : but as it has a double sense it must also have a double antithesis : to furnish that antithesis another phantom is constructed, *legitimacy*, which is the state of law or lawfulness which must mean, right : therefore liberalism must mean wrong. Freedom is also right, and yet its synonyme, liberalism, is wrong. Or go round the circle the other way, and each word is made to mean right, each word wrong, each similitude a contradiction, and each contradiction an identity. But you say "every one knows what we mean when we use these words ! The words do not signify, it is the meaning we have to look to." The words would not signify if there was no meaning attached to them, but they do signify, because their confusion is reproduced within.

These substantives are next called *principles*, and men know themselves thereby, and one says he is a liberal, and the other says he is a legitimist ; and then and therefore they wrangle, and then they fight, burn, and kill. They call this *progress* !* They sail boldly and rejoicingly along, from a past that is despised to a future that is coveted because—both are unknown.

* "We are a mixed community, fortunately mixed in every way ; and I hold that so far from this diversity of religion, politics, or situations being injurious, it is out of it arises that beautiful harmony of society, as in the natural world, from whence come useful results to individuals and general beauty to the whole frame of society."—*Speech of Mr. Wyse.*

The world, and particularly Europe, is free at this day from the great evils, sufferings, and dangers that in different ages have oppressed the human race. There is no conqueror in possession, there are no preparations for invasion;* the great nations of Europe neither groan under foreign masters nor under domestic tyrants; no religious fanaticism binds its victims to the stake. In addition to these immunities, we have great and positive advantages. We revel in luxuries, abound in wealth, in literature and art; we produce, as it were by magic; science unlocks the riches of the soil, the treasures of the mine—multiplies the industry of the hand, transports from place to place with ease and speed, and exchanges spot for spot, nation for nation, benefits and wealth. The imagination had not in former times, even in its dreams, conceived a condition of more fortunate repose in the relations of empires, of more ample fruition of the gifts of Providence, or more successful application of the talents of man. And what are the results? Was ever the condition of the body of the nation so brutalised by deficiency of resources, or by excess of tyranny, as at the present hour? Whence then this result, save that we ourselves have made the laws by which we are governed.

To unlearn is our task. Bacon, following Jeremiah,† tells us to consider the old ways, and upon these to take our stand. What are these ancient ways?—the thought and feeling of a time which had not yet

* Danger from Russia exists not as proceeding from *her* strength, and comes not therefore within the scope of these observations. Danger from France is as a corollary to the Russian problem.

† “Thus saith the Lord, stand ye in the ways, and see, and ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein, and ye shall find rest for your souls. But they said, we will not walk therein.”—*Jeremiah*, vi, 16.

formed fictitious entities out of negative particles, to place in lieu of sense. Men founded societies to prevent crimes; the complete circle is run when it is from the crimes of governments that we suffer, and when the governments that inflict those crimes are the result not of foreign armies encamped upon our soil, or of mercenaries hired to enslave their fellow-subjects, but of the freedom of the people, and set up by the *majority* of its parliament.

It was a favourite saying of Bentham, that the wisdom of our forefathers was a mistaken expression; for as we possessed their experience, with that of all succeeding generations added to our own, we must be the wisest; and that as in each age there was accumulated the science and the knowledge of all its predecessors, therefore not the men of old, but we ourselves are the old and the wise people. If this were so, a nation's fortunes would flow on as a river. In furnishing a house, or studying a science, or storing a memory, if there be any thing wanting, that want you know. Not so of wisdom; he who wants wisdom wants every thing even to the knowledge of his want. We shall therefore say that we have wisdom when we have it not, and that those were destitute of it who possessed it. Wisdom and knowledge are not the same; it may happen that one is found where the other is wanting; it happens generally so*—the ignorant age being the age of wisdom—the learned age the age of vice and folly; the ignorant age the one in which states are built up—the learned age the time at which they fall.

* "Knowledge *without justice* is cunning, not wisdom."—*Plato*.

"Perhaps in this country there may be more knowledge than there was in former times, and less wisdom; more wealth, and less happiness; more display, and less virtue."—*Southey*.

Are, therefore, ignorance and wisdom necessarily conjoined, and knowledge and folly? No, not necessarily so: for we have had restorers of states, and resisters of decay. They at least must have been learned in the learning of the times, and yet untainted with their corruption; they must have handled the nets, and not been caught; gazed on the dancing images, and not been dizzy.

These men did not go into the city to learn "policy," nor frequent the alleys for experience; they did not drink in present follies, nor scrape together accidents called history; but they went to the desert—they communed with themselves. Then did they command the alley and the city; then did they become teachers of what was right, and therein the makers of history.

Alfred founded no new system in England; he established well that which was in the existing thoughts: he went even to the laws of the Britons before him. Socrates told the Athenians that he taught them nothing new, and referred to the men of old; so did Solon; so did Lycurgus; so did Pythagoras. "Why," says Confucius, "do you commend me for my laws and morals? I have invented nothing new, and repeat only what was said of old." And in the book of Genesis itself, the Hebrews were told to observe the records of the generations of the past.

* * * *

A nation cannot give itself the liberty it has not; not so a man: he must free himself to be free, and then may he gird himself to the task of freeing others. "It is hard to be imagined," says Sir William Temple, "how far the spirit of one man goes in the fortune of an army or a state." Ar

more aptly, as applied to our present disquisition, does Burke say these words, or words to this effect :—
“That state is not lost that contains even one citizen who sees clearly that which is, or that which ought to be done ; and it does not require that such citizen should occupy a station of pre-eminence.” And so the Scripture :—“One wise man may save the city, though the *princes* be many thereof.” A free man is a man who has emancipated himself from error, and that he can only do by detecting it where he can master it—in himself. It is not errors of his own original creating that he has to overcome, for that indeed would be a trifling matter ; but the errors he has to break away from, and to cast off, are those of growing generations—these have come to him in speech. Until he has risen above speech—until he knows what it is to think without speech, he cannot be free himself. But there is no free man that is not a giver of freedom. He who has performed this service for himself, can, and must, render it to others.

VI.—INTERVENTION.

“It is one of the signs of a degenerate age, and one of the means of ensuring its further degeneracy, to give lenient epithets to crimes.”—*Burke*.

THE Transatlantic States are to be the field of a “Project of intervention.” Three neutrals are to intervene between two belligerents. A course so novel has startled no one. It is not even worthy a Message from the Crown, and three months after the step has been taken, it slips out in reply to an incident of senatorial inquisitiveness.

A few years ago a grave charge was brought against Lord Palmerston for having *submitted* to an intervention in South America on the part of France. Lord Aberdeen who now fills the same post defended him on that occasion. The defence was not that France had not blockaded Buenos Ayres, nor that the blockade was legal; but—“There has been a similar act of ours a few years ago in Guatemala.” The man whose conduct is impugned is justified by the precedent of his own act, and the minister charged with one crime is secured *because* he had committed another. But the act ceased to be *his*, and became *ours* only because it was criminal. Senators and statesmen who fail to prevent and to punish, become accomplices, and such acts become not precedents only, but habits. Lord Aberdeen holding the blockade of Guatemala as England’s, could only applaud France, who followed our example. Had it been a vague proposition, a fallacy, a mistake

of figures, a belied prognostication, how quickly would the minister have been taken up by his opponent, or disavowed by his successor. When there is a case of crime those are conquered who have not punished; they must cower at once before the home criminal and the foreign aggressor.

“Policy” having been altered from what “*ought to be*” into what “*is*,” it follows that whatever has been done may righteously be repeated. Thus, interference, sanctioned in the first instance, passes unheeded in the second, becomes habitual in the third: from a habit it comes to be a duty, being a duty in the minister,—it is, of course, a service to the State. Thus do we step out from real things into a world of dreams, from the light of truth and law to the delusions of opinion.

The rule for great matters in no ways differs from that which applies to the smallest; so testing *Intervention*, any one will immediately see that the “Policy” to which this term is applied, is as much at variance with our individual sense of honesty, as experience has shown it to be with our public interests.

Let us commence with *experience*, confining ourselves to the important acts of intervention, where there has been a concert for that purpose between various powers. There have been:—

A triple alliance for intervention in Greece, 6th July, 1826.

A quadruple alliance for intervention in Spain, 1834.

A triple alliance for intervention in Central Asia, 26th June, 1838.

A quadruple alliance for intervention in Syria, 15th July, 1840.

A quintuple alliance for intervention in Turkey, in respect to the Dardanelles, 13th July, 1841.

Would Greece have been better or worse had we left her alone? Would Spain have been better or worse had we left her alone? Would Central Asia have been better or worse had we left it alone? Would Syria have been better or worse had we left her alone? Would it have been better or worse for Turkey, had the Dardanelles never been interfered with?

In each case the reply must be, that these countries have not benefited, but on the contrary, have suffered.* Yet the very object put forward for such intervention, was the good and well being of States or Populations which we considered inferior to ourselves in light, wisdom, religion, and civilization, even more than in power.

From the earliest times, down to the present hour, the rulers of Britain have denounced those acts to which is at present applied the term "intervention," when attempted by foreign powers: the Parliament and nation watched over its own government, so that it should not be seduced by its strength or its opinions into the perpetration of the like. No man has ever been found in England to declare intervention to be lawful, far less to assert that it was commendable or advantageous.

But how does such a statement concur with events? How can England abhor and practise the same thing? Speech has been perverted. Words have

* If it be said, with respect to Greece, that her Emancipation is owing to our intervention, the reply is this,—that had England acted legally,—that is to say, declared war against Turkey or advised with Turkey without Russia, that independence would have been at once obtained, without the consequences that have followed for Turkey, for Europe, and the long distraction of Greece herself, through diplomatic intervention.

been introduced meaning two things at once. Double vision, by the mere repetition of the image, takes certainty from sight. What then must be the effect of terms which include not the repetition of the same object, but its opposite?

If for the distinct sense conveyed by virtue, patriotism, justice, and their opposites—corruption, faction, injustice, we got novel terms including shadows of both, applying at one moment to the virtue, at another to the vice—virtue and vice would cease to exist. Such terms have been designated by writers on international law, “Amphibologies.”

“Intervention” is such a term. It is not to be found in the laws of Rome, or of Britain; it is in no Statute. Like Parricide among the Romans, or Infanticide among the Mussulmans, no law can be quoted against it, not however because it was held too monstrous a crime to be perpetrated, but too silly a word to be spoken.

To intervene means “to come between :”—but we have a legal term—Mediation, that is Arbitration; but for the latter, rules are laid down. Common consent is required, and the whole proceeding is judicial; that word then would not do for those who did not seek to repress but to commit wrong—Intervention was the word for them.

What do we *do* when we *mediate* in this fashion? We send men to Spain or Syria, to kill others. Any one of these men, brought before the Central Criminal Court of England, would have sentence of death pronounced upon him, on the simple proof of his share therein. He could plead only war,—a plea which he could not sustain, for there was no war. It is a simple case of felony. “Intervention” then means *murder*. It matters not whether this be done with-

out any covering or with the pretext of a treaty.* The treaty would be nothing more than, in the case of a common murder, a compact to commit it. Murder is however used only as the means of perpetrating interventions; that crime is *subversion of sovereignty and independence*. In the eye of the law of England as well as of the law of nations, the concert between any English minister and the minister of a Foreign power, for the purpose of intervention,† constitutes that minister guilty; not merely of an act which justifies the state assailed "to treat" England "as an enemy,"‡ but, moreover, of treason or of misprision against the British crown.§

Such is the character of the chamberings and whisperings, the conferences and the protocols of secretaries of the council of foreign affairs; a single decision of a court of common law would put down this standing rebellion against all authority, just as a decision of a court of common law cleared away the general warrants of secretaries of state, after being practised in our internal government for a century.

Another source of the public confusion, is the practice of blockading. We blockade without war; we suffer others, by blockade, to interrupt our commerce, when there is no war. The nature of such proceedings is veiled from us by the practice of

* The force of a Treaty is in its ratification. This treaty was not ratified; so that even could a treaty be pleaded to stay judgment, that plea could not hold.

† All acts between England and a Foreign State require *by law* to pass under the great seal. For the regulations established by the constitution for the transaction of international business, and its progressive obliteration, see appendix to "Report of the Colonial Society on the Affghan War," and ch. iv. of "Case of McLeod."

‡ Vattel, Book ii, ch. iv, § 58.

§ Stat. of Treason, Rich. II. Levying war. Doing that by which is benefited an extrinsic power.

intervention, which has broken down the barriers between peace and war. When I first endeavoured to expose this monstrous perversion, I was not understood. To say that no one comprehended is little; nobody cared. At length some little attention has been awakened, and there are some who begin to perceive that blockade cannot be resorted to in peace. At length the doctrine has found utterance in the House of Commons. And then the minister who has changed the practice admits, admits at once, that "blockade is a right of war,* and ought not to be used in peace." He says so, not to bar its use, but to facilitate its being so used. His acts do not depend upon his principles. The principle of government is now to say any thing that will allow you to do as you choose.

Blockade affects not belligerents but neutrals, who sanction the interruption of their trade by the belligerents, in order that the commerce of their subjects may not effect for one of the belligerents that which he could not effect for himself, in which case neutrality would be at an end. But now neutrals blockade belligerents.

Blockade is an *operation*, not a right of war; it is similar to the movement of an army or the fortifying of a camp; it is equivalent to bombarding with mortars or fighting with swords. To speak of blockade without war, is like speaking of broadsides without war. To blockade a port is indeed to attack a port; but that is not war,—war requires both cause and form. If it be the sign of degeneracy, and the cause of its increase, to apply to crimes epithets that are lenient, of what degeneracy is it not

* In war it is not resorted to, at least against the enemy.

the sign and cause, to destroy the very name by which crime is known?

If then, by our intervention, these countries have suffered, what profit have *we* made? There are various kinds of profit—commercial advantages and immunities—booty—territory—exclusion of rivals, in trade or ambition—preponderance—also affection to be gained by benefits conferred, consideration and honour by dexterity and generosity. It is for a nation to choose between the profits of violence and those of good fame; but one or other it must have in view, when it undertakes to interfere in the affairs of its neighbours.

What profit, whether in commerce, prize money, territory, or influence, have we made in Greece? or in Spain? or in Central Asia? or in Syria? or in the Ottoman Empire? "*None whatever.*"

But where such immense forces have been engaged we must have injured ourselves. We did not stand alone; we had allies. Who were they? Have they signally injured themselves?

In Greece—*Russia* and *France* were our allies. Have either of these profited by the intervention? Yes; *one* of them. The one who has profited was precisely the power to counteract whom the alliance was planned.

In Spain—*France* was our ally. Has she profited? No; but Spain being distracted became a source of difference between the contracting parties to the great profit of another power.

In Central Asia—*Runjeet Sing* was our ally. Did he profit? To a certain extent: but again it was another power that reaped the advantage—the same power that had profited by the two above-cited interventions.

In Syria—our allies were *Prussia, Austria, and Russia*. Have any one of these profited? Yes, one, by breaking up the good-will that had previously existed between the people of England and of France.

In the intervention of 1841 respecting the Dardanelles, our allies were *Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France*. Have any of these profited? Yes; again one of them: the others having bound themselves not to pass with their ships of war the straits that lead to the sea which lines Russia's southern limits, where her chief arsenals lie, where alone she can be assailed, and where her maritime means are preparing to assail others.

The results ascertained and established of past intervention are, therefore, 1st. Injury to each country on whose behalf we have intervened. 2. Loss to ourselves by the fact of intervening. 3. Dissension between ourselves and France. 4. Profit to Russia.

All these measures were secretly prepared and effected. The people of England, had it been made acquainted beforehand with what was doing, would never have suffered it.

The ancient doctrine and practice of England was to *prevent one State from interfering in the Affairs of another*. This was her law, and making it her strength, it became her greatness. "Balance of power," was the metaphor of an English monarch to designate *her* power so obtained, as explicitly stated by Vattel to result from her not having been in an equal degree with other states animated by the desire of territorial aggrandisement. When a great power proposed to the England of a better age to decide in common in the affairs of a smaller state, the English minister declared that the union of great

states to interfere with the concerns of small ones, would "convert the world into a society of wild beasts."* At a period nearer our own, the British government replied to the overtures of the Holy Alliance in a circular to its agents: "The alliance (of England with foreign powers) was never intended as a union for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other states."† And later still, the following words were uttered to the echoing cheers of Parliament; "the principle that every nation has a right to manage its own internal affairs as it pleases, so long as it injures not its neighbour. To this principle I most cordially assent. It is sound, *it ought to be sacred*, and I trust that England will never be found to set the example of its violation:"‡ During the present session interference has been spoken of as "a dangerous *principle*," and even a *recommendation* from a more powerful government would entail the overthrow of the independence of a weaker one.§

The study of international law has hitherto been a necessary qualification of those to whom have been confided the charge of public affairs. Wherever there have been great nations upon earth, in their acts will be found the elements of that science. We possess increased facilities for the knowledge of the past, and we universally admit religious, and even philanthropic obligations. We have moreover an additional inducement to that study in the necessity of guarding against the chances of being overreached, deceived, or misled.

* In Watson's Life of Philip II.

† Castlereagh in 1822.

‡ Lord Palmerston, June 1st, 1829.

§ Sir Robert Peel; Motion on Don Carlos.

Our acts in Spain, Greece, Turkey, Central Asia, &c. have entailed heavy sacrifice in blood, money, and reputation. None of these acts could have taken place without the word intervention, which is used only because international law is no longer a study. To the same cause is to be referred the progress of Russia. To the same cause the profitlessness of our alliance with France. It was not by mutual concurrence in injustice, but common respect for right that in the words of Sir R. Peel, who has supplied sanctioning words for all things—the alliance of these two people could “become a pattern for the universe.” Then would there have been no protocols and conferences disposing of the affairs of the world, blasting nations by secret whispers, and using the mightiest empires of the earth as if they were beings cast into mesmeric delirium.

The study of the law of nations was revived two centuries and a half ago, because of the lawlessness into which the nations of Europe had fallen. Some better spirits were touched by the sight, and powerful minds were moved to make the effort of restoring peace by expounding law: thence arose international law, as illustrated by modern writers;—codified indeed by them, but authoritative by the doctrines and the practice of earlier times. Have not the same necessities again arisen? The law still lives, and *foreign policy* may thus be brought even yet within the domain of the common law; but the people or some portion of it must understand the law before the case can be brought within reach of the judges of the land.

VII.—INCIDENTS OF INTERVENTION IN 1854.

“ A people violating (even for their profit) the law of nature and of nations, do but pull down the bulwarks that secure their own peace and safety.”—*Grotius*.

ONE consolation remained to this country. The measures of which we have shown the injury and immorality, were measures of a party which has been in consequence of these driven from office. Their antagonists had not adopted these maxims, nor sanctioned these acts; and, though they did not arrest them, still they expressed their reprobation in every instance. On their accession to power we had a right to expect at least abstinence from the continuation of such practices.

Not having dealt, while in opposition, with *interference* as a breach of the law, the present government could not at once free themselves from its entanglements; but that they desired to escape from them no one could doubt, as appeared in the case of Spain; and then public organs took occasion therefrom favourably to contrast them with their Predecessors.

Nor is this position invalidated by their prosecution of the measures in China, which they had censured,—nor by the attack of Scinde,—nor by the policy pursued in respect to Serbia, which constitute the salient events of the world since their accession

to office. In the first two cases, the question was not one of "intervention," but war: the cause and character of that war were alone in debate. In respect to Serbia we were involved in a treaty to maintain the Ottoman Empire, and the government conceived itself a party already engaged—it was not for *it* a question of the right to interfere, but of the mode of interference. They erred, indeed, but this was no evidence that they had ceased to regard the simple interference of one state in the affairs of another as unlawful, or that they were about to take the contrary maxim as the Rule of their own conduct.

In respect to other countries and subjects they showed a disposition the reverse of making quarrels, and presented a contrast with the noxious activity of past years, that sanctioned the statements made, and partly justified the merit claimed for them by their partisans.

Suddenly, however, this picture has been reversed, and within the course of the last month the intention has been proclaimed to interfere between belligerent powers in South America; to interfere in Greece to establish a Constitution; to interfere in Turkey to overthrow constitution and law.

In reply to Mr. Ewart on a motion respecting the hostilities between Buenos Ayres and Monte Video, Sir Robert Peel expressed himself in the following words:—"Whether it would be possible to put a stop to hostilities by force he would not say, but *it was quite clear* that if any armed intervention could be justified, it could only be so by the concurrence in it of *the three nations* most deeply interested in the termination of the war—Britain, France, and Brazil."

The present ministry have therefore adopted the

maxim of their predecessors. War between Foreign States is a case for its application; concurrence of several, gives the right for its performance. All this Sir R. Peel *insinuates* under cover of a fallacy. Alarming as is the fact announced, more fearful is the mode in which it is conveyed. The bad objects of powerful minds was once to rise above their fellows; the ambition of the able is now to lower them.

There is in America a large field still unexplored, and virgin to Protocols, where Sir R. Peel may gain distinction for energy, benevolence, and success; he may teach us the geography of that hemisphere, as Lord Palmerston has taught us that of the other, by miseries inflicted and villanies achieved.

It is here necessary to prevent a misinterpretation of past occurrences, from being drawn into a false precedent. Mr. Canning is quoted as having already done the same thing in the same country. The authority of a thousand gifted statesmen and the precedent of a thousand time-honoured events cannot change the nature of that which is itself unlawful and immoral: If interference be so, precedent can no more sanction it, than murder can sanction murder, however often repeated. But the circumstances were different.

After laying it down that, "no nation has the smallest right to interfere in the Government of another,"* that to do so is to assault and destroy Sovereignty—that "no Foreign Power has a right to interfere with, and take cognizance of the Acts of a sovereign," Vattel proceeds to revolt, rebellion, or civil war, and says "if the prince, by violating fundamental laws,† gives his subjects a legal right to resist

* Vattel, Book ii. chap. iv. § 55.

† For instance, the Basque Provinces.

him—if tyranny becoming insupportable obliges the nation to rise in their own defence,—every Foreign Power has a right to succour an oppressed people who implore their assistance * * * It is an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties! Whenever, therefore, matters are carried so far as to produce a civil war, Foreign Powers may take part with that party that appears to them to have justice on their side.” When the bonds of political society are broken between the sovereign and his people, *the contending parties may then be considered as two distinct powers.*”

The “taking part” with one side is not optional co-operation without form or responsibility, but was just in its objects, lawful by its forms.

Mr. Canning in the case of the Spanish colonies did not surreptitiously interfere; he did not declare war against Spain, which, in as far as Spain was concerned, he could have done by the letter of the law; he confined himself to the simple recognition of that independence, he did not meddle between the parties nor confederate with others to do so. The act of Mr. Canning had no importance save this, that the continental practice of the last century, consolidated in the present, under the name of the Holy Alliance, had sanctioned the habit of interference in the affairs of state, *to support Governments or rather CABINETS against nations*, and to extinguish internal freedom, while annihilating international law; the recognition of the Spanish colonies, being in an inverse sense to this authoritative violence, was startling—it encouraged waning hopes, revived drooping spirits, appalled designing men, and gave promise of better times.

The present case is not between a sovereign and his subjects, but between two independent and

belligerent powers ; we are then neutrals, and what rights are more strictly guarded, what intervention or *partiality* more jealously watched over than in neutrals ? We may ourselves become belligerent : but then we know what we do, our grounds are assigned, our subjects' informed, all constitutional checks called in, the enemy is so constituted by law, the other powers of the world are appealed to, listen to our reasons, and judge our conduct. It is a judicial decision which we take. This is an attribute of sacred sovereignty. *Interference* implies the very reverse, and if criminal in peace, it is doubly so as applied to belligerents. Interference of *neutrals* is, moreover, a vital question for England, affecting (as it chiefly does) maritime contests, and being mainly prejudicial in its infringement to that power whose weight preponderates at sea. Mr. Canning declares a masked or imperfect neutrality, " would *inevitably ruin the character for honour and integrity* of any nation that should adopt it ; but *more particularly would it be disgraceful to Great Britain*, who, when she was a belligerent had taught other powers the nature of a strict neutrality, though generally she had found them most reluctant * scholars."

These expressions (applied to acts of infinitely smaller degree) may appear vainly pompous to the present generation. The bounds being effaced between war and peace, there remains in the separate terms "neutral," "belligerent," no meaning. *It costs us nothing* to pass from peace to war ; and of course we think that men have ever been so.

* The reluctance has not reference to the habit of *interfering between States*, but to interfering with the operation of our laws on prize and confiscation,—how much more then coercion of the belligerent governments ?

I do not write to describe what is, but to show what ought to be. Unless wrong could be corrected, speech was given to man in vain; a speech being given for our good, a man's judgments may be appealed to against his errors. Cherish "belligerent rights," and respect "neutral duties," you cannot, till you have conferred again on war its judicial import. Then would war, not so sanctioned, become impossible, and if attempted, bring down on the author prompt and terrible justice. If innocence was lost by the knowledge of good and evil, how shall evil be cured without knowledge of the law? When there is an evil purpose, the difference between right and wrong is known; but when acts have to be justified by "good intention," that condition is arrived at for which has been found the expression, "JUDICIAL BLINDNESS."

I trust then, that for those who have some other standard of right or wrong than public opinion,—it has been made clear, that we have no more right to interfere, being *neutrals*, between *belligerents*, than we have to interfere in the domestic concerns of any other state. I trust I have made it apparent that such acts legally subject us to retaliation.

Let us now consider the *circumstances* in which we interfere, and the *parties* with whom we associate ourselves.

Two republics are at war; we interfere to prevent a quarrel from being prosecuted to a settlement. It is not by legal procedure, it is not under sanctioned arbitration; we have no means of forming a just judgment, and no means of executing a sentence. All we propose to do is to *prevent collision at sea between the parties*. What is this if not to favour one party; for we cannot balance between them the

loss or benefit of our interruption of their warfare. The least injury we can do, if we effect anything, is to preserve seeds of discontent, to prevent the exhausting of quarrel and the settlement of it *between themselves*, which alone can restore tranquillity;* but the natural consequence is, that we shall give new energy to national animosities, new objects to intrigue, new weapons to faction, and shall be ourselves involved through our agents in a circle of petty intrigues and animosities, to be the victims and dupes of cunning men in the separate state, or of the art of some one state which will use us against its neighbour. This people we have already debased by our loans, and inured to servility by competition for our

* The following is from a statement in a commercial letter, in the *Times* in the course of last month :—

“After this event (the battle of Arroyo Grande, on the 6th of December, 1842) there was nothing to oppose the army of Buenos Ayres in the Banda Oriental, and no doubt exists in the mind of any one, of whatever party in this country, that if there had *been no Foreign interference*, the war would almost immediately have been brought to a close.

“In the month of February, Commodore Purvis brought down from Rio de Janeiro the greater part of the British force; but it would appear that Mr. Mandeville had then altered his views, as he did all in his power to counteract and nullify the commodore's proceedings; and, incredible as it may appear, these two officers, the minister, and the Commander-in-Chief, are retained in their respective positions, each asserting that his conduct had been approved of at home by government, while they continue to act in a spirit diametrically opposed to each other—the one displaying all his sympathies, and exerting his influence in favour of the Buenos Ayrean, and the other of the Monte Videan cause—exposing themselves and their countrymen to every description of contumely and insult, which the Spanish and English language can furnish (for newspapers in both tongues are published both in Monte Video and Buenos Ayres)—endangering the safety of their countrymen by the irritation which such proceedings naturally create in the public mind, and destroying all the influence and respectability of the British name and character in the two republics.”

infesting favour. To engage in such a course, would inevitably ruin the character for honour and integrity of any people, and be peculiarly disgraceful to Great Britain. I implore every man who can feel for suffering, or abhor vice, to cease all other care, until this door be closed, and to labour to arrest a crime to which no passion impels, no profit invites, and which proceeding from no inveterate purpose, a word breathed in the proper quarter may yet suffice to stay.

One danger from our interference is, the existence of a *French* and an *English* party,—and France and England are *conjointly* to interfere. This union of England and France, admitting it to be at present sincere, will have the very opposite effect of extinguishing those rivalries; for each state and faction will aim at, and intrigue for, the conjoint influence of the alliance.

This brings us to consider our *associate*. We may cut this matter short by admitting that she acts as England does, quite as blindly, but not perhaps so carelessly.* What then, in starting from this point, is to be expected save failure leading to disunion?

Now, let us glance at the past. We have endured it—let us endeavour to extract some profit from it. *Each union has brought forth disunion*. This is a singular position, but it is a natural one. You have done what all wise men have warned nations against doing; you have done so, reckoning that *your alliance* would carry you through. Power so used has

* "Talk to the French chamber, or the French public, of English encroachments, English insolence, no matter how false and unfounded the charges, and every one is awake; but talk on any other subject—freedom of internal government, of religious rights, of trade, the abolition of slavery, or any other topic, and there will be neither audience nor debate."—*From the Organ of the Author of the Treaty of 15th July.*

been broken in your hands : your strength has been turned back upon you. Your sacrilegious weapons will one day be bathed in each other's blood, and you will mutually avenge on each other your common guilt and folly. This will come with the certainty, if not with the order of the seasons. The vengeance of heaven will not slumber : the secular consequences of such imbecility must bring that ruin upon each which can only be effected by the fury of the other. —This is sequence, and no prophecy. Was the alliance not ruptured in 1840 ? What was the cause ? *Intervention in the Levant !*

“ Oh,” it will be said “ that was supposed to be so, but we now know that France took a course distinct from England : it was her fault ; the disunion brought to a head in 1840 had really commenced in 1836. The foreign minister has stated this, and he has not been contradicted. M. Thiers, at the opening of the session, declared, that *France* had diverged from the line pursued by England, and that no real alliance existed in 1840.”

All this alters not the fact, that the rupture of 1840 was on the Syrian question, and the result of a common intervention in the affairs of Turkey.

But supposing it was not so, and that the event of 1840 was a mere corollary, to the coolness of 1836. What was the cause of that coolness ?—*The intervention in Spain !*

M. Thiers, in his speech of the 22d January, instead of representing, as stated by Lord Palmerston, the estrangement as not the act of England, did most emphatically declare it was. But in charging M. Guizot with inconsistency, he used an enigmatical expression which has been fixed upon and perverted. He said,—

“ *You* (M. Guizot) have said that it was not precisely the inconveniences of the Right of visit that was the true cause of the excitement of the country against the treaty of 1840, but the bad conduct of England in 1840. You have declared that it was in consequence of that conduct that the treaty failed. You have said so in the Chamber of Peers. You have said so here. I take you for judge. Have you not then mistaken the sentiments of the country! (Cheers).”

Both these ministers are fully agreed (and observe both are partisans of the English alliance, and both suffer by its rupture), that it was by England's act, in consequence of their common intervention in the Levant, that the hatred of France has been aroused.

M. Thiers disposes of the matter we are now examining in a pregnant sentence. After passing in review all our interventions,—Levant, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, he says, “ *That which united us in all these questions has made way for that which DIVIDES US.*”

In reference to the Spanish intervention he states in words veiled but not ambiguous, that while the French Government was acting in the spirit of the quadruple treaty, and desirous to co-operate cordially with England, *the King was listening to the suggestions of the counter-alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, to which the English and French alliance had given rise, and was thwarting his own government, and ultimately overruled it.* (At a subsequent period, as is known, M. Thiers refused office because he would not consent to act secretly against England with the King.) In reference to 1836, he says:—

“ Whilst,” I quote from the corrected report,

"the English Government earnestly urged us to energetic measures in Spain,* Austria counselled strongly not to follow the Whigs in their career of adventurous enterprise, and warned us against these personages, too boiling and too revolutionary. Austria was listened to, England was not—(*by the King—subaudi*). I speak of what *I have seen*. I say that only which the statesmen of Europe acquainted with the circumstances already know. From the period of this resolution the Alliance has been nearly dissolved."

He then proceeds to mention, that in the subsequent speech from the Throne, the phrase was introduced,—“Always perfectly united with the King of Great Britain, I continue to cause the quadruple treaty to be executed.” This falsehood the English Cabinet meets by silence in the King’s speech in respect to France, and that silence was a course designated by M. Thiers “as a signal manifestation of *a new revolution* of British policy.”

This new testimony must establish indefeasibly the case established before, that the interventions engaged in, in common by these countries, have produced the present lamentable change in their reciprocal dispositions; are we dispensed from following the effects of repetitions of the like; the past reveals what the future will be. But now warned, we advance; infatuation is added to blindness; we are about to accumulate new on old grievances, and the point of departure is not now alliance, but ill-will; it is no longer the same men, but their antagonists

* Those who understand the part of Russia in all this, will appreciate the double perfidy of urging the French government through England, and operating on Louis Phillippe through Austria.

who commence a-new a system which they had watched with anxiety and marked with reprobation. Nay, more, these new interventions are strained for on both sides, as the means of patching up the alliance, which being broken by fraud, they have neither the knowledge nor the honesty to restore.

I cannot resist here quoting the warning of M. Thiers to the present minister of France.

“What has been your object? Apparently to bring together the two countries * * *. Your impatient efforts to restore good-will, have only carried you further away from the end you sought.”

In England, Sir R. Peel declares the Alliance restored:—he forces M. Guizot to belie him. To do so with effect, he attacks British Trade.* Sir R. Peel belied in his statement, has to seek or make occasion in South America, Greece, Turkey, or any where else, to exhibit the concord of the two Nations, heed-

* A recent consequence we extract from the *Leeds Mercury* :—

“Another augmentation of the Linen Yarn Duties in France. We regret to learn, by private letters which we have seen from Paris, that the French government is proceeding in its anti-English and anti-free trade policy, by making another augmentation of the duties on linen yarns. In the year 1842 a very large increase was made of the duties, for the purpose of excluding English yarns, or nearly so. That measure has not answered its purpose; a large, though a diminished, importation of English linen still takes place in France; and as M. Guizot finds that he could both gratify the malice of the war party and please the owners of the flax mills by still further augmenting the duty, he is about to take that step. The following are the intended duties, compared with the present scale :—

“Per 100 kilogrammes (including the additional 10 lbs.) equal
to 2 cwt.

	1st Class.	2d Class.	3d Class.	4th Class.
New duty francs	52.80	77.00	110.	165.00
Present duty „	41.80	52.80	88.	137.50

“From *this augmentation Belgian yarns are to be exempted*, so that the blow at the English trade is distinctly marked, and advantages opened to Belgium as a consequence of our disunion.”

less how mischievous it is now, or dangerous hereafter.

“rimæ cum textit hiatum
Securos pendente jubet dormire ruinâ.”

But is there nothing behind even all this? The “*State Papers*” of 1819, contain some strange documents respecting the founding of one or more French transatlantic dependencies under a Bourbon. In the “Congress of Verona” by M. Chateaubriand, the explanation is given with a startling openness. This plan had been suggested by *Russia* in order to restore the maritime power of France, and enable her to “*be worthy of co-operating with Russia*” in destroying British commercial and maritime domination; the bait held out to France was, the *abrogation of the Treaties of 1815*!

France knew not of these projects of a *bribed** minister. Yet *Russia* was making France act upon them; and had they succeeded, as her projects did in Algiers, you would have had French susceptibility worked up to folly and fury on this field, as effectually as on the other. Witness such a misery as Tahiti—witness also the letter from Louis Philippe to the editor of the *Courier des Etats Unis*, respecting Canada. The eyes, not of France, but of her rulers, are turned beyond the Atlantic, for purposes not of “good neighbourhood.” See the double attraction you present in your own physical weakness in the North, the French intervention to which you invite in the South, and the probability of a return to power in France of Russian partizans, and in England of a Russian agent. Recollect, too, France’s illegal blockade of Buenos Ayres, and the aggression on

* Only £1400 a Year.

British commerce then submitted to in perfidy, to assist and justify the rupture that was preparing.

So much for one of our confederates. Now let us look at the others.

A South-American State is to be associated in our South-American intermeddling. It is the only one that has retained its European structure. It has a line of ancient Sovereigns of great traditional ambition. It is favoured and patronized among regal houses by England; it was by England ferried across the Atlantic; it was by England elevated there to imperial dignity!* This government is incomparably stronger and greater than its distracted neighbours. With its enormous elements, its numerous population, its magnificent situation, its powerful positions,—will it be a stranger to ambition? With its ambitious character and pretensions, will the sole monarchy of the Western World not be disposed to enter the double career of territorial aggrandizement and doctrinal propagandism? Will it not be urged thereto by the new authority gained by concert with the great Powers of Europe? It has, according to Sir Robert Peel, the condition which gives pre-eminent “claims”—*interest in the question*. What line divides “claims” from “designs?” If France is moved to ambitious projects, will Brazil not be a fit instrument? Will not the Brazils become a temptation for France? Have you not sent thither a pompous embassy and failed? Is there not a family alliance just contracted with France? Good God! are there to be found, in our language, words accustomed to describe or denounce such infatuation as this? By the association to your confederacy of a

* Mr. Canning conferred the title of Emperor of Brazil to *spite* Russia!

trans-atlantic state, you are preparing for that country, independently of all other results—a futurity of wars and convulsions. Rio is to become a Western Dardanelles.

The minister who drops the announcement of this insanity on the British House of Commons, in an insidious sentence, is hailed by that assembly as “*a minister of Peace.*”

Your Peace-maker makes here a war for vengeance; then justifies it on “principle,”* now exacts plunder by armies, now interferes with the justice of others by fleets.

And where is all this intervention to end? If “*improper acts,*” or “war,” or “bad government,” be of themselves reason why we should interfere, then we ought to have a new code. If bad Government is a justification for our interference, it becomes our duty to interfere wherever it exists. We must go and seek it wherever it is to be found. There is no middle course. If intervention is not unlawful, it is obligatory. If we can have in any case grounds for interfering, we cannot escape from interfering whenever such grounds exist.

If it is our duty to interfere, it becomes our duty to suffer it. The consequence must be interference of each state in all other states; interference will be backwards and forwards; and reciprocally in opposite senses till chaos ensues.

But it is not merely to collisions in the Western

* “I am afraid there is some great principle at work when civilization and refinement come in contact with barbarism, which makes it impossible to apply the rules observed toward more advanced nations; more especially when civilization and refinement come in contact with barbarism, *in an immensely extended country.*”—Sir R. Peel on the war in Scinde.

Hemisphere—or to codes in protected Greece, that this exuberance of public charities applies—we take in infidels and Turks. The English and French governments have recently required :—"That the punishment of death should not again be inflicted upon Rayahs, who, having embraced Mahometanism, might subsequently recant its tenets."

Turkey does not possess an assembly for manufacturing laws. There is no possible way by which the requisition of these foreign governments can be acceded to, save by an act of usurpation on the part of the Sultan. At one and the same moment you are laying prostrate international law in America, making a constitution in Greece, and destroying one in Turkey. The disinterestedness of the idea is however great. Turkey still clings in untiring confidence to you as her support against your common enemy: her good-will as her internal order, was your strength and best possession; by the same blow you level both, if you succeed; and cast her into the arms of your enemy, if you fail. Was ever such exhibition of civilizing propensities?*

See the consequences :—

"The Turkish Ministers regarded the demand as an interference with their national independence and their religious laws, and were determined not to yield the point, and abide the consequences of their refusal."

Another report says :—"It appears that the greatest excitement has been caused at the Porte by the demand of the English and French Ambassadors,

* The *Chronicle* remarks "As the affair stands at present, Russian influence at Constantinople has but to instigate the execution of one relapsed Christian in order to drive the rival envoys of France and England from the field."

that the Sultan should give a formal engagement to forego hereafter all religious executions. The Ulema, or supreme council of the church, has been called on to aid the deliberation of the Divan; as, on the one hand, the Porte has the dread of disoblighing the representatives of the great powers; and on the other, of shocking the prejudices of the Mahomedan people, on which its existence is based."

I know not how to proceed. To argue with such a nation, or to reason upon such facts, would be like appealing to the understanding of a maniac, or drawing conclusions from his acts.

Last month England learnt that the British representative at Constantinople had been interfering to interrupt communication between Circassia and Turkey. This month we learn that the Russian representative had been following up his blow; how is it that in projects of reform and economy, no one proposes that Russia be called upon to pay the salaries of British ministers at home, and British ambassadors abroad?

The Newspaper correspondence from Constantinople had been remarkable for its intelligence, and for the union of the correspondents of the different organs, in exposing the fatuity of our acts. But now a pit has been dug for them, and they have fallen into it. While they spoke words good, useful, and necessary, no one heeded them, *now* they will be heeded. The recent act of diplomatic fanaticism is thus by them represented to England. "These ministers (who inflicted death upon the Armenian renegade) did answer to the representatives of the interceding powers, that in future such executions should be avoided. The engagement, not solemnly given, was deemed to be sufficiently guaranteed by

honour and *good faith*. Scarcely two months elapse when these ministers inflict death on an unfortunate Christian for alleged apostacy. The crime (of the Turkish ministers), aggravated by such marks of dishonesty and insult, has elicited violent measures from the English and French governments." Every word of this statement is a falsehood. No Turkish *minister* could give a promise on such a subject—no Turkish minister could inflict such a penalty. The Turkish minister did not, in the one case or the other, inflict that penalty. It was a judicial sentence, with which no one could interfere; and in Turkey even yet ministerial "*responsibility*" has not succeeded in subverting the powers of a tribunal, or the authority of law,—however unconscious of the fact the European population or the newspaper correspondents may be.

The writer proceeds thus :—

"It may be asked, on the other side, what right we have to interfere with these religious ordinances of an independent people? We only answer, *the right engendered by the noblest impulses of humanity, founded upon a great moral principle, and sanctioned by the tolerant and civilizing spirit of the age, the right which enables a powerless potentate to demand toleration for the Catholic Church, when oppressed by one of the most powerful monarchs of the world.*"

You have then a different rule of right for Turks and Americans. You discriminate by Sir R. Peel's "great Principle." Lord Denman, speaking of the Louisiana case, says—

"*I am aware that it is impossible for the state to interfere.*"

He again says—

“No one can be more sensible than I am of the *duty* and *right* of all states to form their own laws. And I am also sensible how jealous every state is of being interfered with in their execution.”

Was Lord Denman aware that *we*—the English nation—or certain men acting for us, had done in Turkey what he, a Judge, held it “*impossible*” that *the state could do*? His judgment we have here as distinctly as if the case had been brought before him on the bench. Would it not then become a Judge of the land to raise his voice against the crime of his own government, where he, not denouncing, became a party, and where that voice did possess weight and efficacy, before giving his care to the distant provinces of an alien government? If charity begins at home, surely repression of vice and crime, beginning not there, must be a mockery and a deceit.

I thank the writer for placing in parallel the two cases; but would any one, save a hireling, a fanatic, or a fool, not have reasoned from the case of the Pope thus—“go and do justice in Poland, where you are bound and called upon, before you come to interfere in Turkey, where you have no right, and where your interference will only help the common enemy that will soon treat all of you, Protestants and Mussulmans, as she is now treating Poland?”

It is strange that, at this moment, two signal changes have been effected in legislation, as bearing on capital punishment and proselytism. These have simultaneously occurred in the Eastern and Western hemispheres. The one in Greece, the other in Louisiana. The first makes among Christians proselytism penal, though the *punishment* is not yet specified. The other makes assistance given to the escape of a slave a *capital offence*! Greece we have

wrested from Turkey—we have moulded the state and controlled it—we could not exert our civilizing disposition to prevent the introduction of so fanatic a spirit into a code to which we give our sanction—abhorrent as is the late judgment in Louisiana, we dare not threaten the United States.

The Turks have never done injury to England—they have suffered the most cruel injury from us—they afford a field for trade and commerce—they suffer us to grow rich on their soil without requiring any thing in return. We have a population subject to the British crown, amounting to 7000 or 8000 persons in Turkey, over whom we are allowed to retain entire jurisdiction, giving to Turkey in return, no right of jurisdiction over her subjects in our territories. We are the benefitted parties in the intercourse, and the solely profiting parties by the bonds that connect us. Yet so little do we fulfil the obligation of exercising that jurisdiction which she yields to us, that we have established no tribunal to repress misdemeanours and crimes.*

England has bound herself by Treaty to maintain the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman empire: this law existed when that compact was made. It is not asserted, as it was by Prussia in respect to Poland in 1772, that an internal change had abrogated an external guarantee. England has interfered *in common with another power*, giving the character of conspiracy to the crime, to require the law to be set aside; that is to coerce the highest tribunal in the land, and one possessing rather than

* The Christian murderer of a Mussulman, is by England withdrawn from the judicature of the country, submitted to no judicatory by England—he is merely shipped off, and may in a few months re-appear to murder another.

the sovereign the attributes of supreme power. France and England do not threaten war, but they insinuate that they shall give up the Ottoman empire to Russia, into whose hands they have already betrayed it. Can there be in England men to plot and execute such villany? are we men to endure it? There is heaping up a store of vengeance. Such acts are too often repeated—they come in too many shapes.

Suppose France and Russia were to signify, through their representatives, to the English government, that they would not suffer the execution of some sentence against a housebreaker or a murderer, and that this was done to embarrass or to change a ministry. What would Englishmen say to these nations?

A Constantinople correspondent writes:—

“Those who are acquainted by long residence with the country, dread the results of this interference with the religious prejudices of the people, and anticipate a popular outbreak; those who have followed the diplomatic affairs of the last ten years expect only a change of ministry.”

Can there be any thing more devoutly to be prayed for than disunion between England and France, since their so-called alliance brings such fruit. Singly, neither of them could have dared.

We who cannot maintain our laws at home, interfere to prevent the execution of the laws elsewhere. We, who dare not utter a word, when half a million of people are smitten by an infamous decree on the part of a cabinet, our ally, quarrel with a state that we pretend to protect, because in the execution of its laws—laws that have been unchanged for centuries, a human head falls to the ground. If you overstep the bounds of your own duties and rights, to prevent

that which is wrong in Turkey, why do you neglect Russia? Why do you not correct Prussia? There was no law existing in Russia for the expulsion of the Jews, or the persecution of the Roman Catholics; there was no law in Prussia to enact perfidy and violence against the Poles. The act of Turkey was performed under an obligation which the dictates of right and reason bound you to respect.* The acts of Prussia and Russia are voluntary and in violation of compacts which you are bound to enforce. To interfere in Turkey you had to violate the solemn engagements that you had entered into. Not to interfere in Russia, you had also to violate your engagements. On what ground then do you take your stand? It is not on law. If it be upon humanity, make equal distribution of your sympathies. Or is this a pretext for partitioning Turkey? Lord Palmerston is *not* Foreign minister.

Heretofore interfering in the affairs of a Foreign state was considered a heinous crime by Englishmen; men took credit to themselves for denouncing it, just as they would for bribery or corruption. Now one party after the other has fallen into it, practise it with parade on every occasion in matters the most diverse, on fields the most remote.

To allege good intention is what every criminal will do, if he can, in mitigation of his sentence. This is the *reason* which the British government alone has to offer for its acts!

Sir R. Peel, on the 8th of February, gave credit to Lord Auckland for being moved (in acts, which have brought the loss of 15,000 British lives, and have

* The capital punishment of relapsed apostates has always been considered by the Eastern Christians as the *protection* of the *Christian* faith.

been judged by Sir R. Peel to have been both disadvantageous and unjust) "by the purest motives." On the 14th of March, he "called upon the House to believe that in the instructions which they had sent to Greece, they (the Government) had been influenced by the purest motives." On the 7th of March, Sir R. Peel, in replying to the charges of partizanship of our officers between Monte Video and Buenos Ayres, said, "If they have stepped beyond the strict line of their instructions, they have been influenced by the best of motives."

When Sir R. Peel will have descended to the grave, what sentence of his will survive to future generations? Throughout the dreary mass of his mispent speech, what passage can be found that shall be quoted, beside the words that have been handed down to us from the men who have restored the affairs of nations?

Yet this is the leader as well as the sample of the age. Is there not one amongst the leading men of England who will *withdraw for a time from its idle occupations* to qualify himself for performing to his country the service of saving it?

VIII.—APPEAL TO THE COUNTRY.

To the statement that the use of Parliament, and purpose of a Crown, were alike frustrated by the usurpations of the House of Commons.* The following objection has been urged by a leading politician :—

“Though the ministers of state have to be appointed by the crown from the majority, still, if the king or queen approves not of those ministers, the crown has the power of dissolving the parliament, and *appealing to the nation*; and this is the proper constitutional practice. It would never do for the crown to have the power of imposing *its* ministers upon the nation against its will; but by its power of dissolving the parliament, the crown can take the sense of the nation.”

If the king is invested with the prerogative of executing the law, the parliament is invested with the high function of calling to account and punishing his servants who offend. This is the simplest scheme of government ever devised, and is also the law of England. If you have the House of Commons imposing *its* ministers on the Crown, you have no longer a Crown; if the House of Commons has its ministers it is itself no longer a check upon the Crown: if this be done by a faction or a majority, why then you have no longer a House of Commons.

* In reference to an article entitled “Cabinet and Parliamentary Government,” *Portfolio* (new series) Vol. III, page 581.

It is admitted that the real function of the crown is the appointing of the ministers, but it is averred that these functions are limited *in practice*. Here is a manifest contradiction. As well might it be said, it is and it is not the duty of the crown to appoint its ministers. "*Appeal to the country!*" A century and a half ago there was still a country as there was a crown; there is now no country—there are only the factions. The word therefore has no longer a meaning. The crown formerly, if overridden by faction, might have appealed to the country—it could not do so now even were there a country. To appeal to the electors against ministers imposed by the majority of the elected, is to appeal from the majority to the minority. The country's intervention can appear only in changing one majority into another, and imposing upon the crown another set of ministers; and this imaginary appeal is said to be a "constitutional PRACTICE!" Either it is the right of the crown to appoint its ministers, or it is not. If it is its right, it is its duty.

"It would never do for the crown to have the power of imposing its ministers upon the nation."—But it had just been admitted, that the very function of the crown was to appoint the ministers. Why would it never do for the crown to appoint them? What has the nation to do with the persons who fill high offices, any more than with the person who fills the highest office? What the nation has to do with, is *their acts*; and it is precisely because the nation has lost control over these, that their persons have become a matter of importance. "The crown can take the sense of the nation!" Let us see how. A set of ministers are *imposed* upon the crown; they have, therefore, the majority in the House, and, ~

course, for the time being in the nation. The Queen henceforward can only act through them; and it is through those very ministers that she is to take against them the sense of the nation, in which they have the majority—or, in this case of the cotemporary shifting of parties in the country, still retaining the majority in the House, which they are to dissolve because favourable to themselves! This is the doctrine of the constitution, as laid down by a practical politician and a gifted man. Such is the result of attempting to find reasons in accordance with the constitution for a practice subversive of it—a practice which would ruin inevitably any private concern into which it was introduced. It is, in plain language, converting the body that is to control into the body that is to act; making the officer that is to act, lend his sanction to the act which he does not perform.

There was, however, one occasion on which a Queen did appeal to the country. The successes of the war under Anne, and the ambition and designs of Marlborough, had to a degree unknown at any previous period rendered the cabinets independent of Queen and Parliament, and they combined to exclude their opponents from the Council. Having great popularity, and having allied themselves with foreign powers and statesmen, the Queen found herself as it were in their hands, and the cabal of two reigns before was revived in an opposite sense—no longer to serve but to enslave the monarch. The Queen did make an effort: she dismissed the ministry, and appealed to the country, but she dismissed the ministry first. “The Queen,” says Smollett, “was greatly applauded for thus asserting her just Prerogative, and setting herself free from the arbitrary cabal by which

she had been so long kept in dependence. The Duke of Beaufort went to the Court on this occasion, and told her Majesty that he was extremely glad that he could now salute her *Queen indeed*." What was the consequence? The Queen having got rid of the faction *as a party*, fell into the hands of another. From that hour to the present the notions of every man in England have been entirely the reverse of what, down to that period, they ever had been. Up to that period our forefathers held the chief of a department responsible for his department, and would have considered government by a club acting in concert, to keep or resign their places together, and supported by a faction without, an "insolence to the crown," as said Bolingbroke, and an "intollerable tyranny over the people," as said Ralph.

In 1711 the Parliament offered advice to the crown in respect to the Spanish succession. Several peers signed a protest against this address, as an infringement of the royal prerogative. They meant that the Queen, in the exercise of her Prerogative, having to act through persons responsible to Parliament, the advice offered would diminish the responsibility of those individuals, and stay the hand of Parliament from subsequent proceedings, and to this end wished to take care, in the words of Sir R. Walpole, "that the ministry's war did not become the parliament's war." But if the Parliament appoints the ministers, it undertakes the management of those concerns. No! it knows nothing about them. While negotiations are pending it is warned off by the royal prerogative, so that the majority which nominates them instantly loses all control over them.

Formerly there was danger to the minister *after he fell*; but in process of time an interest of *cabir*

sprang up and even that chance was lost : now the maxim is, that the existing government is not to "*lend its weight* to crush its predecessors."*

Permanency is generally considered an attribute of excellence ; here that which is permanent is evil. It is the permanency of continuous destructions. Each party when acquiring the occasion of conferring the greatest benefits on their country, and securing authority and command for themselves, are able to use that station only in such a manner as to make themselves contemptible, and so raise the character of their predecessors. Thus is party and faction not a state of enmity but of mutual understanding, the knowledge of which is restricted to the higher sphere, whilst the vulgar of faction are made to wage fierce war the one on the other. From this has resulted an anomalous condition, of which some future historian may make the discovery, and it is this, that the permanency of the system depends upon the shifting of the men. Periodically the nation becomes disgusted and indignant—it will endure it no longer—it changes the men. The unendurable measures are endured under the new names, and this results from the wonderful delusion in the minds of all that there is yet a country to appeal to.

We hold the maxim, that the king can do no wrong ; but does a king do no wrong in abdicating the use of his power ?† What greater wrong can he do ? and does not the epithet of treasonable apply to the mal-practices by which men shall contrive to *prevent* the king from doing what he ought to do—the appointing of fit and proper persons to be his

* Sir R. Peel in the debate on enquiry into the Affghan war.

† The power of the crown revives the moment the wearer knows its use.

servants? Persons cannot be fit and proper if they are favourites and partizans of the sovereign himself; and how much more of a faction or a mob!

The first step in decline was neglect of parliament to do its duty, in preventing wrong, and impeaching ministers for crimes. The result was, despite their own maxim, that the king could do no wrong, that they uncrowned, beheaded, and expelled *kings*. A king can do no wrong! yet you punish him, and change after change of man or dynasty follow—rebellion against kingship—restoration of kingship—revolution. Articles of impeachment are exhibited against the king for deeds declared "*illegal*," none of which the king could have done himself, which he did through ministers, and for which they were not held to answer. The king is expelled—the ministers remain *in office*!

After the revolution, the government was conducted by selecting from each party the leading men. This man was said "to undertake" for the Whigs—that man, "to undertake" for the Tories. A majority in the House was ever ready to rise upon the ministry, censure their measures, inquire into their acts, thwart their objects, and yet never thought of displacing them as a body: one might be taken into custody, another sent to the Tower, another impeached, another voted an enemy to the state because of the advice he had given to the crown. They were, in fact, dealt with in an individual not a corporate sense. But as party became intense, then did each come to preponderate *alternately*. For a time government poised itself between them—at last government was usurped by party. Parliament supersedes crown—majority supersedes parliament—party supersedes majority. The several parties are then superseded by

the mutual understandings of the clubs, so that each club, in the alternations of power, secures the monopoly of place for its individual members.

So old as Henry III the debate was, whether the king or the parliament should name the chief officers of state; but, then, the object was to prevent mere favourites and partizans from being placed in stations of dignity and trust. In those times all men were as alert respecting the misconduct of a minister as they are now in respect to that of a private man.* Now, the circle has completed the round; for it is no longer the favourites of the monarch whom the parliament rejects; it is the favourites of the faction who are imposed on the monarch. The favourites of a monarch, parliament could hold to account, and bring to justice; the favourites of the parliament—styled *confidential* servants of the crown—are invested with “responsibility” that is they may break the law, dispense with it, or make laws to legalize misdeeds.

Yet this omnipotent assembly, and the super-omnipotent majority therein, are not allowed to have their own way! Parliament does not rule, it is the

* “Each member of Parliament was the king’s ‘servant,’ the king’s ‘Minister,’ the king’s ‘responsible adviser.’ The fiction of a Cabinet was then unknown. When all Parliament men and king’s executive officers were alike servants of the Crown, no prejudice of caste, no interests of party intervened to screen such as were guilty or incapable from the pursuit of the rest. Ministers themselves were often the first to grant redress against the acts of their fellows. In the reign of King Henry III, the Lord Protector Pembroke is recorded to have given relief, as prayed, to one aggrieved by his Highness’s own colleague, the Justiciary of England. In criminal cases, recourse was had to the formidable method of impeachment before the Council itself or its Committee. *It was generally sufficient if the presentment were made upon the oaths of ‘twelve men,’* as in cases of caner delinquency.”—*Anstey’s Const. of England.*

very slave of the two clubs of leaders.* In a grave matter they must not have their own way, because it is important, nor in a trifling matter, because it is insignificant. Men sent to represent, not grievances but opinions—an assemblage conducting public affairs, not because they concur, but because they disagree—such is the House of Commons, appointed to redress grievances, become, of all grievances ever conceived or endured, itself the greatest. This assemblage, which neither represents the country nor controls the government, disposes of the one to the other, and then declares itself—omnipotent! They have such omnipotence as felons have, except that thereto is added impunity.

This may be beneficial to a few; but even to those to whom it is so, it would be abhorrent, if their own right reason could prevail; to the rest of the nation, it can prove no benefit or advantage whatever, deleterious to the public, it is so to individual interests. Let us cease to speak of loyalty, or let us restore to our sovereign her freedom, and her power, in order that she too may be able to speak what is true and do what is right.

* "The English people imagines that it is free, but it is much mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of Parliament: as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved, it is nothing."—*Rousseau*.

IX.—STANDARD OF VALUE.*

"The country is exposed to perpetual oscillation between hollow prosperity and real calamity, whereby uncertainty is introduced into the value of all property, and a spirit of gambling and fraudulent speculation into the ordinary transactions of domestic life."
—*Sir James Graham.*

THE accession of George III divides political discussion into two parts which present the most striking contrast to each other. The first offers practical and immediate remedies for known grievances—the second speculative remedies for sufferings. Suffering, which is not the result of wrong, it is not the province of political institutions to avert, or of politicians to deal with: wrong is to be remedied only in its causes. When wrongs have been suffered blindly, it is not to be expected that they can be remedied intelligently: then the remedy becomes the worst part of the disease. Such is our condition in respect to the money of the realm.

In the Pentateuch a curse is pronounced against the man who changes the weights and measures. In the present day, the laws of exchange are based upon a constant alteration of weights and measures.

The value of gold is to be measured by itself; how can any substance be the measure of its own worth—in other things? the worth of gold is to be es-

* In the design of these Essays, the present was to have followed one on THE CREDIT SYSTEM, tracing the process of the accumulation of debt from 1688 to the fallacy contained in that term. That Essay has so extended from its historical nature as to have become available for its original purpose.

tablished by its own *weight*, under a false denomination of that weight—and an *ounce* is to be worth so many “*pounds*” and fractions of pounds. This is—falsifying a *measure*, not establishing a *standard* !

The gold money that circulates in England amounts to but a tenth part of the paper money that circulates with it, and both constitute but a small portion of the aggregate wealth and obligations of the community and of individuals. This mass is subjected to change by every change in this fictitious standard.

The worth of gold, like that of any other commodity, depends on the quantity on hand—make it depend on the amount of paper in circulation, which paper is to be regulated by it !

If I give a man a piece of coin in lieu of something else, it is barter. If I give him a note of hand, or if he trusts me without it, it is credit. All the reasoning in the world will make nothing more of commerce. All that philosophers ever talked or wrote, could not disturb a single transaction of the value of a groat between the humblest artizans, it is another thing when idle speech is transformed into legislation. “A standard of value” as a proposition is an absurdity, but when parliament decides that you shall not measure this commodity by that commodity, according to your wants, or those of others, but by a curious plan of its own “for regulating the Bank issues,” “preventing fluctuations,” and “protecting the nation against the drain of Foreign Exchange,”—then is it colossal robbery.

Gold and silver are the commodities that most fluctuate in value. No others have to the same extent varied in quantity or worth ; there having been in one age no less than twenty times as much of them as at another age, and the difference of their

exchangeable value against other produces, being no less at one period than sixteen times what it has been at another. If the quantity of goods in a country augment, the money remaining the same, the latter will increase in value, and *vice versa* : in other words, prices are high or low, in proportion to the quantity of the money in circulation. *If there were no laws regulating the standard of value, these differences would matter nothing* ; for one half or one quarter, or one-twentieth part of the existing coin would as efficiently perform the service ; but when you have fixed a standard of value and have reduced to it taxes, rents, bonds, then every fluctuation of the value of gold on every contraction or extension of the paper in circulation, convulses society. When paper, from sign of trust between man and man, becomes money by government authority, then is it liable to be *increased* or *diminished* by a secret and irresponsible power, and becomes the most terrible of scourges ever devised by, or inflicted on man.

The consequences are too intricate for observation ; too mysterious for exposure : they may be compared to private robberies committed by or on each individual throughout the land. If there were equality in the number of the sufferers and balance of profit and loss, still would this be atrocious and inconceivable ; but what is it when millions are sacrificed for the benefit of tens, and the wealth so accumulated is smitten with barrenness ! It is a matter of congratulation rather than of regret, that hundreds of millions wrung from the sweat of pauper-branded brows have been sunk in foreign loans and projects.

Before the general coinage of Henry the Seventh, the seniorage and the laws affecting circulation made

the money-changers exceedingly averse to the use of English coin, and the excess of exports over imports (three-fourths, or sometimes four-fifths) was paid for in foreign coin or bullion, so that there was to be found in common traffic in England, every denomination of foreign coin from those of Byzantium to those of Lisbon; gold and silver circulated also by tale and in grain, and it required great experience in the detecting of coins and in the assaying and weighing of metals to traffic therein: this was the trade of the goldsmiths and Jews, exercised under severe penalties. There was no subject of deeper importance to the public, and several Parliaments were assembled in consequence of the general suffering from counterfeit money, after many failures at last the cure was found and it was A STANDARD OF METAL. The British coin was now the most pure in Europe, and our coinage was the model for other states. The "currency" was brought to the most perfect state that it was possible to imagine; gold and silver coin wanted for the purposes of commerce was reduced to a known quality and quantity as signified by the mark it bore—further than this *no law*.

We pass down two centuries and a half, during which care has relaxed and abuse revived,* and we find England convulsed again with currency. We have not relapsed into our former errors, but have entered upon a new field: we are in chase of an "ideal standard." We now scout the touchstone and the

* Lord Liverpool mentions in his celebrated letter that the coinage had deteriorated in the time of William the Third 40 per cent., but he rates the value by the metal, leaving out of consideration the change in its worth by the influx from America. William's bill to restore the currency was analogous to Sir R. Peel's measure of 1819.

scales as childish things ; we call for law to make value *immutable* !

Value means what a thing is worth of *something else*—the worth of each shifting by the worth of all other things by it. The value of coin depends upon its scarcity, or its abundance. The worth of corn upon the land on which it is produced—the relative proportion of pasturage and tillage—the instruments of agriculture, manure and drainage—the internal arrangements of the farm by which the husbandman and the labourer are united or dissevered in interests—on the condition, moral and practical, of the labourer—the repose and tranquillity of the country—the amount of taxation—on the science employed in the abstraction of ores (iron or gold) from the bowels of the earth—but far more than all these, upon the mode of taxation. So, likewise, every other produce. There is no fixed rule nor rateable tides or ebbs for any one ; and if there were a rule or a thousand rules or fixed ebbs or tides, it would not depend on parliaments to control them. If, then, there is a quantity of corn to be exchanged for a quantity of copper, or of iron, it is upon the relative worth of each, known by each man upon the spot, and by each trader, and never inquired into as a philosophical question—that must depend the quantity of the one to be given against a certain quantity of the other.

“The difference in the price of commodities,” says Jacob, in his inquiry into the precious metals (vol. i, p. 163), “only really marks the fluctuations in the price of gold and silver.” There have been famines in cities filled with hoarded treasure. Corn has been worth more than its weight in gold. The fluctuation of one cannot rate the fluctuation of any other.

vertheless corn has been considered the most

steady meter of the prices of other objects: it is by corn that we ascertain the value of gold, not by gold that of corn. At the period of the fall of the Roman republic, and within the compass of a single life, the change of relative value, between gold and corn, was so great, that the measure of the latter which sold for 1*s.* 4*d.* of our money, cost £1. Corn had not become dear, but gold cheap. In striking the average of the price between the time of the discovery of the American mines and the beginning of this century, gold and silver have fallen in command over the necessaries of life in an equal proportion.*

“Much puzzling,” says Cobbett, “has arisen on this subject, from this, that the note always retained its *nominal* value, and always goes by the same name—a pound-note is still a pound-note, whether it be worth as much as it was or not, and this is called the *Standard of Value*.” The pound-note has no character belonging to a standard. Indeed it is exactly the reverse of a standard—for it is *the thing itself*. A thing fluctuating and a name permanent! In 1841 a pound was equal to a certain number of pounds of grain, and in 1843 it was equal to a different number of pounds of grain; it was consequently no longer the same pound—the change was not in

* The price of bread at Rome under Augustus, and in England at the beginning of this century, has been estimated equal to each other: this has been one ground for inferring equality in the quantity of the precious metals in circulation at the two periods; but the Excise in Rome not falling on consumption, the money value of bread would be much lower. It might be said that our dexterity in agriculture would compensate for the burden and the mode of our taxation. This is to be answered by reference to countries where agricultural methods as rude as those of Rome are employed, and where yet the price of corn is infinitely lower than it is in England, with all our improvements and means of transport.

the grain but in the pound. The harvest or the seasons influenced not the market, but changes in our laws regulating the taxes! In 1822 corn was worth 43*s.* the quarter; in 1820, 65*s.*; whence this difference? The amount of loan of the Bank to the Government. Some millions are lent to Government, and therefore so many more millions of paper are put in circulation; more money must be given for every thing, for money is cheapened; and this is called "Government *securities*." In the one case a tariff, in the other an operation merely of banking, which at the time no one knows of, changes every pound in every man's pocket; the value of every obligation, the amount of every tax: one man gets more than his due, another less than his right: the rich is made richer, the poor impoverished, and all this comes from what? From taking that which is liable to fluctuations from every cause and calling it Standard of Value; doing this, you are lost in a maze of idle words and a chaos of confused results, and thus the Parliament exercises its privilege of *making laws*. Formerly there was fluctuation in price, the result of circumstance; now there are convulsions in price, the result of legislation—the pretext being to keep prices steady! There is nothing great that is not natural; here the greatness of the measure depends upon its being so unnatural, that the sense of common men is overwhelmed, and the people are struck dumb and so led to slaughter.

And in what did the measure of 1819 originate? The pound-note circulated for 17*s.* It was proposed to make by law the pound-note equal to 20*s.* Had it been proposed to make it 10*s.* the immorality would have been as great, but the burdens of the state less by one half. The purpose was to double

those burdens, and it was accomplished, for the gold was increased in value by the new demand.* Could such things be done in the face of a people that had not been mystified by words?

Seeing that England, fighting for a phantom, has enacted against herself terrible laws which overpower the imagination by the enormity of the misery they bring, and the dark shadows of the consequences which they cast—what remains but to deal with her as one insane? The insanity is not in the brain, where it would be incurable, but in the tongue, where it is easy of cure when set about in the right way.†

When England becomes sane she will know that for tampering with coin the proper tribunal is the Old Bailey; it is too base a treason for the Tower! Then too she will know—that as guilty as the man who proposed such laws was, so was each man that assented to them,—and far more the Parliament who bargained for them,—bargained to suffer them as evils which they were conscious of, in exchange for the gratifying of hopes as criminal and as delusive.‡

You have taken as your standard of value two materials: the one, that which has undergone the greatest of all fluctuations; the other—*rags*, which you hold equal to gold, because “convertible,” and

* The proposers of the measure declared that the loss to the nation in debt, taxes, &c. would be only 3 per cent.; to ground this assertion, £7,000,000 sterling were poured into the market at the Mint price while the Committee was sitting.—See Sir J. Graham's *Corn and Currency*.”

† “Wealth! It were well if the ambiguities of this word had done no more than puzzle philosophers. One of them gave birth to the mercantile system.”—*Wheatley's Logic*, p. 232.

‡ See Sir James Graham's “*Corn and Currency*,” where is shown that the House of Commons in 1819, bartered the Corn Laws against the Currency Laws.

which you use *only* because it is not convertible: this you call the *sound principle* of a currency.

But Sir R. Peel has dug a second intrenchment behind the first in the citadel of fallacy. It is now no longer standard of value, but *ideal* standard. At least the debate (see correspondence with the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce and Mr. Ingleby's admirable letter) is now on the "IDEAL UNIT." To speak of an ideal standard is to assert that the standard in question is an *unreal* one.

Interwoven with the fallacy of "ideal unit" and "value standard," is now—who shall deny?—the very existence of England. Pauperism, hatred of class and class, class legislation, centralization of power, fictitious increase of public debt, danger of bank stoppage, fluctuations, foreign grain, panic, all spring from or depend on monetary laws, which could not exist if there were no discussion on those abstract points. There could be no such discussion if the nation could feel the senselessness of the terms *ideal*, *unit*, &c. The poor African may here help us, for he has an "ideal standard:" one real because *only* ideal.

This standard has a *name*, it is "BAR;"* originally derived from a bar of iron. They measure the iron by this standard in their minds—"a bar" is worth so many material bars, according to the changes of the market, of gold, or the pound of beads, or the dozen knives, or a sheep, or a slave. By this method changes in value are estimated whilst the operations of exchange are effected with the utmost ease. It is an Algebraic conversion of various values into one denomination, which not interfering with any one

* In different places there are different names—one is *Paceta*, from the Spanish.

material or produce, and used to rate only, is invariable, and stands as a mathematical rule in the mind.

Having ascertained that the *amount* of money affects all value and all possessions, it follows that if the gold or paper were diminished the property of every man would be changed ; he would receive more than his due, and pay more than his debt, and so the other way. Thus it is that the influx of precious metals by diminishing the nominal value of coin, has been considered so conducive to the emancipation of the people, the establishment of the rights and the extension of the enterprise and energies of Europe. It may be inferred, that a diminution of the precious metals would have the opposite effect ; and in that case, no matter of graver consideration can be presented, and no announcement of more alarming import made than this—that the precious metals are diminishing, and that during the last quarter of a century the order has been inverted, and yearly accumulation made way for a yearly loss.

At the time of the establishment of the Roman empire, the sudden liberation of gold from the treasures of various empires, augmented the amount of money in circulation, in the space of fifty years, in nearly the same proportion as in Europe by the discovery of the mines of America. The change in the former period produced little effect ; gold as it increased in abundance diminished in value, that was all. At the time of the discovery of America, the precious metals in Europe were reduced to less than one-tenth of their sum in the time of Augustus, say £35,000,000. Since that period the tide has set in, it has flowed for two centuries and a half, and the sum of precious metals amounted at the close of the

first quarter of this century to above £800,000,000.* Then the ebb commenced again, and though we know it not, we are carried down, and may at any instant be left stranded.†

The decline of the precious metals no more affected the Roman empire, than their increase had formerly done. Observe and mark the breakers that for you will soon raise their head from out the sinking tide—the Roman empire *had no debt*; the taxes were paid in *corn rents*, and by *local assessments in kind*; the obligations of man to man were equally so adjusted; the OUNCE of gold was not taken as a standard. THE MONEY WAS REDUCED IN PROPORTION AS THE METAL BECAME DEAR. Suppose the Roman empire had been overwhelmed with a debt to be paid in a certain weight of gold—would it have required the aid of our ancestors to overthrow Rome? Suppose monetary laws had taken money itself as the standard of itself, and so fixed all contracts between man and man, all assessments, and all rents—would it then have been left to England and the nineteenth century to reveal the phenomenon of pauperism? From Augustus, striking the average between the two empires, Rome was for 700 years exposed to this progressive diminution of the precious metals; what, then, under our supposition, was not effected in one year, one generation, or one century, would be so in the next: expedient after expedient would be exhausted, the chain broken to-day, the burden cast off, would be the one reformed, the other reladen on the morrow;

* These treasuries were themselves the mines of Rome, Macedon, Egypt, France (Thoulouse alone yielded nearly £10,000,000), to say nothing of the derivative wealth from Spain and from the East, through the conquests of Carthage and Alexander.

† The recent discovery of the new supplies of gold has averted practically this contingency.—*Ed.*

and if the delusion of "standard of value" continued to endure—facts pass, delusion endures—the fall of the Roman empire, whenever it did fall, would have been to succeeding ages an example of the effects of the "ideal unit," and of the "*Standard of Value*!"

This is the picture of what is coming for England—not for England alone—but for Europe. This will come if there were no cabinet at St. Petersburg, and not come the less surely or the more slowly because there is one.

The tide of metallic wealth now flows rapidly in the wrong direction, and the amount of the inverted ratio, as compared with its advance in the previous century, is between five and six millions sterling yearly. That advance had enabled us to bear up against the burden of taxation and the novelty of debt. Now the converse is before us: time, the alleviator and the remedier, has become the oppressor and the tyrant.

When there were former tamperings with the currency, that is, deterioration of the metal, it *was* a grievance, and there was redress, and if the King saw not to it the Parliament did—now it is not grievance, *and* the Parliament's doing. We are slaves, and of a novel breed. Other slaves suffer, because they cannot get redress—we, with a splendid army and fleet, because we do not think of it. Other slaves have tyrants over them—we, uniting the extremes of wealth and misery, find neither power in the one nor courage in the other. We do the work of inquisitor and victim, and furnish ingenuity and flesh. The tongue has done it all. The roar brings forth the monster. At the close of the seventeenth century, the word CREDIT SYSTEM brought forth *public debt*. At the beginning of the nineteenth,

STANDARD OF VALUE stalked forth, and behind him come the realities he engenders—*Panic—Monetary Crisis—Bankruptcy—and Revolution.**

* A pamphlet, "Parliamentary Usurpations in respect to Money," published in June, 1849, when the monetary crisis seemed to have abated, predicted its subsequent intensity, and indicated those means of averting ruin afterwards adopted in the suspension of the Bill of 1844.

X.—SUBDIVISION OF LABOUR.

THIS expression does not convey a fallacy, it insinuates a falsehood. As an expression it is whimsical and silly enough, for we should have to commence with *division*; and the sense implied is not a division of toil, but a union of crafts. However, let that pass. The faultiest language is always good enough for those who can use it. Let us come to the implication.

The Subdivision of Labour is the great boast of civilization: the completion of progress of mechanics—its sign in political science. Its merit consists in cheapness, and in that merit we have the grounds and reason for the assembling of the population in factories, and for the creating of a distinction between commercial and agricultural interests.

I was once the studious and humble disciple of Adam Smith. His work was my companion in travelling in the East, and I sought in it the light by which to read the circumstances around. After a period of struggle, I discovered that those circumstances afforded the light by which to see through the darkness of Adam Smith. This however was at the time scarcely more than a guess. The East and the West were different worlds, and perhaps Political Economy only belonged to Civilization. I returned to the West, and then discovered that political economy did indeed belong to

civilization, being the nomenclature and classification of the social diseases it has itself produced.

In the Highlands of Scotland domestic manufacture is still a practice, and it is easy to compare by merely crossing a rivulet, the condition of two cottages in all other respects similarly situated: in the one of which the spinning-wheel is at work, and in the other of which the clothing is supplied by the slop-shop. In the one you have industry, sobriety, practical intelligence, the love of domesticity and well-being. In the other you have the reverse. The difference in mere money value will be about eight pounds a year. So much for the cheapness obtained by subdivision of labour. "It is not" said a Highland woman to me once, speaking of a neighbour, "that it is cheaper to go to the shop, but they are idle."

When a household makes for itself the labour costs nothing, for it is taken up at spare moments, and there is no household in which, if the habit existed, time could not be found for doing all its own work. But that habit can be maintained only by vigilance. Human nature is very prone to vice, and idleness is the parent of them all. When then the philosopher comes with a specious theory encouraging this vice, the habit of industry is exposed to very serious hazard: when in addition to these seductive phrases, fashions are introduced, and when the nobles and leaders sever themselves from intercourse with their people, frequent the capital and buy everything in shops—taste, attachments, and self-respect stand in equal jeopardy with the habits of industry. This is the history of England and of civilization.

The unit of the nation is not the man, but the

family. The independence of the nation can reside only in the independence of the units—that independence consists in the use of its own hand. Civilization draws everything to the town, and makes each family dependant on the *factory*: to that den is not transferred that sanctification of the household by its easy tasks and varied occupations, which has now departed. In addition to all the rest, you divide the people into two hostile camps of clownish boors and emasculated dwarfs. Good heavens! a nation divided into agricultural and commercial interests calling itself sane—nay styling itself enlightened and civilized, not only in spite of, but in consequence of this monstrous and unnatural division!

To subdivide a man is to execute him, if he deserves the sentence, to assassinate him if he does not.—The subdivision of labour is the assassination of a people.

The following observations on the same subject are extracted from “The Pillars of Hercules:”—

“The comparison between home-made and shop-purchased goods cannot be instituted where the habit has been extinguished; the implements and the dexterity are wanting, and new habits have arisen, adjusted to the articles and stuffs that have been introduced. In the highlands however the old habits subsist, and a family clothed by its own home work, saves one-third. Of course, no cotton will be used when clothing will be home-bred wool and home-grown flax.

“The change in this respect is generally deplored; but it is considered as inevitable, no hand-labour being able to stand against machinery. Home-

spinning *costs nothing*. Twenty pounds of wool converted unobtrusively into the yearly clothing of a labourer's family by its own industry in the intervals of other work. This makes no show; but bring it to market, send it to the factory, thence to the broker, thence to the dealer, and you will have great commercial operations, and nominal capital engaged to the amount of twenty times its value. The cloth so returned not half as durable, costs the labourer twice as much as it would have cost him in money, had he paid for spinning, weaving, &c. The working class is thus amerced to support a wretched factory population, a parasitical shop-keeping class, and a fictitious commercial, monetary and financial system. The landlord, for his share, pays five shillings per acre poor's-rates. This is the result not of "cheapness," but of delusion. The people of England were better clothed, and fed than at present, when there were no commerce and no factories. At this moment after exhausting human ingenuity, they are returning to domestic labour, as a means of remedying the evils of Ireland!

"Hallam has admitted that in those times which we look back on with pity, the labourer received twice as much as at present for his labour. This is a terrible blow and a fearful avowal. Mr. Macaulay, on the contrary, sees nothing but progress, hears of nothing but decay"—He must have transposed the two senses, or carefully selected the spots for indulging in their use; if indeed by progress he means approach towards a fair remuneration for labour, and by decay a falling away from just judgment in important concerns—or is it his purpose to cover Hallam's indiscretion?—"They say that in former times the people were better off. The time will come that they will say the same of this. If we be in a state of progress, those who speak thus must be very foolish, and if the proposition deserved notice, it required reputation."

"But the Arab woman asked 'are your women happier than we?' The European lady would be shocked at the very possibility of comparison. She shrinks from domestic occupation, yet is she not able to expel nature, so as to despise Nausicaa and Naomi. We cannot refuse to bow before the shades of the heroic or patriarchal times—our nature acknowledges Abraham or Aleinous. Yet if our condition be that of refinement, how contemptible must be Fanaquil and her distaff, Penelope and her loom?

"An English lady who had the means of comparison, has not hesitated to assert that between an Eastern and a European household, the balance of happiness leans to the side of the former; and in the Eastern household it is certainly the women who have the larger share—who are the idols, and who possess authority such as belongs not to our courts, and affections on the part of those under their sway which belong not even to our dreams. The most touching words of the wisest of men are the description of the mistress of a household. It is an Arab woman he describes.

"Julia could work for her husband because there was then a noble and an antique costume. An empress, she could summon about her handmaidens, because there was a formula of ceremony which enabled all ranks to associate without derogation or familiarity. Then there was the hall to assemble in. 'The plant' still stood in every house. Because all this is gone, are we not to count the loss? If we cannot restore let us not mistake. If we cannot return let us not hurry on in the wrong direction. It is something to know whither we are going when the speed is the result of our own will.

"Nations are not changed by time or accident; they change themselves. Progress of society—march of intellect! good heavens! we can utter such trash and call ourselves reasonable beings: as well speak of the justice of a steam-engine or the virtue of a rocket. What need to examine their state;—their words

suffice. When the phrases have gone mad, what can be in order?

"It is something in the midst of Empires crumbling to the earth and civilization gasping for breath and struggling with itself for life, to point to the permanency of single tribes who have never reasoned, but who have simple habits ; and to be able to say to the wildly-frantic or to the meekly-deluded Christians, 'ye are incorrigible.'

"The plough, the yoke were 'the invention of gods and the occupation of heroes;' are the loom, the spindle, and distaff of less noble parentage? You sever the distaff and the plough, the spindle and the yoke, and you get factories and poor-houses, credit and panics—two hostile nations, agricultural and commercial. Poetry becomes politics, patriotism faction ; and a light-hearted and contented people rusts into clowns and sharpens into knaves."

XI.—DISCIPLINE.

WE have transferred a term connected with the tutoring of ingenuous youth to the instruction given by a drill-serjeant to recruits. There is no ambiguity in this appropriation, and therefore there is no harm, except the harm that belongs to two names for the same thing, which renders every position perilous. Supposing we had been content with a pure military term, such as "drill," it would have remained for all times fixed to its special use and available for nothing else; the manner of shouldering a musket, dressing a rank, or wheeling a platoon, could never have disturbed the conscience or apprehension of any individual, civil or military. In a word, it could not have facilitated the issuing of an unlawful order by bamboozling those to whom it was issued. A man, by enlistment, is not freed from any law, he only has a new one imposed upon him; he is still the servant of the civil law, in addition to which he is the servant of the military law. In regard to the action of troops within the realm, these landmarks are respected: any soldier receiving an order which is unlawful, as for instance, to fire on a mob, he himself not being attacked, and the riot act not being read, knows full well that he will be hanged if he obeys; therefore no such order is ever given.

In regard to foreigners, the landmarks have been swept away. Between nations the riot act is the

declaration of war; that form constitutes the state of war; without it, the soldier who draws a weapon is legally in the same predicament as he would be in the case above put at home. He is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court, and the facts being proved, the judge would call on him to show cause why sentence of death should not be passed upon him. The order of his officers would be no "cause,"—the only protection being the declaration of war, not in this case forthcoming. Every man employed in Afghanistan, in China, in Syria, in Spain, is liable to this process, being, in fact, a pirate.

Now, supposing that we had no such word as "discipline," the justification—"It is not for soldiers to reason," would not hold. People could not say "this is a matter of drill, and a soldier must obey." Every one would see that drill was one thing, and the nature of an order another; "discipline" being hazy and uncertain, those who admit these so-called wars to have been bad, hold the hands by which they have been perpetrated to be blameless.

On the immorality so engendered it is superfluous to dwell, but look on the danger that is incurred. The soldier ceasing to distinguish between a lawful and an unlawful order, unlawful orders are given by the officer without a moment's reflection, and unlawful measures are with equal facility adopted by the minister. No prior consent of the nation is required; no after penalties follow; no impediment stands in the way of execution. The minister can, and does at every moment, exercise a power of threatening foreign states, which renders him a despot as regards each weaker power. The stronger and abler powers have now the deepest inducement

to gain an ascendancy over his mind or will. It is this which gives such terrible efficiency to diplomacy, and all from the use of a term classical and candid.

THE DUKE OF YORK ON UNLAWFUL ORDERS.

At the table of the Commander-in-Chief not many years since a young Officer entered into a dispute with Lieutenant Colonel — upon the point to which Military Obedience ought to be carried. ‘If the Commander in Chief,’ said the young officer, like a second Seid, ‘should command me to do a thing which I knew to be civilly illegal, I should not scruple to obey him, and consider myself as relieved from all responsibility, by the commands of my Military Superior.’— ‘So would not I,’ returned the gallant and intelligent Officer, who maintained the opposite side of the question; ‘I should rather prefer the risk of being shot for disobedience, by my Commanding Officer, than hanged for transgressing the laws, and violating the liberties of my country.’ ‘You have answered like yourself,’ said his Royal Highness, whose attention had been attracted by the vivacity of the debate, ‘and the Officer would deserve both to be shot and hanged that should act otherwise. I trust all British Officers would be as unwilling to execute an illegal command, as I trust the Commander-in-Chief would be incapable of issuing one.’— *Sir Walter Scott’s Memoir of the Duke of York in the Edinburgh Weekly Journal.*

LAWFUL ORDERS IN ROME.

Numa instituted several sacred orders. The Feciales, who were like the Irenophylakes or guardians of the peace among the Greeks, had, I believe, a name expressive of their

office, for they were to act and mediate between the two parties, to decide their differences by reason. The Greeks called such a peace Irene, as puts an end to strife not by mutual violence, but in a rational way. In like manner the Feciales, or heralds, were often despatched to such nations as had injured the Romans, to persuade them to entertain more equitable sentiments; if they rejected their application they called the gods to witness, with imprecations against themselves and their country, if their cause was not just, and so they declared war. But if the Feciales refused their sanction, it *was not lawful for any Roman soldier*, nor even for the king himself to begin hostilities. War was to commence with their approbation, as the proper judges whether it was just, and the supreme magistrate was to deliberate concerning the proper means of carrying it on. The great misfortunes which befel the city from the Gauls, proceeded from the violation of these sacred rites. For when those barbarians were besieging Clusium, Fabius Ambustus was sent ambassador to their camp with proposals of peace in favour of the besieged, but receiving a harsh answer, he thought himself released from his character of ambassador, and rashly taking up arms for the Clusians, challenged the bravest man in the Gaulish army. He proved victorious, indeed, in the combat, for he killed his adversary and carried off his spoils; but the Gauls having discovered who he was, sent a herald to Rome accusing Fabius of bearing arms against them, contrary to treaties and good faith, and without a declaration of war. Upon this the Feciales *exhorted the senate to deliver him up to the Gauls*, but he applied to the people, and being *a favourite* with them, was screened from the sentence. Soon after this the Gauls marched to Rome, and sacked the whole city except the Capitol.—*Plutarch*.

XII.—KNOWLEDGE—WISDOM.

“It is not fleets and armies, it is not wealth and possessions, that constitute the strength of states, but it is watchfulness.” Thus spoke the greatest of patriots, and the first of orators. At a period but little removed from national extinction, this statesman had to labour to destroy in his countrymen, *confidence in wealth, strength, and dominion*; and to combat their minds’ pride of intellectual endowments. The necessity and the fruitlessness of the warning were proved by the consequences. A state, proud of wealth, and possessed of greatness, sunk in decay; men, pre-eminent for every intellectual endowment, were unable to avert or even to perceive it! These are the lessons taught the boys, and forgotten by the men of Europe.

In England, at the present day, there is a sedate and sneering confidence derived from the possession of wealth, which closes the mind to care; we do not conceive it possible that scientific acquirements can coincide with national decay, or classical attainments with corruption. Yet it would seem to require but a moment’s reflection to perceive that the mental processes required for science are distinct from those which are necessary to detect error in thought, on which depends that judgment which makes men upright and nations long-lived.

In science we proceed from experimental data: we add or subtract quantities ascertained; the

results remain in hand positive and tangible ; further, we test our work by the results obtained by other methods. The results in themselves stand distinct from the mental faculties involved in the process ; high attainments in the one, and useful consequences in the other, who can gainsay or despise ? But mathematical acquirements are not all that are requisite to form a man or to constitute a state, and the wealth and power which may be the result of their application is not a defence for the community, but rather is an increase of danger, if there be deficiency in the sense necessary for its proper use or its absolute protection.

In moral or political science, it is a process of a very different order that is called into action. Here we start from no ascertained data, and we obtain no tangible results. The useful process in morals would be the detecting and rejecting of false quantities included in our words, and woven into the very language which we speak. Wherever there has been a man capable of grappling with ruin, *he has found his enemy in the loss of the true value of words.*

The habit of thought of a mathematician, brought to bear on politics and morals, gives us this result, that he proceeds from error as data, for he begins with words, and then fights with these false mplements with all the logical sternness of men who are certain in their process, because certain in their data. In individual cases we do not fall into the error of supposing that knowledge of one kind serves for another purpose. No statesman would think of employing an astronomer or an abstract calculator in the negotiation of a treaty, or in the settlement of a question of national right and law, and yet the results and the habits of thought of the mathem-

tician are conceived to be a protection to the whole state. Knowledge, therefore, does not necessarily coincide with clear and defined judgment, which is wisdom, unity, patriotic zeal and affections. Of these we see few indications to-day, and yet science abounds. Every man is instructed, in a degree unheard of at any previous time in any country, or in this, in literary and scientific attainments; yet every man is at war with his neighbour.

XIII.—CONSERVATIVE AND REFORMER.

“Whig” and “Tory” were two good, rough, serviceable words: they were, in fact, names and names at least so far honestly acquired, that they were not assumed by the parties but given to them by their antagonists.*

The titles we have substituted for them are not names, but qualifications. Each has assumed it for itself, to convey an insinuation: the value of each consists in being false. Had the implication been correct, the names would not have been invented: the merit of art which they display lies in this, that the so-called Reformers have reformed nothing, and the so-called Conservatives have preserved nothing.

The change, however, could not have been effected, unless the parties had been sick of themselves and ashamed of their name. It is a pity that they cannot proceed a step further and be ashamed of any name. Every name implying the adoption of a borrowed opinion, reveals in each individual who assumes it the

* Whig, or Whaig, is the Scotch for Whey, which became a sobriquet of drovers, and a representative of bandits. It was first applied as a nick-name to those who attempted to resist the oppressions practised against Scotland.

Tory came from “*toory*,” in Irish “give me,” and, like the “*perdioses*” of Spain, was applied to beggars and then to outlaws. It became the sobriquet of those who resisted the oppressions of Ireland.

In both cases the contemptuous appellation was accepted with pride by those to whom it was applied: in both cases it represented in the origin justice and integrity.

absence of character, originality, thought,—in a word of self.

The other terms with which we have been dealing, have the fine intricacy of an organic disease which it requires the microscope to detect, the artist's pencil to pourtray, and pathological science to investigate. These are gross and vulgar daubs, fitted only to illustrate a hustings' cry.

XIV.—REPRESENTATIVE AND CONSTITUENT.

“Represent” and “Constitute” are old and good terms, only the meaning is changed.

“To present” and “presentment” were equivalent to “verdict.” The popular courts presented the grievances of the people: these being reproduced or represented in Paliament, the Knights of Shires and Burgesses were the representatives of those grievances.

The bodies in making these presentments commenced “constitutum est.” The French have still preserved the word “constaté” or established by evidence. That which was constituted was the grievance, and those who represented it were the elected of the Shires and Boroughs.

To-day, the elected represent opinions, and constituents are the voters for such representatives.

In these lines are traced the picture of England as it was, and as it is.

XV.—HAPPINESS.

THIS term may appear to have little connection with politics, but after all, is it not the end we look to in all that we do? Is it not at once the sign of success in government and the source of tranquility and stability of constitution? The formula of the greatest of formulists is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." If all our terms have proved ambiguous and deceptive, shall we expect this one to be clear and precise?

Happiness is like the rest, not the sign of a distinct idea, but a producer of indistinct ideas. It is the foundation of the different systems of philosophy, at war as to the sources of that happiness, which is but the expression of feelings varying in every man, constant in no man, and shifting from age to age alike in the mass and in the unit.

We have here the advantage of dealing with a native term; it comes from "hap" or "happen," means chance and implies luck. It is no other than good fortune, only that being made abstract, it is the state of good fortune or good fortuneship. In French it is "bonheur;" in German (glückheit) pure "luck;" in Greek the word may be rendered "happy influence" (good dæmon); in Latin the word if not primitive is at least insoluble to us, but the application is always made in the sense of good fortune.

In the original, therefore, the name had reference to external circumstances and not to internal affections. As in other instances we have displaced what

we had to observe, substituting for it the condition of our own minds. There was in its primitive sense no idea beyond that of the thing which had happened to us, and there was therefore no philosophico-egotistical discussion.

It is this class of words which Socrates has most elaborately and beautifully dissected, showing the necessity of reversing the order of abstraction and of distributing them back again upon their objects.

Happiness taken in the sense of enjoyment, can be no more seized and examined than the rainbow. No man knows his own enjoyment, because he has no means of rating it against that of another. Though his speech is absolute, his meaning is relative, comparing his feelings at one period and another, or as excited by this object and by that. This does not prevent him from dogmatizing to the extent of rating political institutions, by what he gratuitously imagines, would or would not be his own happiness, under circumstances with which he is not acquainted.

One, and perhaps the most grievous, effect is, the extinguishing of our chief means of correction and instruction—the knowledge of our own past history. We think of it in reference to social manners, and deciding in the manner above stated, the condemnation is transferred to the whole.

When we look back we are always struck with formality, which to our habits, and consequently to our feelings, is a sign of unhappiness. From the knowledge of parallel societies, I can state that habits of politeness produce happiness, as compared with societies in which forms are disregarded. Seeing on both sides of the curtain, I assert the English people to be the most unhappy, excepting the Americans,

with whom I am acquainted, by reason of that very freedom of manner in which they consider their enjoyments to exist.

Formality and politeness call forth the latent sensibilities of the heart, in the flow of which resides the chief enjoyments of man. It is not as being the object of them, but as being the fountain of them that this gratification is experienced. When these forms are suppressed, self-love takes their place, with it comes pride; these have their gratifications. When we observe a society of which deference and respect are the rule, we erroneously imagine that its enjoyments consist in the mere gratification of those passions.

The mean mind looks for inferiors, the noble for superiors. So the race. The quarrelling one seeks to domineer; the polished one to venerate. Independence and equality are the shibboleths of a vulgar people; politeness the attribute of a refined one.

If we look then to test the institutions of a country by the amount of happiness they produce, how shall we proceed? In my "opinion" it may be that, in which the various grades of society are linked together, where the family bond is strong, and where a chain of dependence establishes the observance of man for man from the highest to the lowest. But how shall I accord with a man whose "opinion" is that happiness* is to be found only where the nation is a mass of isolated units or a mountain of sand?

It is however indubitable, that we in England have now returned to the primitive idea of happiness,

* In Chinese the signs of happiness are a stork, a Mandarin, and a child, implying what is useful, what is necessary, and what is simple. The stork destroys serpents, the Mandarin punishes the transgressor, and the child is innocence.

—that is fortune: fortune for us is money. Avarice grows upon a man with years, and in proportion as his other enjoyments cease; to say that a man loves money, is to say that he has lost all other and better loves. To me, therefore, this selection, in regard to the object of happiness, is a confirmation of what I have observed in the habits of the people.

But how does the argument stand for those, who taking wealth as the means of happiness, would apply it as a test of fortunate institutions? England is the country which produces and possesses most wealth, and, in this sense, the greatest amount of happiness. But we are not dealing with aggregate wealth, and with abstract happiness. We are considering the state of individual men. One eighth of the whole population of England is pauper, and the country that possesses the most wealth, is the one in which there is the largest number of individuals suffering want and misery.

We owe to a wonderful combination of material circumstances, and to a not less remarkable “progress” (here, that word has sense,) in science, a facility of producing wealth unparalleled in any other age or time. This is independent of our institutions, but our institutions interfere to effect the distribution of that wealth, accumulating it in the hands of a few, and leaving the rest more unequally apportioned, and thereby more reckless, more discontented, and more unhappy, than in those states which we despise for their poverty and their laws.

XVI.—EXPLETIVES.—TRIVIAL AND PRO- VERBIAL EXPRESSIONS.

“Le style c’est l’homme.”—*Voltaire*.

I HAVE seen such proof that the character could be read in the handwriting, that I must admit the result, though I do not comprehend the process. What can be less comprehensible than that the spiritual and moral being should be rendered palpable by the fluctuations of the nerves of the fingers? Our lives are spent in dealing with each other and managing each other: yet the ablest amongst us are only peeping into their fellows, like children into wells. Rare indeed the instance are of those qualified to see clearly therein. When one so qualified does appear, he is known as a ruler or a founder of rule. This he can effect only by influencing those nearest to him, and men can only influence those whom they have judged. That knowledge in which the mastery of men resides, comes not by intuition, but by observation.

For great performances of course great faculties are required; but still crude genius can effect nothing: even the most powerful mind, being original, has to commence by creating for itself its method. That method, when found, benefits the weakest. All method rests on watchfulness, and whoever is intent, rises out of the sphere to which otherwise he would belong.

It has often been remarked that nations and tribes who are ignorant, and whom we call barbarous or

even savage, possess infinitely higher powers of discrimination than ourselves, in regard to individual character. The difference between them and us is that they are more observant. They are so not because of a different method, but because their faculties are not absorbed and expended in forms of speech. In all practical dealings of man and man, we are children in their hands. They are able to judge of us ; we are unable to judge of them ; we are occupied in reasoning, they intent on observing.

Between ourselves the facilities are much greater than for the strangers to whom I have referred, for we speak the same language and our speech is incessant. He who can observe has the words of others just as the reader of handwriting has the strokes of their pen.

We have hitherto been dealing with mutations in the matter of language as destroying the judgment of nations. Here we descend to an inferior application, but which serves not less to show its hold over the human mind. The first tone gives you the singer, the first glance the age of the individual. Three words suffice to give you the character of a man, and that independently of the meaning they convey.

A language contains some forty or fifty thousand terms. The motions of mind seeking vent in speech, are in number infinite, and in power and inflexion not comprisable in any terms of any language. Wherever we pass beyond object and person, substantive and pronoun, we enter into a region vague and indefinite, through which the linking of sound and sense, implies action of the temperament and character, no less than of the intelligence. When then on these points, you lie in wait for men, and

can but make them speak, they must be at your mercy. You have here a separate physiognomy to look at, whilst at the same time you have that of the features to assist and correct your observation.

A word insignificant as to meaning, and unconsciously used by the speaker, is of all others, indicative of his dispositions. These we know under the name of expletives, generally understood as applying to adjectives, because no one considers interjective adverbs as worthy of enumeration. Men have their tricks of sound, no less than of habit, and the minutest matters are always the most important, because of most common occurrence, and including every grade of capacity. On what lips will you not find "in fact," "in fine," "in truth," "really," "indeed," &c.?

At the first moment of addressing a stranger, you are in presence of the scale of humanity, because you have to fix for him his grade in that scale. An expletive of any kind, classes a man, for a superfluous word at once brings him down to mediocrity. Any further interest you have with him, is merely in reference to his weaknesses and his failings. From that moment he becomes, if you are honest, your patient—if you are cynical, your plaything—if you are designing, your victim. He who has the habit of saying "really," you know to be trifling; "indeed," to be insincere; "rather," to be puzzled-pated; "in fine," to be loquacious; "in truth," to be doubled-faced; "quite," to be a schemer; and all to be destitute of judgment, because an habitual superfluity results from an anxiety to disguise, and an inability to conceal.

Expletive is derived from a Latin word, nevertheless it is not Latin: the absurdity would be too

gross of using "full" as meaning "empty." It is an adjective: to make it into a substantive it would have to take the shape of expletiveness, but that would not do for the name of a part of speech. We like then the cheap course of adding the indefinite article "an," and so convert it into a particular designation for every meaningless word.

"Whilst expletives their feeble aid do join,
And ten low words oft creep in one long line."

Verbs active, or in the sense of action, are as solid as substantives in the first intention. When you say "he went," or "he came," you are as certain and algebraic as when you say "the chair," "the house." Such terms reveal nothing to any eye, however keen. But there are verbs unfallacious in themselves, which, in their application, betray weaknesses of character just as effectually as abstract substantives. These are those which a man selects to describe what passes in himself.

When a man hears something new, he will follow it, or he will not; he will possess himself of it, or he will not. In the first case he will ask further, in the latter he will speak of himself. The first belongs to the class of active intelligences, the second does not. The first will be known by the point of interrogation, the second by the particle "if," or "but." The first if satisfied, will say "I SEE." The second will say "*I think*," or "It occurs to me," "I doubt," "I suppose," &c. In every case you have the character of the man before you as completely as you have his face, when you force him into a selection between "I see," and "I think." The first is the simplest expression of the application of the mind to an

object, the second the sign of inability to use the mind.

I could count upon the fingers of my two hands, and leave some of them inappropriated, the persons whom I have heard use the word "I see." It has also happened that persons who had begun in the ordinary strain, "I think," "I suppose," &c. have come to "I see," without this explanation. This to me has been as the blow of a drowned man, the sign of restored animation.

The temperaments of nations are, in like manner, evinced and created. The Turks always say, "I see," "It is true," "It is certain." The Greeks and Arabs, like us, employ expletives and superfluities. The Athenians were loquacious, and the Spartans laconic, although they both spoke Greek. The French gesticulate, the English do not, although philologically the two languages are classed together.* Who

* "I have been often struck with the facility which, as compared with other Europeans, an Englishman possesses of making his way amongst the Turks. A Frenchman, whose character of mind must be, to the eye of an Eastern, closely allied to that of the Englishman, seems at once marked as one with whom no sympathies can exist. The nervelessness of the French language has, I conceive, given to those who speak it a loudness of tone and extravagance of gesture, which are intolerable to the sensitive nerves and the high-breeding of an Eastern gentleman.

"A Frenchman says, 'J'aime.' It is replied to him, 'You do not.' The French language not affording vocabular means of strengthening the assertion, he can only reiterate, 'J'aime!' but he does so in a louder tone: he calls to his aid the muscles of his arms as well as those of his throat. The Englishman says, 'I love.' The proposition is denied. He retorts with lowered tones, and with perfect calmness, 'I *do* love.' His language affording him the means of strengthening his assertion without the assistance of intonation or of action, it is by the suppression of display that he can best reach the conviction of others."—*Spirit of the East*, vol. I, p. 373.

can follow the endless effects produced by aphorisms which have become habitual.* Who can detect the dominion under which we lie even to interjections? Were I to reduce to a single head the symptoms of social disease under which we labour, it would be *vulgarity*, for its opposite, politeness, contains the cure, even of our mental disorders. A really polite man would never, even in debate, state to his antagonist, what he knows he already knows. By this rule discussion would cease to be infection, and would become useful. Vulgarity is inoculated by interjections, "Pooh, pooh," "Eh!", "I say,"† and so forth.

The adult guilty of such coarseness deserves not to touch our sympathies; but what are we to feel in reference to the boy who, looking up to his elders and his parents, is degraded by his very respect to their level? The sounds to the man become the thought to the child.

Our language makes us what we are, converting men into the mere accidents of chance. It is only after he has mastered it for himself that he can be said to be himself; until then he has no soul but his tongue.

The mind once so quickened, intercourse with our

* The missionary Huc, in his work on China, mentions as interesting to those "who see in language causes of national peculiarities," the Chinese aphorism, "Make thy heart little," as contrasting with the French one, "prends garde," which is not translatable into English—the one as producing a cowardly, the other a martial spirit.

† "How vast is the improvement of the present age when any wise thing can be put down by two words which have no meaning, '*pooh pooh*.'"—*Lord Ponsonby*.

In our fashionable novels we now have "Eh?" introduced at every turn, converting every sentence into a question, and exhibiting such insolence, as the manner of being of persons *comme-il-faut*.

So struck has been a polite people like the Chinese by the "I say" of the English, that they use it for "Englishman."

fellow-men acquires that increased interest which a landscape has for the geologist. He is constantly occupied with the commonest things. He can tell the nature of every soil, and the value of every rock. He can detect the hidden treasure in the dirt that the familiar boor treads under foot. The dealer however in rocks at best but classifies strata and opens mines. The geologist of the mind has a treasure to create to himself by exploring the recesses of the breasts of others. Then too does he penetrate to the fountain-heads of history, and future fate unrolls before him her mysteries.

God has given us powers of judgment; why should we talk as if we had none?

XVII.—ANALOGY.

IF anybody said, in English, that he reasoned by “counter-speech,” the risible not the reasoning faculties of his auditor would be awakened.

Nothing can be understood save by understanding it, that is, by looking into it, and not talking about it. Nothing can be liker to a thing than the thing itself. No rational being therefore would try to find a thing like another, and set himself to cogitate thereon; and this is the most that can be made out of “reasoning” by analogy.

There is however one legitimate use of this process, as it is called, as an aid in expounding to others a case already understood. It is so available against what are called “preliminary objections.” But we proceed differently. If an analogy is adduced, the adversary seizes upon it, and shifts it in a counter-sense. The propounder does not stop him and say, “I have used an analogy to facilitate your comprehension, not to increase your confusion. You may reject it, and there the matter drops; but I will not permit you to use it improperly.” This would be to proceed logically, but there are no logicians now-a-days.

It is Southey, I think, who speaks of Butler’s using the *sword* of analogy! Analogy is no weapon, far less an offensive one. It is not in that sense that Butler uses it. Analogy is the oil for the hinges of the doors of inquiry, to allow them easily to open.

When that severe hall is entered, attention is awake, and silence reigns.

I may be permitted to seize the opportunity of illustrating the proper use of analogy in reference to the argument of this little volume.

Its proposition is—*Men cannot think and know not what thought is, until they ascend beyond the terms which are used as the signs of thought.*

The objector—I was going to say the blind objector, but every objector is blind—meets me by a preliminary objection. I answer, “Permit me to put to you an analogous case. You tell your cook to get salmon, and to boil it; to get beef and roast it. You know that you are ordering your dinner, not inventing cookery. You are not under this delusion, because you are aware that English cookery is one thing, French cookery another, and so forth. Your free-will you know to be exercised merely in reference to the matter, the manner being fixed for you. The affinities of ingredients, the influences of heat and vapour, the detail of mechanical appliances, would have to be possessed and practised by you in order to attain to an original cookery: then, and then only, would you *think* in matter of cookery. Failing to do this, your free-will is but an exercise of the memory. So in all moral and metaphysical matters. You must cease to recollect before you begin to think. You must know that your thoughts are of a certain country and a certain age, until entering into their elements, you think for yourself.”

My objector is sure to answer, “You will admit that roast beef is a very good thing, and if it is good it is well conceived, and why are we to reject that which is good and well conceived?” On this I
uld rejoin, “An analogy is an aid proffered to an

antagonist; you have either to reject it as inapplicable, or to accept it."

POSTSCRIPT.—ARCHBISHOP WHEATLEY.

After concluding the revision of the last paragraph, I happened to open Wheatley's Logic at page 177, and read the following passage:—

"*Every* question that can arise is, in fact, a question whether a certain predicate is, or is not, applicable to a certain subject, or *what* predicate is applicable, and whatever other account may be given by any writer, of the nature of any matter of doubt or debate, will be found ultimately to resolve itself into this. But sometimes the question turns on the meaning and extent of the *terms* employed, sometimes on the *things* signified by them. If it be made to appear therefore, that the opposite sides of a certain question may be held by persons not differing in their *opinion of the matter* in hand, then that question may be pronounced verbal, as depending on the different senses in which they respectively employ the terms. If, on the contrary, it appears that they employ the terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the question is real—that they differ as to the opinion they hold of the *things* in question."

Let me interpret it.—

"Every discussion consists in, what is to be said of some thing, the thing being a word. Nevertheless, what is meant by the word has sometimes to be thought of: but that is an inferior matter, being merely verbal. The question is real only when the meaning is not considered."

Here is the definition of Logic, "the proper use of

reason ;"—by the man who assumes to have re-inaugurated in our age, that art and science, by means of which, he professes to put down "common-sense" and to show "the preferableness of systematic knowledge to conjectural judgments."* Its laws, according to him, "apply to every intellectual occupation of MAN *as* man:" first amongst these occupations he enumerates the Statesman. So far he does not differ from Aristotle, who equally defines man "political" and "logical."

I open this volume at another place and I read as follows: "Complaints have been made that Logic leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the chief sources of error in reasoning, namely the ambiguity or indistinctness of terms" "no art is to be censured for not teaching more than falls within its province . . . To find fault with Logic for not instructing us in the full meaning or meanings of every term is as if one should object to the science of optics for not giving sight to the blind."† In every science the first step is the definition of terms, but what shall be said of a science of which the name is logic or the science of words, which repudiates definition? What of the logician who uses as an argument for its exclusion a false analogy and nothing more? The blindness for which Logic is the cure is not a natural ailment but the "ambiguity," which results from the loose application of terms.‡

* Preface, page xii.

† He is arguing here against Aldrich's claims for definition, the best, the only valuable part of his work.

‡ "Language has actually become a part of our intellectual constitution, the use (character) of it exerts an influence over the whole

I dare not trust myself with this book of Archbishop Wheatley, or with others of the same stamp. The dipping into them involves one of two alternatives equally distasteful, volumes in answer, or the throwing down of the pen in disgust.

To have mastered the science of logic, and far more to have been its restorer, must imply the knowledge of its application; and as the science of navigation enables the navigator to find the place of the vessel in the ocean, so must this science of logic have enabled Archbishop Wheatley to find his country's position on the earth. He must be able to guide England and to detect her aberrations if she goes astray. Yet in what have resulted his labours and that of all the other logicians? Has one deflection in morals been exposed in the people, one error in conduct been denounced in the government? Have they so much as dreamt of their high functions as teaching a people how to live? It is in the midst of their unmeaning jargon, and as its necessary result, that every crime has found a palliatory reason, a justifying term, and a free course. "This would not have happened," as he says himself, referring to a subordinate matter, "if men had always kept in mind the meaning of the names they used." Yet this is not a mere logician; he is also a clergyman, and a primate

of our mental operations, and while it facilitates them in one sense does also in another impede and limit the play of our faculties, *and especially of the highest of those faculties. The constant presence of words in the mind slackens its curiosity*, by leading it to believe that in fact it knows what in fact it does not know; *it renders also its perception of all abstract truths obscure and confused*, in so far as the rude symbol of each idea is taken in the stead of the idea itself, and carries with it its concretions, its excess and its defects, and its accidental associations."—*Taylor's Physical Theory of another Life*, p. 150.

of a church. But when the schools cease to detect error, how should the Church denounce sin : if being such men we call ourselves logicians, why should we not call ourselves Christians ?*

This leads me to a reflection which may not inappropriately close this volume. Logic is not the only field which has recently been cultivated with earnestness and assiduity by men of rare ability. England, France, Germany have rivalled each other, for the last quarter of a century or more, in the application of human faculties to the improvement of man in every branch of study, in every walk of life, in every condition of society.


In our own country alone, the enumeration of the men who have attained to reputation or to fame would fill pages. From the Universities, from the ranks of the People, in the bosom of the Church, among the leaders of political life, we have had a breaking away from the ties of habit, and the chains of interest, and an earnest and laborious devotion to the pursuit of truth ; to that extent have honest intentions triumphed over dishonest associations that even political struggle has itself given way, and it can no longer be said that parties exist in the state. We now inquire how man shall be consistent in his faith, just in his conclusions, conscientious in his conduct, benevolent in

* The work of Archbishop Wheatley contains the conjoint labours of Dr. Copleston and Mr. Newman. When urging upon the latter, before he had quitted the Church of England, the practical duties involved in the teaching of the men who were to be the rulers of England, whom he had to instruct not only in what was just, but in the manner of being just at this particular time, he answered me, "On examining the history of England, I find her predominating character to be that of injustice, which must consequently be the element of her future life." He has since been lecturing on the partition of Turkey in the interest of Christianity !

his nature, profitable in his benevolence, dutiful in the exercise of his rights, observant in the performance of his duties—how he shall render the stores of his imagination a fountain of charity to his fellow-men—how he shall relieve the burden to the oppressed, how he shall elevate the lowly in condition—how he shall enlarge the homestead of freedom—how he shall put far away wrong, violence, oppression—how he shall remove the causes and mitigate the effects of strife and war. But in all this not a single trace is to be discovered of an application to the conduct of our Nation as a Nation.

From Archbishop Wheatley to Carlyle—from Gladstone to Mills, there is not a sentence to be found going beyond an assumption of what men are; it is those who have assumed the style and title of instructors, who, boldly maximizing what is done, have inaugurated Atheism in principle and practice.

On the other hand, the works, the most attractive, and therefore the most influential romances and books of personal adventure, are successful almost in proportion to the scorn with which are treated our intellectual faculties, and our national habits. But aberrations not being traced to a cause, the truths conveyed are but dreamer's fictions and traveller's tales. The reading public is only justified in sneering, and the nation is divided into dogmatists and scoffers.



FAMILIAR WORDS.

PART II.

I.—MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, DEMOCRACY.

HAVING taken, as we have seen in so many instances, Greek words that had sense to make them nonsense, it is quite natural that we should seize on Greek words that were themselves nonsensical.

Monarchy never described any condition in Greece. Their word for sole ruler was "Tyrant," implying the practice of *Turan*, of which they knew nothing, and "Despot," derived from two Sanscrit terms, meaning "country" and "ruler:" the Greeks give it as a title to a bishop, and in the feminine to a lady.

Monarchy, in the sense of one alone ruling, never has had, nor can have, existence amongst men. To admit it into our vocabulary is to introduce ourselves into the land of dreams. Except in the case of physical superiority, and within reach of the waking arm, no man can do what he chooses, unless in so far as other men choose that he shall. If it be necessary to state so simple a matter, the fault must lie at the door of those who cannot use their eyes, and will not hold their tongues. Let us take an instance or two.

The modern doctrinaires glibly quote to you the condition of the Scottish clans as examples of slavery, consequently their chiefs must be monarchs. General Stewart, their historian, remarks, "that the meanest clansman held as firmly to native usages as the proudest chief." He only appeared supreme because the people were of one mind, and he was their executive.

For the Emperor of Russia a particular term has been invented—"Autocrat," which means "self-strength," or "strength himself." In our slavishness we have accepted this amusing device as a rank in sovereignty superior to Monarch or to Emperor. The holder of this office is in a condition of dependence without parallel in ancient or in modern times, liable to be put to death at any moment by a few foreign renegades, called his servants. No form of procedure is requisite, no revolution required, no intimation is given, and no hope remains. Such is the office of Autocrator of all the Russias.

The Sultan of Turkey is another specimen of a monarch who cannot so much as make a law, or impose a tax. He is actually in the hands of the English ambassador, as Stanislaus Augustus was in those of Repnin.

Montesquieu, who has strikingly exhibited the absurdity contained in the words "despotic power," nevertheless does quote the Emperor of China as the most striking instance of that quality. That government is carried on by six distinct tribunals, each bearing the epithet of "*Sovereign*." The Emperor has not even the faculty of inspecting the record of his own acts; and while for thousands of years the system of government has remained unchanged, the dynasties of China have been upset

with periodical regularity every century. Rebellion is a fundamental maxim of their morals and politics should the Emperor violate the law. An inhabitant of China could no more understand what you meant by Monarch than what you call Mandarin, or what country you spoke of by the name China. Really it becomes a question between burning histories or dictionaries.

The Greeks, as we have seen, derived from the land of Turan, that is the East, their abstract notions of absolute power, and have been dutifully followed by ourselves. As we take up with a foreign term to disguise a fatuous thought, so we refer to remote instances to maintain a false fact. The reasoner, beaten in the West, claps on his wings and is off to the East, and smites you down with "oriental despotism." Far am I from asserting that despotism, in the sense of energetic will, exists in the West; but I do assert that it is in the West, that you are furnished with that prostration of mind in the masses which enables perverse cunning, or perverted philanthropy, if not to rule, at least to oppress. Far am I from asserting, that in the East, order is supreme over violence, but it is there that the examples are furnished us which might shame our popular slavishness and our governing fraud. But my word goes for nothing. I am a bigot in respect to antiquity, a fanatic in respect to the East, and a blind sceptic on the subject of parliamentary freedom and railway civilization.* Well, let that pass. But here are the

* Hume, as far as the Western side of the comparison goes, does not seem very far from coincidence with what I have stated.—

"The utmost that can be said in favour of the government of that age is, that the power of the Prince, though really unlimited, was exercised after the European manner, and entered not into every

words of a Frank and a philosopher, who has never been in the East, but who, having studied laws and institutions, may know something more about it than men who ride a Tartar trip and publish a three volume tour.

“One striking feature amongst all varieties of Eastern governments is, to find nowhere and scarcely at any period, that odious despotism of degrading servitude, the dark genius of which, we imagined, towered over all Asia. Except in the Mussulman States, the springs of which require a peculiar study, the sovereign authority, surrounded with imposing exteriors, is not the less subject to restrictions the most inconvenient—I had almost said the only ones—which are really effective. A king of India, it is true, burns like the sun, and no human creature can contemplate him. But that superior being cannot raise a tax on a Brahmin, were he himself to die of hunger; convert a field labourer into a merchant, or infringe the slightest enactment of the civil and religious code. An Emperor of China is the son of heaven, but he cannot choose a *sousprefet* except from the list of candidates presented by the colleges; and if he neglected to fast himself on a day of eclipse, or to acknowledge publicly the faults of his govern-

part of the administration: that the instances of high exerted prerogative were not so frequent as to render property sensibly insecure, or reduce the people to a total servitude; that the freedom from faction, the quickness of execution and promptitude of those measures, which could be taken for offence or defence, made some compensation for the want of a legal and determined liberty; that as the prince commanded no mercenary army, there was a tacit check on him; * * * and that this situation of England, though seemingly it approached nearer, was in reality more remote from a despotic and Eastern monarchy than the *present government* of that kingdom, where the people, though guarded by multiplied laws, are *totally naked, defenceless, and disarmed.*”

ment, 10,000 pamphlets sanctioned by law would trace to him his duties, and recall the observance of ancient rule Who dare in Europe to oppose such barriers to the power of Princes?

“I have spoken of institutions, and this word all modern and all European, may appear pompous and sonorous when applied to a people who knows neither budgets nor reports nor bills of indemnity. It certainly is not here applied to those sudden notifications to a nation to change its habits on a given day. I avow that in this sense throughout the greatest portion of Asia there is nothing that can be called Institutions. The rules and principles which control the powerful and protect the weak are customs and national character based upon prejudices, beliefs, or errors. * * * These impose upon authority more effectual checks than any written stipulations, and from which tyranny can only emancipate itself by running the risk of perishing by violence. I see but some isolated points where nothing is respected, where consideration is unknown, and where power rules free from obstacle. These are the spots where the weakness or improvidence of Asiatics have allowed strangers to establish themselves, moved by the sole desire of amassing riches; people without pity for men of another race, neither understanding their language nor sharing in their tastes, their habits, their faith, or their prejudices. Force alone can maintain for a time that absolute despotism which is necessary to a handful of dominators, who will grasp all in the midst of a multitude which believes itself bound by no right to give anything. The effects of such a struggle are to be observed in the colonial establishments of Asia, and the strangers of whom I speak are the Europeans.

"A singular race is this European race. The opinions with which it is armed, the reasonings upon which it rests, could astonish an impartial judge, if such an one could be at present found on earth. They walk the globe, showing themselves to the humiliated nations as the type of beauty in their figures, as the basis of reason in their ideas, the perfection of understanding in their imaginations. That is their unique measure. They judge all things by that rule. In their own quarrels they are agreed upon certain principles by which to assassinate one another with method and regularity. But right of nations is superfluous in dealing with orientals."

It was in 1829 that Mr. Abel Remusat wrote these words. In 1855 they appear a prediction, not a description.

If mendacious Greece has prevailed in teaching us this fable of monarchy, we can be no better off in reference to its cognate terms. The exposure of the one serves for the rest. Greece took to these words in her age of speculation; we, adopting her terms, have brought upon ourselves the decay of which, in her case, they were the symptom.

Nations are as diverse as the leaves of the forest. They are constantly undergoing change in themselves. You may have a people changed, while the same forms exist—the forms changed, and the people remaining the same. You may have similar forms in various nations, and the character different, and correspondence of character with divergency of forms. But if you make your political investigations consist in classifying nations as you do plants, under Greek terms, and if you pretend to deduce consequences therefrom, you certainly will never know anything of the men you undertake to examine, and do no good

to the state which you propose to put to rights. More blood has been shed and more misery entailed by an abstraction than by the spirit of rapine and the lust of power.

"Three words," said Lord Ponsonby, "have for sixty years ravaged the world, and have done so because they meant nothing." He referred to "Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality." You may put in their places, Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy.

"Great" and "small" are relative terms. I may not be speaking according to the conventional standard, when I say that a Republican or a Monarchist is a man of mean faculties; but who will venture to deny the proposition, that a Royalist at Washington is not less a traitor than a Republican in England?

It is not in a legal sense only, but also in an intellectual. That man is a traitor who entertains speculative opinions in opposition to the existing form of Government, because such speculation disqualifies him from dealing with or correcting any wrong. The periods of a nation may be divided into three; well-being, transition, decay. The first is known by attention to public business, the second by confidence reposed in men, the third by speculative remedies for wrong. The latter it will be perceived is contingent upon the employment of ambiguous terms.

It is the great misfortune of Europe that the so-called learned portion of the various languages have a common origin which supply a channel for the infection of all, from the corruption of any one. Through the Latin language, the vehicle of this contagion, the fates of these nations are so linked, that in a philosophic and historic point of view, they

may be considered as one. There are, however, two great European Empires differently circumstanced ; the Russian and the Turkish. They have their own languages, not affiliated to the Latin, and not in themselves predisposed to original fallacies of a similar order. Neither of these people have any affinity with Europe, nor are in the remotest degree sharers in its metaphysics.* However they may appear to be involved in it by common transactions, they stand wholly distinct in fortune and fate. They have struggled together for at least 3000 years, and may struggle together for 3000 years to come. Whatever internal wrongs may exist for either, whatever public dangers or disasters may overwhelm them, these races free from the gangrene of opinion possess an inherent and indestructible life. The Russian Empire may crumble to pieces, but the Russian people will hold,† and it is only when you have destroyed the Ottoman Empire that you will understand the vitality of the Turks.

If we review the course through which nations generally pass, we shall find them with a sole chief at the beginning and at the end. They pass from monarchy to aristocracy, to oligarchy, to democracy, and end by despotism. Greece started under her heroes, and ended under her tyrants. Rome began with her kings, and ended with her emperors. France,

* It is true that Russia keeps in Europe a few natives to personate revolutionary affections, as exiles, and legitimate affections as diplomatists.

† The Poles are of the same race, but they have sought to make themselves Europeans, and the consequences that we see are only what, in 1791, Rousseau predicted for them. "You are," said he, "an Asiatic people; if you want to become a European one, you will die." The Turks will be saved by the present conduct of Europe from that mistake.

beginning with a Pharamond, is now under a Louis Napoleon. England clamours for the coming man, calling him by anticipation Dictator. In the first period they have a chief to maintain the law and custom, in the latter they invoke a despot for protection against themselves. There is but one master—it is the law. That law has nothing on earth to do with the forms of the government, and thus it is that by disputing about the forms of government, a nation brings upon itself first, despotism, and then extinction.

II.—TYRANNY AND SLAVERY.

ALL the alphabets of the West derive from a common origin, of which the signs, now representatives of sound, symbolized ideas. The hieroglyphics preserved down to their last hour that original character conjointly with the phonetic. The signs of the monosyllabic languages (the Chinese) belong to the same category, and are actually read by nations speaking different languages. All these early attempts at writing were portraitures of the operations of the mind, not of the sounds of the lips, and they reveal to us a process exactly the reverse of that of abstractive, on which is based our logic and our pretensions to intellectual superiority.

The readiest key is that which is furnished us by the hieroglyphics, of which the very letters are poetry. The animal kingdom furnished in its endless varieties a rich treasury of delineation. The beasts "of the hand of man," the beasts of the forest, the birds of the air, the fish of the sea, the crawling reptile, are the unmistakeable colours with which to describe, to ennoble, or to vilify man. There is no taking of the common parts to form non-extant entities to bring down again upon the concrete, and to fill the mind with vagueness and the speech with pleonasm; the hawk, the serpent, the hare, give you the conqueror, the traitor, and the coward, and thence that warmth of life of primeval times, depending upon the direct energy of speech.

But the Egyptians lived by themselves; the tribes of our ancestry of blood or thought—the people of the Himmalaya, the ancestors of Goths and Teucrians,

of Romans and Yavans (Greeks) of Iran and Turan, drew their descriptive words and phrases, not from animals, but from men. Observing in a certain people a peculiar character, their name was given to individuals resembling them: this was the habit even of the Greeks, from whom we fancy we derive our logical abstractions. Thus an effeminate man was an inhabitant of Sybaris, a licentious one of Corinth, a false one of Cyzicus, a silentious one of Lacedæmon, a man who spoke bad grammar of Solis, a sea robber of Epirus, an embroiderer was a Phrygian, a wrestler in the games was a Pelethite, a bowman was a Cretan, a courageous man was one of the Horim (Hero),* a learned one a Braber (Barbarian), and such is the etymology of the Greek word "Tyrant" and the English word "Slave."

Τυράννος was not originally a term of reproach, as we may be assured of by the title of Sophocles's play, *Œdipus Tyrannus*. It was taken from Turan, and represented the manner of Turan, which was that of being governed by a tribe chief. It meant for the Greek nothing more than "Turk." They changed it to "tyrant" when they changed themselves to slaves. No epithet is in its origin vituperative, it becomes so by descending with the habits of a descending people.

There was in Greek, no class name to designate slavery. It was *Ἀιχμαλωτῆς*, or captured by the spear: generically it was represented by Helot, or the tribe Loto, again of Tartar origin, and whose oppression is somewhat apocryphal, seeing that they might be

* Our word "Huzzar" comes from the Hazrites of Judea, the Huzzarah of the Himmalaya, a pure Turkish tribe, whose costume was adopted from the Hungarians. "Huzzara" is still the name for master in the Southern portion of India.

enrolled as citizens, that they bore arms, and constituted the immense majority of the Greek army at Platea: there the struggle lay, not between Greeks and Persians, but between those same Helots and four Tartar tribes which Mardonius had selected from the Persian army. However what the Greeks thought or said upon the subject concerns us little, as we have no word derived from them.

Throughout the whole range of philology, there is no fact more striking or wonderful than that the nations inhabiting the regions which extend from the Himmalaya to the Alleghanies, embracing all the great stocks of the ancient world and the modern of Europe, Asia, and America, are destitute of a primitive term to designate the condition of servitude—singular testimony to M. de Stael's proposition concerning the antiquity of freedom. In all these tongues the name of some people is adopted for this end, and although these vary, they all designate one and the same race.

Beginning from the Easternmost point we have "Venede;" then "El Assyr," and "Yeshir." From the earliest antiquity these words have descended to the present time, where they are actually in use, as the name of slave throughout the East.

In Rome the words were "*Syrus*," and "*Servus*," from this cause the "Servante," "Serf," and "Servant" of the Italian, French, and English. The modern European languages have also another word which they severally write, "*schlave*," "*sclave*," "*esclave*," and "*slave*."

The Venede are the Henites translated "the famous," whom we find in the first ages of Christianity, established on the Adriatic and the Baltic, and from whence comes the name of Venice, and which

from Jornandes is identified with the slaves who overran the Byzantine empire in the 6th Century, which name of slave means "glory" or the "glorious" in their tongue.

"Yeshir" is the same with "El Assyr" or the Assyrian. There is no root in Turkish or in Persian for that word; it must therefore mean the people which bore it. From their relative positions Assyrians would naturally be captives amongst the Arabs: the monuments of Nimroud and the Memnonium show as far back as the eleventh Century before Christ, the Turks in a similar portion with reference to the same people.

The hiatus is not great between the period when we find the Henetes spread over a wide region, and that when the great empire of Assyria fell. None of the great stocks of the East are lost. We have no reason to think that the Assyrians should be an exemption, and the two might appear to be identified by the names being selected by all the nations for designating their social condition at home. It is true that the Assyrians are classed among the Semitic tribes, and so distinguished from the Sclavonian or Sarmatian; but that classification has been found to be too absolute, and the Hindo-Germanic casts a doubtful shadow over both. There are besides other indications which however inconclusive they might be considered, were we possessed of surer data, do possess in the absence of these a specific value. They are the proper names of the Assyrians which are to a remarkable extent translatable by the vernacular Russian.*

* From the numerous illustrations given in Michieviz's Lectures I quote the following:—Daniel and his three companions, when taken into the service of the Assyrian monarch, received Assyrian titles and names. There were Belteshazzar, Shadrach, Meschech, and Abednego, which may be explained in Russian as arm-bearer

“*Servus*” and *serf* come from *Serb*, the designation of a large branch of the *Sclaavs*, it means pruning-hook, or sickle; in French “*serpette*.” Such a name was not inappropriate, as we do not find that people spreading by conquest, but by industry.

As to the word *slave* and its synonyme nothing has to be said: its universality would establish, if historic grounds were wanting, that the populations actually inhabiting Europe passed, in entering it, over the body of the *Sclaavs*, carrying them captives, and were before that migration, unacquainted with the condition of servitude or slavery.

Nor was it originally the internal condition of the people whose name has been adopted for its designation. It has singularly happened that it has become enslaved so to a degree unknown elsewhere. It is not that *serfdom* exists for the Russians, but that no Russians exist save in the condition of *serfdom*. The dominating class is of foreign extraction. Whoever bears mastery springs from an exotic root. Whatever is Russian is abject. The very term for the distinguished class is itself ethnographic and foreign, and means *Tartar*.*

The slave in Turkey is a captive, made from a people not Mussulman, and in a lawful war. Such is the law, and if observed, there would be now no slaves. Slavery however subsists, in consequence of the social advantages connected therewith. The slave being placed in the rank of the master, that status is

to the King—(*Balta* hatchet and *Tzar*) Purse-bearer, (*Meshok*) Tent-pitcher (*Shatior*, Tent) and Purveyor, (*Obedniak*, Meal).

* *Chinovink*. *Chin* was anciently the name of greatest extension, as applied to those tribes, and was spread from Casghar to the Indus, the Volga and the Amour. They carried it to China, to which country that name has been erroneously applied by the interpreters of the classic writers. It was still in use in Tartary in the seventh century of era.

eagerly sought after and seldom voluntarily relinquished. Slavery opens that door for women, for which we employ balls and intriguing matrons; and for men, that which we seek through Parliament. The slave is the adopted daughter or son, and that of persons of distinction. Consequently the highest social positions and the first dignities of the state, are in the hands of slaves. The condition of the slave is to be sought for in the character of the people.

Our slavery is the kidnapping of niggers, the packing them like salted herrings for the middle passage, and the planter's whip. Here again the condition of the slave is to be found in the character of the people.

But we amalgamate in our natures philanthropy with savageness. We will put down after our lawless fashion what we have enacted. We sacrifice enormous treasure to emancipate the western slave, and then proclaim a crusade against slavery in the East. Such is the result of abstraction and generalization.

Not content with the attempted convulsion of existing things, we carry back our generalization to convulse our notions of our own past history, causing there to reign supreme our own black form of serfdom, a word and a thing utterly unknown. But looking at the state in more senses than one, to which the people of England are reduced, from the Queen on the throne to the pauper in the workhouse, and the culprit sentenced to "penal servitude," it would be in the interest of distinctness to restore to the word "slave" its present ethnographic value, and then by calling Englishmen—Russians, you would obtain an accurate definition of the inhabitants of this island.

At the conclusion of a lecture which I gave at

Portsmouth on pauperism in 1845, some of the assembly were startled, and the president giving utterance to their astonishment, I had again to reply, and conclude with a fragment from that answer.

“You then asked if I meant to assert, that *the serf of ancient times in Europe, or the slave of Eastern despotism of the present day can exercise or does possess, that influence over the councils of the state and the government of affairs that is exercised by the free and enlightened opinion of England over its rulers?* You have perfectly understood me in representing the supposed serf and slave as exercising a control over their rulers, and in representing what you call the ‘free-enlightened opinion of England,’ as powerless to control the government of this country.

“To speak, however, of a slave controlling his rulers, or a ‘free and enlightened people, unable to control their government,’ is to say, that a slave is a free man and a free man a slave; or it means that you are mistaken in the slavery you attribute to others, and in the freedom you attribute to yourselves. In other words, that opinion which you hold to be free and enlightened, I hold to be erring, and therefore enslaved. I have shown that you were wrong in holding the villain of ancient times to be a slave; and if so, I have proved that your opinion is not enlightened. As to its power—make the experiment with any of your opinions in this assembly, and what a storm of contradiction will be raised! To speak, therefore, of your opinion, is to speak of storms and perversions, disturbance to peace, rebellions against reason; for this indeed, it has power,—for every wise and virtuous purpose it is wholly powerless.”*

* “Wealth and Want,” p. 106.

III.—NATIONAL AND PATRIOTIC.

“ If there could at this day exist on the globe,” as says Mr. Abel Remusat, “ an impartial observer,” the word “ national ” would be that at which he would point the finger. From “ national impulse ” and “ national movement ” to “ national debt ” and “ national schools,” whether in the emphasis with which it is uttered, the monstrosities to which it is appended, or the placards on which it is printed, it is the monster badge of duplicity and conceit. It is a thing with which one can have no patience, and yet the claims of pity for an innumerable multitude are irresistible.

The word in Latin means birth, thence race. There is no harm when we say “ the British nation ” “ the nations of the earth ; ” but there its proper use ends—there its important misuse begins.

To apply the word “ national ” to anything *interior* is improper, because every nation has its own name : it is also superfluous, and as such is artful, and conceals a purpose. Cobbett asks, why the army is called the king’s and the debt the nation’s ? and answers himself by saying that this nation, *i. e.* the English, are so easily befooled by words, that in the one case they are made to believe the army not their own, and in the other the debt to be so. I may not be quoting his words with perfect accuracy ; I have not seen them since I read them as a child ; from which time my ear has been on the alert to catch the sounds with which men befool themselves.

In the foundation of our Gothic kingdoms, we had public assemblies and councils, to which various names were given. These were always logical definitions. "Great business," equivalent to "*Res Publica*." "Assembly of the wise men," "Common Council of the kingdom," "Great Council." When the new order of theories was instituted, again there were assemblies, and again a name had to be found for them. What do we find? We must look to France, the leader in the march of intellect.—*Assemblée Nationale*.

"Logic," says Watt, "is the right use of reason." But that use is not in a syllogism. Reid, following Descartes, tells us that the syllogism never taught a man anything. I wish it were so. A great deal to be unlearned is taught by a process which professes to make one thing equal to another, by means of their equality to a third, different from both. There is, however, one branch of the science of words, which is of such value, that without it, the faculty of speech is a curse: it is the rule of definition. The categories are but the formula of questions to ascertain the nature of an object or the circumstances of an occurrence. The rule of definition is simply that the terms shall include the object, and exclude all others. Let us test by it "*Assemblée Nationale*."

The body collected at Paris, was composed of delegates from the *parts* of France and from the *orders* of the people of France. It was either territorial or personal. Its object was either to control the executive, or to make laws, or both. To define it, one of these attributes had to be selected. This has not been done; consequently, the first condition of a logical definition is wanting.

This *Assemblée* existed in France and nowhere else. It might at least have been called French. It is not

so called: but being called National, no other nation is excluded.

Nation and people are the same thing. At that time the French held in utter abhorrence the word people. The burst of indignation which saluted Mirabeau, when he uttered it, and his reply, are one of the remarkable features of that distracted period.

Contrasting the incoherence of these latter terms with the grand simplicity of those of early times, I am reminded of the parallel drawn by Bochart between the poetic beauty and descriptive genius exhibited by the ancients in giving names to places, and the flimsy sycophancy of their successors.

If you ask a man the difference between "National" and "Patriotic," he will say there is none. Yet his verbal instinct, as is often the case, is not at fault, for he would not say "national man" or "patriotic debt,"—at least not yet. The victims of "national movements" are being called on the Continent "patriots," and in England, a voluntary rate in aid for a treacherous war is eclypt—"The Patriotic Fund."

The distinction is this. National applies to the race, Patriotic to the country. Generally speaking a just war is made at home, an unjust one abroad. In the one the country is defended: in the other the nation is engaged. In the first no one speaks of the people, for the "country" is invaded. In the second country cannot be mentioned, and you must excite the passion for glory of the *race*. Thus "patriotic" is associated with justice, "national" with lust and violence. Our present war is on our part "National," on the part of the Russian "Patriotic." Before we took part in it, it was on the part of Turkey "Patriotic," or that of Russia

“National.” It was defensive: you have made it aggressive.

The word “National” is a foreign importation. Within my memory it was a word unknown, except as belonging to the debt—itself a foreign imitation, and consequently not held in very high estimation. France was its particular home, because in that country the martial spirit was strong: so it was adopted as an excellent disguise for theories of government propagated by bayonets.

There next proceeded out of the epithet “national” a superincumbent generality—“nationality.” After this ethnographic affinities, true or false, were held to justify the violation of every compact, the destruction of every right. An aggregate was struck of the various wrongs and grievances of Italy and its states, or Germany and its states, of Spain, and out of these we got a common cause “the cause of Nationalities.” The revolutionist of Madrid, of Paris, of Milan, of Pesth, or Vienna, were held to as enrolled under the same banners,—henceforward the banner of crime; for however justifiable might have been rebellion in any one case, all rights dependant on special grievance vanished when these were generalised. Thus by the perversion of the most sacred names, has Europe been prepared for that chaos which it will assuredly undergo until reduced to a new order by the lance of a people not emasculated by foreign terms nor “used up in political ideas.”*

* Napoleon.

IV.—REASON AND FAITH.

WHEN we have a verb and a substantive derived from the same root, we must take the verb as guiding us in fixing the more wavering value of the substantive. We have in English "to rate" as well as "reason," and the sense we still attach to "rate,"* is nearly identical with the word "reason" or "ratio" in Latin. Reason is not only employed to designate the human faculties, it is also implicated in the object to which they are applied. We say "the reason of a thing," a phrase confusedly recording the difference between things which the original word implies. Again when we say "reasoning faculties," we mean some thing very distinct from mind. The words if they have sense at all, imply the power of comparing one thing with another, or of establishing the ratio or proportion between them.

How then have we arrived at this anomalous word? Simply by the ordinary process of idolatry, placing the creature for the Creator. In the consciousness of not exerting our natural powers, we have given to the results which we have attained, a general name covering failure, and then transfer it, to our own faculties. It is always the same thing.

* When she rates things, and moves from ground to ground,
The name of reason she obtains by this;
But when by Reason she the Truth has found,
And standeth fixt, she Understanding is.—*Davies.*

Words spring from inefficiency of thought, and then return to clog it.

When we exercise ourselves in judgment, the result depends not on the labour bestowed at that moment, but on the previous care given at once to store up, and to exclude what is unworthy of being stored. It is just as when the body is called upon for an effort. It makes it by the strength, prepared by health, preserved and dexterity acquired. It springs to its task with a bound: the mind equally prepared takes in its object at a glance. You think of your limb only when it cannot act, and of your eye only when it is diseased. And so also of your mind. That "thinking" in the case of the body consists in pain,—in the case of the mind in reason. When you reason, you are as sure to err, as when you are in pain, you are certain of the presence of disease. Put it in another shape. You look at a tree, you see it distinctly, you describe the tree. You do not see it distinctly, you say; "what is the matter with my eye." If you could deceive yourself by words with regard to physical objects as you do in reference to ideas, you would say that your "*vision* told you so and so." You fix your mind upon an object, the mental sight is indistinct: then you say "my reason tells me so and so."

It is true, that we cannot draw this distinction between cases in which we are wrong and those in which we are right, because when we are right the thing is done at once and we never think about it: a thousand such cases occurs for one of the opposite character: one world of words is always made out of exceptions.

"All his decisions were instantaneous." Such is the finishing-stroke of the picture of the greatest

statesman as drawn by the greatest writer in the most brilliant period of man's existence. So Thucydides writes of Themistocles. But it is true of all men when they are right, and is the point to which every true observer will look. Thought, I mean perception, has the property of light, rendering clear and at once. It is a flash of lightning.

Reason then, as a term, is a bastard, and as a result, an abortion. Applied generally it is an excuse for slovenliness; applied particularly, it represents mental blindness.

In antithesis to this we have recently introduced the word "Faith." If reason be the sign of mental disease, faith must be intended to represent health. But it is exactly the reverse. "To reason" is to represent the powers of man. We have here a parallel case of the right-divine of kings as an antagonist to the sovereignty of the people.

Faith comes from *fides*, which is the Latin for *πίστις*. We have the expression "to see is to believe:" in Greek to believe is to know, for *πίστις* is derived from *πιστιν*. Such is also the etymology of believe in Hebrew. The religious value of the word is no other than knowledge. Nothing is more correct, than the antithesis of faith and reason, only accepting reason as knowledge, our faith must be the reverse.

The Latin synonym of "*fides*" is "*fiducia*" or "trust." Faith rendered into its elements is knowledge and trust; words which a child can understand, and if other words were required Christ would never have told us "that such only should enter the kingdom of heaven."

That we are ourselves conscious of the hollowness of what we call our reason and our faith

is evinced in our having recourse to the term which we apply to the actions of dumb animals "instinct." A person says "my" Instinct "tells me so and so," you may find fifty other terms, but the multiplication of these will not help you one jot, except in making confusion more complete. Get rid of your terms and use your faculties. Watch, observe, record, that is life; and then you will know how to use it. Be assured whenever you are occupied with yourself you are wrong. Your attention must be always employed abroad, if it returns on yourself it is misused. If you want to walk you use your legs; you do not take a scalpel to dissect them. Use your mind in like manner and then you will become as a little child. You will get rid of the wrinkles of the age in which you have been brought up, and return to the youth and the freshness of your own nature.

But you ignore original sin. Evil dispositions are in our nature: so also is nakedness. Were speech simple, evil dispositions would experience as much difficulty in struggling into life as nakedness into sight, when it is held decent to be clothed.

CIVILIZATION AND BARBARISM.

THE Englishman will say "the best of everything can be had in London for money." It may be observed to him, I cannot get a cup of coffee, a cup of tea, or a cup of chocolate, or a *vol au vent*, or butter or Yaourt, &c." Still the Englishman will say, "the best of every thing is to be got in London for money." This is Civilization. If he said—"the best of rump, steaks and stout are to be got in London," it would be plain sense, because he would be talking of things which he understood. But when he decides upon things of which he knows nothing, then it is philosophy and requires a fine term.

To popularize is to render popular; to legalize, to render lawful; to generalize, to render general; to neutralize, to render neutral. Civilize must therefore mean, to render civil. But we mean by it, to render uncivil; for it is not civil to condemn others and to commend ourselves.

Proceeding from the verb to the substantive, which, observe, we have made and not found, it must mean the state of civility or politeness. Now it is forced upon me, not by theorizing but by observing, that the people who speak of civilization are remarkable for the very opposite character. I do not mean only that they are uncivil in their judgments of others, but that they are rude in their intercourse among themselves.

I was once asked by a lady surrounded by her children what was meant by Civilization and Barbarism. I answered that I could not tell her, for I did not know, not having been endowed by providence with the faculty of comprehending abstractions, and not

being in the habit of using words I did not comprehend, but I could tell the difference I had observed. In Barbarism children are taught to be polite: in Civilization they are left to be savages. In the first the master and the mistress of the house salute their servants and treat them as human beings; in the last they treat them as machines. In conversation the Barbarians never sneer, and never say pooh! pooh! She replied, "You mean that they are civilized and we barbarous." I answered "I state facts, you call names." Which is just the distinction between the two.

We have some great inventions in our days. The steam-engine, electricity, and others of the sort, whence we have dived into the mysteries of nature and converted to profit the secrets we possessed. We have inventions of another kind where we have dived into the heart of man and brought to light his hitherto undetected mysteries. These are, "public opinion," by means of which we have perfected the instrument of government; and civilization, by which we have remodelled society. When the wise man says, "God made man perfect, but he has found out many inventions," to which of the two does he refer?

Man and virtue are different things. There is the knowledge of both, but it is widely different: the one is science, the other virtue. It is in the first case, *what we know*; in the second, *what we are*. The first can only be achieved by infinite toil, and the accumulation of the toil of many generations. The second requires no toil. God made man proper—He made him in ancient times, but is also making him every hour. That antiquity is reproduced before our eyes in every child that is born; it also is perfect until initiated into the knowledge of inventions not

those of steam-engines and electricity: the child would still grow into the perfect man if left to himself. "*Suffer little children to come unto me.*"

This perfection is of the mind, not the character. Original sin consists in proneness to evil acts, not to false terms; the sin of Adam was taking an apple, not taking a Latin or Greek term. An Arab once taking up a translation of the Bible threw it down in disgust; questioned as to his meaning, he answered, "you make God speak bad grammar."

Somehow or other we have mixed up the two species of inventions, so as to puzzle Solomon and make him either condemn Railways or approve of Public Opinion; for if you speak of the first or of the second, you are immediately told that it is a result of Civilization. The nature of things included in a common term must be similar.

Again, if you speak of those blots on humanity—pauperism and prostitution, of the absence of hospitality, you are told that they are effects of Civilization, so that Civilization is a state of politeness engendering at once science and corruption.

You will object to the definition, and so do I; but I take it from your own lips.

I should place it in this form: "it is a state of rudeness engendered by corruption," or again, a chimera with a brain of cobweb and a heart of mud, polluting whatever is within, destroying whatever is without.*

* "The fiend-like skill which we display in the invention of all manner of death-dealing engines—the vindictiveness with which we carry on our wars, and the misery and desolation which follow in their train, are enough of themselves to distinguish the white civilized man as the most ferocious animal on the face of the earth."—*Herman Melville's Marquesa Islands.*

I have done my best to obtain a better definition, but I have failed. People talk very glibly about it, until you ask them what they mean. I have never found a man whom that question did not make to look very foolish or to feel very angry; I am reduced therefore to the etymology and history of the word.

It is derived from the Latin without being Latin; it is spoken in English without being English; and so it is a solecism. It came into use in very recent times, and so is a novelty. It is a word without grammar and without history, and is at open war with its cognates, "civil" and "civism," being neither applied to urbanity as contrasted with rusticity, nor to citizenship as implying the knowledge and performance of our duties to our fellow-men and the state.

Its procreation is not to be traced in the term, or by any specific invention so called, but comes by way of generalisation which I have already shown to be silliness. It is nothing more than public opinion, which means the place in which we stand or sit, and the hour at which we speak or write; it is a name given to an aggregate of all things, which is then spoken of as a thing distinct from all things. After that it is brought in as something acting upon us, and is referred to as accounting for whatever we do or do not do. This is a very ingenious and elaborate process, and speaks highly for the culture of our minds; but take a microscope and examine a sore, and you will find ingenuity and elaborateness to be the common character of disease: is disease an invention which destroys the perfection of health?

We have in England knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice, wealth and poverty, loyalty and disaffection, order and usurpation, happiness and

misery. To find the cause, and to rate the amount of each, requires cautious and laborious discrimination, and such is the task, I will not say of a wise man, but of a human being. To jumble them together, to call the whole by a name; to tell us that that name is a thing, an agent, the maker of us, and the producer of these results, is not to proceed scientifically, in fact it is no procedure at all. If we were under the necessity of having such a word we should at least require to discriminate the subordinate quantities by some sign. If we count wealth *plus*, we must count poverty *minus*, and so with the other items furnishing two categories, one of positive, one of negative civilization. Then we should have to add and subtract, and then only could we predicate of any country that its civilization was positive or negative, reducing it to this form—

CIVILIZATION TABLE.

England—

	Minus.	Plus.
Wealth		+ 10
Poverty	— 10	
Science		+ 15
Ignorance	— 5	
Virtue	— 50	
Vice		+ 30
Happiness	— 10	
Misery		+ 20
	— 75	+ 75
Subtract		— 75
Result		Zero.

You would have to proceed in like manner with France, China, Sweden, the Marquesas Islands, &c., and after this laborious process, what would you do

with the table? Dr. Gregory gives the following receipt for preparing cucumbers : slice fine, steep for two hours in salt and water, drain carefully, add oil and vinegar, and—give to the pigs.

But there has been a great book written by a great statesman, there we find it in the earliest times, and extending over every region of the present earth—in Greece, in Rome, in China, amongst the Mussulmans. That is to say in the countries of Antiquity, where it was unknown, and in the regions of the East which we now call barbarous! Well, let us look closer. What is it? The book tells us nothing new. It furnishes us simply with the author's views on the events of these lands.

According then to M. Guizot, Civilisation is history ; but it is not, for it is civilisation. Again it is not ; civilisation is history. So it is with its prototype Schlegel's Philosophy of History. It is the principles contained in history, the historical development of man, it is a standard, an ideal standard no doubt, a standard of human value finally attained in the country where M. Guizot writes, and of course in an excelling degree in the writer, "the union of the human and divine mind!"

Yet it doubtless is a discovery and a valuable one, for it facilitates talk without meaning, and arrays ignorance and pretence with a cloak of "grasp of intellect." In after times the title of M. Guizot's words will suffice to tell of the existence for a time of a race, endowed with a fatuity that cannot reason, and cursed with an activity that will not rest. Alas for man, if the events which we have seen were the fruit of the proper use of his faculties! Alas for folly, if with such apostles, institutions could prosper or nations endure!

For the spectator it is pleasant to live in these times : the public supply of diversion exceeds anything since the time of Pericles, and even then the favoured Athenian had to pass from the Academy to the Palaestra, and could only separately enjoy the sophisms of the one and the agonies of the other.

What is the character of perfection, if not simplicity? I speak not at present of institutions but of mind, things which never can be separated. Suppose then we assume in civilization an existence, the men in whom it exists will be calm, judicious, benevolent, anxious to inquire into whatever they are not acquainted with, humble and distrustful of themselves. Those afflicted with barbarism, will be self-sufficient, presumptuous, contemptuous of others, unable to observe or to profit by whatever is different from themselves. On which side then shall we place civilization? We are contemptuous of the Barbarians; they are deferential towards us. Does this proceed from our superiority of mind, or their superiority of character?

Some years ago in a book of travels in the East, I presented the case in the following fashion.

"The European in the East begins by reasoning and drawing comparisons, a pernicious habit which impedes his progress. "As it has cost me several years of constant application to learn that I had anything beyond mere facts to acquire a knowledge of, I am naturally anxious to spare to those who may follow me like loss of time, and chances of misdirection. What would I have been spared, had anyone told me that this study did present the only practical means of investigating the moral and social state of MAN, because here were afforded the means of testing our previous conclusions? then should

have I approached the East with the feelings of a child.

“An ancient or an eastern would probably describe us as a people distinguished from his own by ‘a habit of asserting and contradicting, which they call expressing opinions.’ Were Socrates or Aristippus to visit again this earth, he would be more astonished at the political retrogression of modern Europe, through the division of opinion, than at its mechanical progress through the combinations of science. Europe has become a vast arena of strife and hatred on every subject connected with politics, ethics, and religion; it must be evident that the men of Europe have the faculty of creating, not of solving difficulties, and cannot intrude on a new field without carrying thither that confusion which they have produced in their own.”

Civilization is, in fine, a monster without brain or heart, or noble organ, but with a life of mere limb, such as belongs to the order of polypi destitute of cerebral functions. It might be compared to that kraken or Squid of the abyss, except that the wretched limbs of that hideous growth do serve for pasture to the whales to which it is cast.

Its antithesis, Barbarism, must occupy a similar intellectual station. It is the aggregate of unknown things as civilization is of known ones. It generalizes the infinite as civilization does the finite, in other words as civilization is Europe, so barbarism is Asia,—“European Civilization” “Oriental Barbarism.”

The Greeks used Barbarian in lieu of “Foreign,” as the Jews did Goim, and they hated what was foreign. So far we are agreed, only that we do not hate, we only despise. But then the Greeks had no

counterpart to Barbarian except Hellenic; to put ourselves on a par with them, we should say Barbarian and British or Barbarism and Britishism. But again the Greeks did not say Barbarism; they only reached the length of Barbarize and Hellenize, meaning the use of Barbaric or Hellenic idiotisms. Expert as were the sophists, not one of them ever wove a net for others or himself from this hemp. No dreamer of the stoæ or academus ever made an abstraction of his city or his country or himself or of all the world as every English potboy can.

The word originally was the name of a people,* and because of that people's qualities represented science and letters. That people were the instructors of the Greeks and afterwards their enemies, and because they, being vain and rancorous, reviled their benefactors, we with the discrimination and independence which belong to us, have adopted the vituperative sense finally given to the term, as a generalization of all detestable things.

We must now find the limits and frontiers of these two worlds. One great logical authority deals with the matter, syllogistically illustrating a major by "all white men are civilized." An epigrammatic politician would exclude all but pure Caucasian blood, and still narrow the limits to the families breeding in and in; less acute intelligences will content themselves

* The Berbers or Brabers at present extend across the whole breadth of Africa from the entrance to the Red Sea to Cape Nun. Barba and Marma is the same word, B and M being controvertible letters. The Doric Colonies of the Syreniaca knew the natives under the former name. That name is still found at both extremities of Asia Minor, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bay of Marmorice. The Greeks confess having received letters from the Barbarians: they even call them Barbaric letters. Socrates refers to the Barbarians for the unknown roots of Greek words.

with more vulgar coteries, and descend from physiology and psychology to facts. The Liberian will be admitted although an Ethiop, and Job's robbers excluded although Arabs of the Arabs. It comes after all to the form of government, and wherever you find a Union, a Lunatic Asylum, a County Gaol, a Gibbet, you have the satisfactory assurance that civilization is spread. Clearly then Turkey and Russia are both excluded, for in neither are there paupers: in the one there is no hangman, and the other is so barbarous that it has not even punishment by death. No doubt there is a mass of conflicting authority on the other side. M. Guizot finds civilization at home amongst the Saracens and the Ottomans, and Mr. Carlyle finds in Russia the pure expression of the highest and last achievement of human intellect which has identified might and right, M. Guizot's union of "human and divine mind."

As the market is not yet closed, I too may make a bid. I exclude from civilization in space and time all the races of antiquity and all those of modern dates, who when they speak have something to say. I concede it to those, ourselves, fathers, and grandfathers in this corner of the earth, who are possessed of the invention by which to construct phrases without expenditure of thought, and by means of them carry on government at home, negotiations and war abroad.

Three centuries ago the authority of law and the repose of mankind fell before religion. Wrong became right when those of a different creed were concerned. This painful spectacle passed away, and now right and law are set at nought within the sphere of our own contentions by differences in respect to the form of Government, and without that sphere by the

assumed difference regarding the respective value of societies, and thus philanthropy places arms in her hands and perfidy and lust alike avail themselves of the convenient cloak.

Plutarch, in reviewing the great struggle between Pompey and Cæsar, concludes with deploring that they should have turned their arms and consumed their genius the one upon the other, when so much safer and more glorious a course was open to them, by uniting for the subjugation of the remainder of the earth, not then included in the Roman world. But, anticipating a stumbling-block in the mediocrity of his readers, he applies himself to show, that there was no insuperable objection to the scheme. He says, "the pretext might have been adopted of civilising the barbarians."* Plutarch was a Greek, and he was writing of Romans—Romans, who had not a "*Times*," or a Foreign Office, but who had a Fecial College.†

In June last, the ulterior objects of the government were expounded in a celebrated essay in the *Times*, known by the name of "the Punjaub article," from its having illustrated England's prospective course on the banks of the Bosphorus by its recent achievements on those of the Indus. To obtain this opportunity of "civilising the barbarian," the aid of Russia was requisite. Although we had a Foreign Office and a *Times*, we had neither, at least, a two-legged Cæsar or a Pompey; the British empire was destitute

* Of course I translate the word according to our present notions. In the original it is *ἡμερώσειν*, to render mild.

* To this body alone was confided adjudication in all matters with Foreign States. Rome did not trust the awful prerogative of peace and war, on which ultimate existence must depend, to the ignorance, the caprice, or the treachery, of a mob, a monarch, or a minister.

of the power to be brought into play. The not very profound scheme then presented itself of helping Russia to effect a disorganization in that empire, lying by ourselves to come in in its need, as its friends. I say "not very profound scheme;" but still, shallow as it was, it was on that account all the more admirable; because the dishonest portion of the nation soon got to the bottom of it and applauded, the virtuous, threw up their hands in indignation and disbelieved. However, the civilizing of the barbarian whether a reason or pretext united all voices.

Besides these there were the reasoning and political men who cared not a fig either for civilization or for Turkey but who with profound sagacity saw that Russia had to be kept out. This great principle being established endless contention arose.—Are the Turks civilized or not—is the Ottoman Empire to be destroyed or preserved—are we fighting for or against civilisation—for or against ourselves?*

If we know what civilization is, we cannot tell where it is to be found. If we know in which direction it marches, we cannot tell what are "obstacles" in its path. For an individual despot to destroy an empire would be a frightful crime, for civilisation in the person of some Liverpool merchants, to do so, it is highly proper and estimable,

* "Our war with Russia is for no speculative object."

"We are engaged for the cause of civilization."—*Lord J. Russell*.

"The mere dissolution of the Turkish Empire would be no more than the dissolution of the kingdom of Dahomy."

"The Turks are truthful and honest, but England can have little sympathy with a people that is not civilized."—*Times*.

"The Integrity and Independence of the Ottoman Empire," for the maintenance of which we are *nominally* fighting, were, in the opinion of a majority of the Council obstacles to civilization and improve-

and not the less so if it is itself that it destroys, and not the empire which is the obstacle in its path.

At the late conferences of Vienna we have another view, or two opposite views, opened by the Austrian Plenipotentiary, by which it appears that civilization is and is not yet attained to being contingent on the unity of Europe, Europe being at once united and at war; he says :—

“ May heaven in enlightening us all decree that the *Union of Europe*, so necessary to the progress of civilization, shall become *more consolidated than ever* from these negotiations.”

Sir A. Alison is more philosophic, and less diplomatic :—

“ At last has arisen that gigantic power which now overshadows the Asiatic empires, and is pouring down on the *corrupted regions of the East* the energy of Northern valour and the *blessings of Christian civilization.*”

I now crave permission to say a word of sense. To keep Russia out of Europe, you must keep Turkey barbarian, and you must become barbarian yourselves if you would be civilized.

The condition of barbarism you had still the opportunity of observing at the beginning of this war in the natural laws, debtless treasury, free-trade, cleanliness of person, truthfulness of tongue, integrity of dealing, toleration, charity, hospitality, refinement of manners, and gentleman-like deportment of the Turks.

The effects of civilization you are now undergoing ment which ought to be got rid of, if practicable, without aggrandizing Russia, not advantages to be maintained at the cost of so much blood and treasure as we have spent and are likely to spend upon them.”—*Liverpool Financial Reform Association.*

in bringing ruin on a confiding ally; in giving victory to a malevolent foe already beaten when you entered the arena; in the fruitless expenditure of 40,000 lives and 50 millions of money; in the abandonment of your fundamental maxims of Maritime Law; in the prostration of all honesty and respect for the governing class, reconciliation to disaster, admission of weakness, and nonsensical talk, preparing you for a continuation and repetition of the like until the death.

PROGRESS—MARCH OF INTELLECT.

I WAS once one of four insides travelling from Edinburgh to Glasgow : one of my companions started the subject of "progress," and we were immediately let in for a discussion on the spirit "of the age,"—no easy task for one to three, and in Scotland. We discussed and rolled along until getting on the stones, I said, "Now, gentlemen, I acknowledge that we have made progress, and that our condition is civilization ; for our journey is finished, and we have arrived in a city ;" but they did not seem to take my submission in good part.

When from a known point you start for another, to move is to advance, and you do progress, which means to step *forward*—Not so when the country is not known, and you have no map. If, however, you keep moving without knowing whither, it is expedient to substitute for the end of the journey, the fact of your own activity. Who could suspect a person in great delight at his "speed" to be groping in the dark ?

There is in England increase of wealth, improvement of machinery, advance in science ; but will any one say there is improvement in government—that is in Wisdom ? Discriminate then and say : "in this branch we *progress*, in that branch we *retrogress* ;" or put it in English and say, "we step forward in this, in that we step backward." Do this like men, and no lips will be defiled with such trash, no minds smothered in such idiocy ? Wherever you generalize, your intellect has marched beyond the reach of sense.

And what is this thing that is to march? Intellect is from inter-lego or "to choose between," it is always placing the operations for the mind. The Roman said, "I understand (intellego); he had no "intellect." To the mind a metaphor of movement cannot apply. That metaphor of movement we apply only to it, and then place it by itself, as if it meant something.

We might expect that the instructors of youth who have to deal in words, would give some if not their principal care to guard against their improper use, and the employment of such as are destitute of meaning. This however is no part of our education. Stress is laid on words and their etymology, only to impress as a prime meaning on the mind of the child the ambiguities which have been admitted into the speech of the man.

At this moment there is not in England a Poet; there is not an Orator—there is not a Statesman; there is not an Architect; there is not an Admiral; there is not a General, nor out of the Cabinet an Actor; it is rational that we should describe ourselves by an irrational word.

MORAL AND PHYSICAL.

It is singular to observe the migrations of Politics, how having abandoned their own seats, they have encroached upon other territories,—invaded and occupied surrounding kingdoms. It was not long since physical science reigned tranquilly in the schools, and moral philosophy showed its benign light from the modern Athens and Cambridge. Now politics has grasped with its right hand the balance of the one, and laid its left upon the chair of the other. But rebellion has followed conquest, the peaceful banners are turned to bloody flags, and Chartists and Repealers are rallied under the hostile colours of moral power and physical force. Meanwhile, England's line of battle-ships are the instruments of moral influence on the furthest seas, and bombs and battalions physically argue progressive propositions in unknown regions of the earth.

How is "moral" the antithesis to "physical"? For no other reason than because "physical" is the antithesis to "moral." And of course, in reason, as in language, use is right and law. Still may we take the painter's and the poet's license and speculate.

Moral, as the readers of Paley know, is an adjective made out of *mos* customs or manners—not that the weak-minded Romans were possessed of such an adjective. Moral is therefore something connected with customs and manners, with which philosophy has much to do, but not our philosophy, or it would be superfluous to call it moral. The antithesis must be *extraordinary immoral*; and as applied to philoso-

phy, it must designate the moral as distinguished from the *immoral* philosophy.

Physical is derived from *φύσις* nature: it is our word natural. Its antithesis is *un-natural*, and if you have physical sciences, there must be also *un-physical* or *un-natural* sciences. If the terms did legitimately belong to science or philosophy, Politics never could have meddled with them. They were ambiguous, unmeaning, confused, and confusing; therefore Politics wanted them, and philosophy and science were too decrepid to retain them.

When they come into the hands of Politics, they are no longer instruments of the learned, but implements of the rude. Illiterate men must prefer homely language, in which shape they will stand as "mannerly force," and "natural force." In that form, however, they would have elicited no bursts of eloquence in the Convention of London, and the Conciliation Hall of Dublin. No squadron could have been sent up the Dardanelles to apply a "mannerly support" to the Sultan of Turkey. How surprised a Roman would be if he could witness the convulsion of the nineteenth century, occasioned by Latin adjectives, which could not be so much as spoken in Latin, which if he heard so spoken would make him hold his sides with such laughter, as would shake those of the British nation, if they heard them spoken in English.

PUBLIC QUESTIONS AND MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

No word can be more unambiguous than question in its private capacity; it is different in its public. In the first it is an interrogation having to be answered; in the second a dispute that cannot be solved. What rational being could call the game laws, or the poor laws a question?

When learning revived in the Universities of Spain, and disquisition reappeared in the schools of Europe, doubts regarding many existing things arose, and the authority for them was questioned: in other words, reasons were sought: *questio* comes from *quæro*, to seek. The method of investigation was carefully framed, and minutely studied, being the revival of the logic of Greece. It was the basis of all learning, and its habits and terms passed to every man instructed in humane letters. This science consisted in the application of the rules of evidence, to the matter of language, so as to reduce every meaning within the strict limits of its symbols. The adaptation of terms to ideas was the aim and end of logic; and for this purpose the categories were called in, which were no other than the questions a man had to put, and to get answered, in order to the true understanding of each subject, and of each term.

The schoolmen became pedants, logic fell into contempt, but still the habit remained of putting a question in the case of doubt: when those doubts so multiplied that the habit of answering fell into

desuetude the enquiry stood by itself, and to say "a question arises," was equivalent to saying "a doubt exists." But then as many doubts sprang up as there were cases, and each case was "a question," and so every thing was called in question, because no one could give an answer. The word has become a label for universal fatuity.

Still this term had been confined to the rabble, or at best the press, and though it was on the lips of the gravest personages, it never was affixed in writing to any formal or official matter. This apotheosis of imbecility has been reserved for a crowning occasion, the dispersion of the Conferences of Vienna. The Blue Book has been thus entitled, "Papers relating to the Negotiations at Vienna on the EASTERN QUESTION." It is worthy of remark that as a general title it succeeds or displaces that of "Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey," which had itself displaced "Integrity and Independence of the Ottoman Empire," which again was but the successor to "Pacification of the East," the whole of which are intended to render, according to their different phases, "the Difficulties (not the Coasts) which surround the Black Sea,"* viz., the obstacles presented by the Turks to being dismembered.

The biographer of Burke writes as follows:—"A history of public questions might be a work worthy of some great benefactor of his country. It would show the perpetual facility with which the public mind may be fruitlessly disturbed; the guilty dexterity with which party exposure may inflame popular passion; and the utter absurdity with which nations may be

* Mr. Gladstone, May 24 1855.

impregnated, at the moment when they are giving themselves credit for supreme wisdom; the whole forming a great legacy of political common sense—an extract from the follies of the fathers, for an antidote to the crimes of posterity.”

We as yet are here deficient in an abstraction: we should have by rights a “questionism,” or “questionability,” to represent the public reason, as we have an abstraction of the answers not given to represent the governing power. We had, once *rogation* of the Commons, as we still have *prerogative* of the Crown. It would surely be more coherent and epigrammatical to distinguish the divine functions of a constitutional government, by an analogous antithesis to Ministerial Responsibility.

If, we so dignify a disposition to question never gratified by a reply, how do we pass unnoticed the faculty of answering when called into exercise? A witness in the box must give answers; a congregation in the church do give responses; we never hear of the responsibility of a witness, or of a congregation, while the word is reserved for those who are never known to give any responses at all—Her Majesty’s Ministers.

In 1842, during the debate upon the Affghan War, I was seated in the gallery of the House of Commons, an anxious and disgusted listener, at a moment when Sir John Hobhouse was agitating himself vehemently between the red box and his vacated seat. My neighbour emitted a growl of intense satisfaction. I turned and scanned him; he was an aged man, with lowering eyebrows, high cheek-bones, retorted nose, depressed chin, and leering aspect—a modern Democritus, pursuing his sport on its proper field. The chord of his risibility was struck by a certain word, and its vibration

fixed that word henceforward in my memory. Sir John Hobhouse was indignantly denouncing the indecorous spirit of questioning arising in the House. I quote not from "*Hansard*," but from my own uncorrected memory—"which interfered with the exercise of the great responsibility vested in Her Majesty's servants." I then recollected passing, a couple of years before, Sir John Hobhouse in the Park, mounted on a very small pony, while several stalwart individuals, mounted on hacks and horses 17 hands high, clad in mourning for their relatives done to death by him in Affghanistan, were circulating around in fearful proximity, and yet, on he rode, with a boldness that would have done credit to an Antar or a Roostem. I now obtained the solution of the extraordinary phenomenon. He was environed—not like *Æneas*, with Venus's cloud—but with the awful mantle of unquestionability.

Responsibility is, therefore, a Governmental process for the engendering of power; power to do right or wrong, as it may happen: men may therefore be proud of it, ashamed of it, grasp at it, shrink from it; it furnishes a store-house of epic positions, a green room of scenic costumes, an arsenal of forensic weapons, a dictionary of sounding talk, conferring on the happy possessor the faculty of doing what he likes, by refusing to tell what he does—"on his responsibility."*

In the recent perplexities that have arisen in reference to how we are to be governed, one grand and

* "Under the circumstances I am perfectly ready to AVOW my responsibility in what then took place."

"We cannot escape the responsibility of the knowledge of these papers."—*Gladstone, May 24th, 1855.*

"I object to answering that question on my responsibility as a Minister."—*Lord Palmerston to Mr. Robinson, 1831.*

classical idea has been struck out, that of instituting a Dictatorship. The peculiar character of a Dictator in Rome was that he should not be called to account; and, on this account, the term of the office was strictly limited to six months. Now, I submit, that in the word "responsibility" we have not only the element of dictatorship, but the very thing. There may be competitors for the office, that is a matter of private arrangement; but the nation may go to bed every night in the week, in the assurance, that out of their breath a palladium for the public security has been wove, realising for the British commonwealth, for every hour of its existence, that critical expedient achieved at rare intervals by the Republic of Rome.

A public journal speaking of the present Premier says, "The country hopes and believes that, in proportion to his power will be his responsibility." The terms ought to be transposed: "In proportion to his responsibility is his power." However, one is not far from the mark when the two are linked together. Since the course of human affairs became so muddled, that words were taken for facts, and "opinion" for "judgment," there never has been a man at whom the word "responsibility" has been so often talked as the predecessor of the present Premier. He gets the blue ribbon by going out of office, and keeps his Government in place!

Well, a "blue ribbon;" what is it? The intestines of a worm, dipped in indigo and alum, spun with a jenny, wove with a shuttle, glazed, and told off by the shopman's yard over a haberdasher's counter. Aye, but then it was a sign of mental power and patriotic worth. So, too, was the other texture, "responsibility," at one time. It did mean, formerly, with regard to this particular branch, killing the Queen's enemies. It now means killing the Queen's subjects.

POLICY AND HONESTY.

SOCRATES is often represented as saying to his interlocutors, "now let us make an effort." Here is the occasion that it is applicable to me and to the reader. The effort I claim from him, is to unthink ; I *ask* him not to take in what I present, but to shut out what is already within. No human being can convey anything to another, but he may assist him in turning to account that which he has. It is never knowledge that is wanting, it is never memory that is at fault. If these were deficient, the deficit would now be supplied, because we are constantly engaged in that task. Men suffer only in reference to matters where they are unconscious of failing—the case, however desperate, is remedied where care and anxiety are awakened. There is one attribute of the mind which never is to us the subject of care or of attention. Every one will deplore his lack of sharpness, of imagination, of memory, of mechanical or mathematical powers, but no man was ever found to regret the weakness of his judgment. It is here, then, that a service may be rendered to him by a fellow-creature; and if he will respond by an effort on his part he may learn to discard from his mind that which is useless. If there were a room so filled with furniture as to be unfit for use, a friend, by persuading you to turn out what was not needed, would make you a present of chairs, tables, sofa, &c., and habitation. Such is our case. Our intellectual lumbars have turned our faculties out of doors.

In a former chapter I have disposed of the etymology of the word.* I now propose to deal with it as in common use, and to show how the sound derived from a sense which is extinct serves to maintain the ball of idle discussion, and to cloak acts bearable only because disguised. I will commence with a reply I gave a Committee of Working Men.

“Qu. In what sense do you use the word “policy?”

“Ans. Policy is a word without meaning; when a nation comes to use words that have no meaning, they are ready for acts that have the worst of meaning. It is by the tongue being misled that the brain is confused. Clear false terms from a language, and the nation becomes honest. Confuse its terms, and the people become worthless. You have here in this simple question, and in my answer, the means of putting yourselves right. The word “policy,” while meaning nothing, covers an absence of meaning. It does not imply the thing that is good; yet it is a mask for the thing that is bad. Consequently it has a double meaning. As there have been men wishing to state things which it was not desirable a nation should understand; and having at the same time to deal with a nation not acute enough to perceive the process of deception, they have substituted for the simple statement of such acts, a general word, such as that of “policy.” It has been done in time past. At present no man makes the effort of deception; but all are victims of the mist it has occasioned.

“Qu. The word is most commonly used with regard to foreign affairs; and we are under the impression that of the different parties in the state one may have one foreign policy, and another another. Is it so?

* See “Religion and Politics,” page 16.

Ans. Of course I must here take the word as the system. The question may be put thus—Is there a system of foreign affairs belonging to the Whigs, and is there a system of foreign affairs belonging to the Tories? What I have stated with reference to the Austrian, French, and Turkish treaties is the answer in the negative. We find the minister pursuing the objects of a foreign state, and the opponents of that minister are ignorant of what he is about. Here there is no system anywhere, unless it be a system to disguise the truth, not for the service of any British interest, but for the service of a foreign state. Therefore there is no difference between one party and the other. You have it illustrated most efficiently at the present moment. The two foreign ministers who have represented opposite principles, are united in the same cabinet.”

We understand the word as the craft or manner of government. By so understanding it, we do, in fact, institute a government of policy. If we had not this understanding, we should have to return to our previous state.

Government by law may be good or bad. Government, save by law, is no government at all.

Policy represents “those practices which it was the object of the institution of government to put down.”*

We did not at once lapse from government by law to government by policy. There was a transition phrase—“reasons of state,” or “law of state.” It passed with extreme difficulty, and even danger, and those who first uttered it were martyrs to the cause of progress, and visited the Tower. A generation ago

* Lord Lyttleton : His sentence begins, “Government now consists in those practices,” &c.

“reasons of state” were held treason to the state by the then highest legal authority, Lord Camden, who stated even in Parliament in reference to the unnatural position of a Chancellor of England occupying a place in a cabinet, that when seated at a counsel-board he had often “hung his head, when testimony to things that an English judge should not listen to.” However, intellect marched on, the mask was dropped.

The proverb “Honesty is the best policy,” tells very distinctly the public inference in respect to its nature. But is it a thing? Who will show what it is? They tell us of the policy of the government—the policy of England—the policy of France—the policy of the whigs—the policy of the tories; substitute for policy, object, and the phrase will run the same; but if you said object you would have to proceed to state *what* object.

Thus the matter would become seizable, and it would be possible for men to apply to it some rule, be it right or wrong, of morals or of conduct. This is precisely what is not desirable for those who govern, and in a constitutional system unfortunately the governors are those possessed of the best heads. And they make an outcry for strong government, for able leaders. Alas! Alas! What evil does England suffer from, but from her government, and a remedy is its increase! Had the government and the parliament of England been extinguished two years ago—had our printing presses, ay, and our navies, been sunk in the Red Sea, she would to-day be tranquil and secure. But even had the word “policy” been withdrawn from the sum of her bewildering talk, that government and that press would have found it difficult to befool the nation to the extent of placing us and Europe in our actual jeopardy.

Still we are come better off than our neighbours. "Policy" is with us after all but a mouthy word; with them it makes up into an argumentative sentence. We can only speak in English of "policy" as a thing extant, we cannot say "make policy."

A remarkable instance occurs to me of the influence on the destinies of the human race exercised by the mere articulation of that phrase. In September 1840, I was arguing with M. Thiers the possibility and facility of breaking the treaty of 1840 by sending away the English ambassador from Paris. During a period of anxious pause the silence was broken by a shrill voice uttering these words: "*Ce n'est pas comme cela que nous faisons de la politique,*" and so the occasion was lost. Had the conversation taken place in English, the interjection would have been impossible, because it could only have been rendered by "that would not be good policy," which would only have brought us back again to the argument, and it would not have been said. The phrase proceeded from M. Leon Faucher, and it may thus be understood how well-earned was the gratification which he received from the Emperor of Russia* on the ground of his being a "friend to public order."

The case submitted to M. Thiers presented indeed a grave difficulty. The course suggested required a variety of collateral measures to give it effect, measures which would have put France fair with Turkey, and in opposition to Russia on all points, by assuming the position of the defender of public right. Reduced to its simple expression, it was the restoration to Turkey of the lost provinces of that empire;

* His wife was a Pole, and her property, which had been confiscated, was restored to him.

without that, the dismissal of the English ambassador availed nothing. What did this amount to? It was a return to honesty on the part of France. My reply therefore to M. Faucher was, "If this is not the way to make policy, it is the way to be honest." The argument was lost upon M. Thiers; he who can understand policy cannot understand honesty.

To say "policy is the best honesty" shows that honesty is a thing clearly understood, whilst policy is a thing not understood. To speak of policy is to be dishonest; but that is not all: it is to be unable to understand either what is honest or what is knavish, so you are shut out from the gains alike of virtue and of fraud.

But is honesty the best policy? I doubt it; for the men to whom the proverb needs to be adduced are not those who have to be instructed in what is serviceable to their own interests; but I will tell you when honesty is the best policy, and that is, on the rare occasions when knaves have to deal with honest men who are not fools.

To men suspended in the void, the earth itself appears but as a cloud. Minds afloat on generalization look on facts as they do on air. Here there is the effort required—the effort to get down and touch the earth. They cannot comprehend how plain dealing can extricate them from the troubles they have brought on themselves by speculating.

If a clerk in a banking-house neglected to enter the drafts he paid, or turned them to his own profit, or forged the signature of the firm, and the partners applied themselves to speculate on the policy of his conduct or the policy of theirs, and if the public applied themselves to speculating on the probabilities in reference to the facts, or such hints as might be

obtained from the other clerks or the porters in the establishment, and then to write leaders in the different newspapers on the different views of policy that might be entertained in reference to the supposed facts, and that public opinion interposed to arrange the facts and to conclude upon the policy in its own antithetical fashion, the cause would become insoluble, and the Bank, in Sir R. Peel's phraseology, would "go out of existence."

To deal with it as a dishonest act, would entail some little trouble upon the partners and a great deal of annoyance upon the culprit, but the public would be relieved from a vast load of business: the case would never be heard of beyond the score of individuals concerned, the field of forgery and speculation would be so far shut to individual enterprise, the bank in question not be ruined, and similar establishments not placed in danger. This is looking at a matter on the side of honesty. A very homely and quiet sort of thing, and without any attractions for an intellectual age. Thus is "private" synonymous with honest, and "public" with politic; or again, "private" with practical, and "public" with "theoretical."

But if the exercise of his intellectual faculties is a source of enjoyment to man, so also is the possession of well-being, repose, wealth, and luxury; if the one set of inducements be pitted against the other, we might expect that the physical should prevail over the intellectual, the more so as each man invariably in his own private concerns does prefer the latter to the former: how then are we to account for the contrast? Simply, that every man understands his private concerns, and no man understands the public

It will be objected, that the simple method of former times involves a knowledge of public concerns, which of course is preposterous, as we are much more advanced than our forefathers, and have the benefit of free discussion and a free press.

I answer, that our forefathers did understand public matters, and did even consider them as private ones. That, considering them as private ones, and dealing with them as such, the one was as simple and as intelligible as the other, and every man was honest *and* political.

That honest people were indeed destitute of "the air which we breathe, and without which we die;" but they had arms in their hands, and knew how to use them. There was a grand inquest of the Nation, and there was a high court of parliament, and the days of impeachment had not gone by. Now see what policy has given you instead. Thus writes Mr. Macaulay: "It is impossible to deny that impeachment, though a fine ceremony, and useful in the seventeenth century, is not a proceeding from which much good can now be expected. Whatever confidence may be placed in the decision of the peers on an appeal arising out of ordinary litigation, it is certain that no man has the least confidence in their impartiality. When a great public functionary, charged with a great state crime, is brought to their bar, *they are all politicians*. There is hardly one among them whose vote on an impeachment may not be confidently predicted before a witness has been examined; and even if it were possible to rely on their justice, *they would still be quite unfit to try such a cause.*"*

Honesty declares grievance, and demands redress.

* Macaulay.

Policy ignores both. Those arguments which I now employ against our individual misjudgments, it will evoke for the convulsion of the state, when sober thought will have been overpowered by revolutionary feeling.

PUBLIC OPINION AND PRIVATE JUDGMENT.

“The mind reposes as quietly before known ignorance, as before ascertained truth.”—*Arnold*.

A MAN introduced into the society of the blind,* is delighted and astonished at the uses to which they turn the senses which they retain. Those of touch and hearing become so powerful, as in a measure to stand in lieu of that one which is wanting, whilst there is a corresponding development of the reasoning faculties in immediate connection with the senses. We have a case, which I might almost call a psychological phenomenon, that of Laura Bridgeman, where, by means of one sense out of the five, that of touch, the individual has been reattached to its species by all the ties which apparently can be linked by the understanding. This poor girl through the aid of the fingers has attained to the enjoyments of the domestic affections, has been endowed with the extremest delicacy of feeling, and what is most remarkable, is “at once pertinacious of her rights, and respectful of the rights of others.”†

Man is so largely endowed that he is oppressed

* In “The Poor of London” will be found a description of the blind of London not inclosed in asylums well deserving perusal.

† The case is mentioned in Dickens’ *America*, though not the points here selected. These will be found in Dr. Howe’s account of the process he employed for her instruction.

with the vastness of the resources lying hidden in him; the estimate that he forms of himself is, that of his neglect rather than of his riches. It is only when an accident has partially revealed some item in another, that the suggestion arises of what he might be if he cultivated himself.

The mind is concealed behind the senses, while these are latent, cannot be known. The mind too has its sight, its hearing, and its touch; but there is this difference, that the deprivation of one does not quicken the remainder. In the body there are necessities unremitting for culture and exercise, at once impelling and correcting. All these are wanting in the mind; here the impulse, if it arises, is from within; there is no fellowship to sustain, no model to excite, no censure to correct: from without, it is exposed only to impediments and risks.

Our faculties are remarkably acute, when exerted on the relations to each other of the objects of inanimate nature. In all matters not scientific and not of mere business routine, it is the rarest of things to meet with a cultured mind; there, the only faculty exerted is the memory. This want of culture does not bring indolence and quiescence as in the case of body, but, on the contrary, activity and presumption.

The senses whilst they constitute life are destined also for its protection from the accidents to which it may be exposed. Dullness of hearing may in the domestic circle be conducive to quietude, which on the field of battle may endanger life. So at one period the neglect of our talents, and their consequent activity, may be indulged in with safety, whilst at another we may be thereby exposed to suffering, to danger, and to ruin. The latter is our condition. Three centuries of this disordered activity has de-

veloped doubt respecting every fact and every maxim, made doubt the source of action, and has subjected to this action constitutional, municipal, and international law; that is to say, tranquillity at home, and security abroad. To be right is therefore now become a necessity of existence.

But the difficulty is in proportion to the necessity. Already is the error a man has to correct a part of him: how can he form the design of looking into it? For this commencement a discovery is necessary greater than that of Columbus—one for which the powers of a Bacon, were he to live to-day, would not suffice—*that it is a man's business to be right*. I do not see how it is possible for any one, however great his powers, having grown to manhood amongst us to reach to this primitive truth save by some happy accident which has thrown him into another sphere, being at the same time gifted with rare ingenuousness of nature and earnestness of disposition. For years my sole hope has resided in the chance of persuading some great mind to retire to the desert, from the arena of politics and so to subject himself to the discipline of that forgetfulness of petty and immediate things, which has ever been the condition on which men have attained to permanent greatness, and conferred greatness and longevity upon empires. To be ourselves, we must lay down our age.

Whoever perceives that it is his duty to be right, has discovered that all are wrong; not wrong by accident, for then the case would be hopeless, but by method. He will also know, that to be right in any one point, he must be right in all. Will he not then recoil at the sight of the hopeless and endless mass, not of human aberration only, but also of passion, through which he has to fight his way? The vastness

of this delusion invests it with grandeur, and confers a magic power upon the name which we give to it; so that even the good impulses of our nature join in magnifying it, for it is the intellect of man they see in its aberrations, and they see it in no other form.

Once, however, the mind quickened, it acquires the power of endurance, if not that of success. The very universality of error becomes its guide and protection, for it knows that it has failed and fallen, whenever it is alike those around it. In the event of success in working out its way to results, there does open a possibility of their being transferred to the state, by reason of that very intellectual prostration which has rendered error universal.

It is the fortress of intelligence, and the palladium of liberty that I thus speak of. I venture to assail that "Opinion" held by all to be the lever of politics, the symptom of improvement, and the sign of worth. The very purpose each man will take as an offence to himself, yet each man commits that offence; for whoever entertains an opinion assails its opposite. The difference is this: that he impugns a conclusion, I the method.

It is assumed that a man's opinion is his own, and indeed that he has a right to it. It can be his own only by being achieved through his labour. Yet neither are the data ascertained by himself, nor are the formulas of his own invention. The signs themselves, words, contain values not of his own fixing, and of which he is even in ignorance. All these belong to his age, not himself. So far then from any offence to his self-love in impugning his opinions, it is the greatest compliment you can pay a man, because you appeal to himself against the accidents of his birth and circumstances.

From the moment that I perceived that it was my business to be right, I ceased to have opinions, because I knew a thing for certain or knew that I did not know it,* and it is from finding the benefit of this freedom,† that I am anxious that others should enjoy it.

It might appear that this would involve the taking up of each separate matter with each individual, and in each case convicting him of error, but it is not so, because that would be dealing with definite objects, which are excluded when we use the word. We take it for knowledge, and at the same time we understand it as doubt; put in this shape it could not be used, and that is all I contend for. If I can show, not that it is equivalent to doubt, but that those who use it consider it to be so, I shall have established my case.

We say, "I am of such an opinion;" we never say, "I am of such faculties," or "of such a judgment," or "of such knowledge." Faculties and judgment are the gift of God, and by them we attain to knowledge. Thus, syntax reveals a distinction between this word opinion and those other words respecting which there is no ambiguity.

We draw a distinction between opinion and judgment, and yet we equally say, "my opinion" and "my judgment." In the latter case we imply the faculty of judging, but not in the former, and yet it conveys a conclusion; in both these instances certainty

* Socrates, in the first Alcibiades, shows that it is not from what we do not know, but from what we think we know, that all disorders come. He describes as approaching to insanity the condition of a man who does not know whether he knows or not. The dialogue might be entitled, "On Opinion."

† "The freedom of a man consists of speaking the truth."—*Ali*.

is connected with the words that stand in opposition to opinion, and the opposite to certainty is doubt.

The word in Latin was formed in the latter time of the Roman people out of a verb, which we also have, to opine, which means to guess or doubt—which is synonymous with our own “to think.” In the verb you see the mind in action; in the substantive you have the same action abstractedly. If you ask a man your way, and, instead of telling you, he says, “I think you ought to turn to your right:” that it is his opinion that you ought to turn to your right; you have learned that he is in doubt, and you act upon that knowledge, for you repeat your question to the next passer-by.

Whenever a man describes to you what is passing in himself instead of informing you of what you desire to know, you are aware that he is not in possession of that knowledge, and moreover that he is not logical in his habits; for if he were he would state his ignorance: and every man gives you this information who uses the verb “to think,” or the substantive “opinion.” He tells you in fact that he has not thought, if thought really means a successful exercise of his faculties; and this is all that need be said of opinion if we were not dealing with a habit.

Opinion is a term of law, and it is as such that it has passed into our language together with “verdict” [*vere dictum*] and “judgment,” which have retained their proper meaning. The first is the conclusion of the advocate or barrister on the *ex parte* case submitted to him by the agent or attorney. The second is that of the jury after sifting the evidence on both sides. The third is that of the judge when in possession of the statement on both sides, of the evidence

sworn to, of the finding of the jury; to all which he applies the test of the law, the judgment being the completion of the process which has been put into course of adjudication on the contradiction of the opinions formed upon the two *ex parte* statements—that adjudication proceeding on the assumption of necessary error in one of the opinions.

There is no term in the English language which is questionable or questioned, of which the sense is laid down and defined in a more precise, emphatic, and practical manner; that value being preserved and acted upon in every single case of litigated rights throughout the land. Yet its universal application is in contradiction with this definition and this use; so much so that it is sufficient to define it in the one sense, to take the contrary of its definition in the other. For an opinion not legal there requires no jury to investigate facts, no judge to apply to them the law, nor is even so much as an *ex parte* statement wanted; whilst it supersedes verdict and judgment, and being adopted without hesitation is reversed the next hour.

The meaning of a term has to be sought for in its antithesis no less than in itself. What in this case is that antithesis? JUDGMENT, the word which we associate with our Creator, where we would represent his vengeance on the errors of man. It represents the faculties of man in their highest and most perfect exercise. It is synonymous with justice and truth, which are certain, unchangeable, and even eternal; and in all these again it is the antithesis to opinion, which is changeable, which is uncertain, and which being of the hour can have no connection with truth, with justice or eternity. I tremble lest in pointing out this testimony which our lips still bear

that instead of suggesting the duty of eschewing opinion, I am merely suggesting the idea of obliterating the distinction.*

No man is ashamed to avow weakness of memory ; on the contrary, he is rather prone to confess it : no one was ever heard to confess weakness of judgment. In my experience, I have found memory always in excess ; they know too many things. Knowledge is analogous to appetite in the body—judgment to digestion ; the one is external, the other internal ; the one evident, the other occult ; as voracity is fatal to digestion, so is the desire of knowing to judgment, unless it be the wholesome appetite which results from the due performance of the internal functions. A nation seeking for news, a people who talk to you of facts,† is one where the mental digestive organs are fearfully disordered.

* Since the above was written I have fallen upon this passage in the most authoritative work on Logic, showing that the corruption of the times is sufficiently acute not to need my aid :—"Since, therefore, each gives the preference to unassisted common sense only in those cases where he himself has nothing else to trust to, and invariably resorts to the rules of art wherever he possesses the knowledge of them, it is plain that mankind universally bear their testimony, though unconsciously, and often unwillingly, to the preferableness of *systematic knowledge to conjectural judgments.*"—*Whately's Logic. Preface, p. xii.*

Elsewhere judgment is thus defined :—"Judgment is the comparing together in the mind two of the notions, or ideas, which are the objects of apprehension, whether complex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they *agree* or *disagree* with each other ; or that one of them belongs, or does not belong, to the other. Judgment therefore is either affirmative or negative."—Book II, chap. i.

† The last of reproaches addressed by Demosthenes to the Athenians was, that they were lovers of news, in other words, gossips. Facts are things done—*facta* ; we speak of them as data. Let any one read M. Guizot's History of Civilization with the knowledge that he has before him a morbid corpse to examine, and he will regain a wholesome nausea for the atrocious word. He will

If men were in the habit of complaining of their judgment, the complaint would be groundless, because it is within every one's reach who feels he is in want of it. To be judicious it simply requires to be attentive. Judgment is life, for life is attention. I was once asked by a friend whom I had succeeded in convincing of a series of misjudgments, that is opinions, contained in a single phrase, for a rule to keep him right for the future. My answer was, "live." Three years afterwards we met again, and he said to me, "I now understand your word and discovered its meaning by your having left me to puzzle over it." This attention is not of a serious or a deliberative kind, but of a trifling, commonplace, and incessant one. It is a habit of watching and observing every person and everything; the context of speech as well as its significance; the eye, the manner, the cheek, the attitudes of the body, the movement of the hand, of the foot, so as to picture to yourself all that is passing in the man, and all that a man is, in whom a given operation is being performed. This may be supposed to involve a great expenditure of labour. No, it is a continual source of enjoyment. It is the calling forth of life from its latent condition, and giving you a daily crop of gratifications independently of those which result from the uses to which these are applied. Nature works out all her processes by attraction. Wherever you do well you are happy.

If opinion be the antithesis to judgment, opinion is also the antithesis to life and happiness, as well as to accuracy and use. By judgment we possess in every

there find "great fact," "two-fold fact," "general fact," a whole menagerie of Pythons and chimeras sufficient to explain the present state of France.

mental operation a distinct organic existence; with opinion you have chaos, which word, of Phœnician origin, meant darkness.

The absence of essays and disquisitions on this word, is to be attributed to this, that it is either bowed down before as an idol, or spurned as a loathsome slough. Those who practically know it in its workings, are careful to conceal their profitable knowledge. Those who know without using it, are turned to misanthropists, and neither hope nor desire to benefit such a people. Besides, since it has attained to supremacy, there has been in England pre-eminence only for evil. Still a few passages are scattered here and there throughout our literature, which will not be unacceptable to whoever has subdued his indignation enough to follow me thus far.

“Opinion is when the assent of the understanding is so far gained by evidence of probabilities that it rather inclines to one persuasion than to another, yet not without a mixture of uncertainty and doubting.”—This is from Sir Matthew Hale. What would he have said of England ruled by this condition of the mind?

Bishop Wilkins freely renders the celebrated passage of Cicero—*Opinionum commenta delet dies, &c.*, thus “Time wears off the fictions of opinion, and doth by degrees discover and unmask the fallacy of ungrounded persuasions.”

Ben Jonson says,—“Opinion is a light, vain, crude, and imperfect thing settled in the imagination, but never arriving at the understanding there to obtain a tincture of the Reason.”

His dogmatic namesake presents to us “opinion” as “guess” in a Latin dress, thus—

“OPINION, persuasion of the mind without proof or certain knowledge.”

"GUESS, judgment without any positive or certain grounds."

"CONJECTURE, guess, imperfect knowledge, preponderation of opinion without proof."

Burke, who treats with contempt the idea of a government providing for popular wants, equally ridicules the idea of a Member of Parliament being the representative of opinion, declaring his duty to be "that of corrector of the opinions of his times, and especially of those of his constituents."

A Poet (Byron) having seen the monster full grown, thus portrays him,—

"Opinion, an Omnipotence whose veil
Mantles the earth with darkness until right
And wrong are accidents."

But what I am dealing with is "a public opinion," not a word, but a power; not the frailties of individuals but the aggregate, abstract and perfect intelligence of a community; not the intelligence of the community as existing in all times and as subject to variations; but a discovery effected and perfected in the freest of States in the most advanced of periods, surpassing all the prior efforts of wisdom or of genius, and conferring gifts on man, such as severally they had not derived from the teaching of a Socrates and the laws of an Alfred.—Nor is this what the frivolous narrate, but what the able inculcate.*

* "We must not forget that a principle of government is reserved for our own days, that we shall not find in our Aristotles, or even in the forests of Tacitus, nor in our Saxon Wittenagemotes, nor in our Plantagenet Parliaments. Opinion now is supreme, and opinion speaks in print. The representation of the press is far more complete than the representation of Parliament. Parliamentary representation was the happy device of a ruder age, to which it was admirably adapted; an age of semicivilisation, when there was a

And here I confess that I am placed in a most painful and embarrassing situation; one to be compared to the hero of an isle of enchantment rather than to that of a disputant in a forensic debate. I have to combat a principle of conduct and a discovery of politics which I hear of everywhere, and which is believed by all. Principles and discoveries have to be established before they are admitted and accepted, and when, being so, they are impugned, you can go back on the shelves of libraries for the arguments and proceed through the monuments of events to trace their application and their results. But here there are no ponderous tomes, no fugitive essays: why it was accepted you do not know, nor when it was invented. Its date, its author, and its history are alike unknown. It has had no antiquity, no expositor, and no opponent. There have been dissidents, but that dissent has never taken an expository shape; there has been no critical pursuit of facts, or exposition of fallacies; the disposition to condemn has never resulted in the effort to destroy, but has evaporated in a sarcastic phrase or vituperative epithet.

If again I look around me to see if I can see traces of it by my unaided efforts, I am equally at fault. In what should so happy a condition reveal itself? Surely in wisdom in the conduct of the state—I see only insanity: in caution in the judgments of men—I see only recklessness: in economy of the public resources—I see only extravagance: in contentment in the minds of the citizens—I see only rancour and

leading class in the community; but it exhibits many symptoms of desuetude. It is controlled by a system of representation more vigorous and comprehensive, which absorbs its duties and fulfils them more efficiently, and in which discussion is pursued on fairer terms, and often with more depth and information.”—*Coningsby*.

disgust: in respect for those who rule—I see only contempt: in unanimity of the public mind—I find, on the contrary, Public Opinion.*

I may therefore claim some indulgence at the hands of the reader in an attempt to open a new field and to place the matter in that way for discussion which shall give alike to votaries and unbelievers the opportunity of establishing its claims or quashing its pretensions.

It might create a useful pause and awaken a sense of self-examination to know that this word was not known and could not be spoken in the classical ages or languages;† from which we have received our philosophy and the build of our instruction—that it was not known in that language or to be found in that book through which we are taught all our duties,—that it is not to be found in the pre-eminent writers of our own country on which we form our style. But instead of doubts being suggested by such facts, we change them into grounds of presumption, and pride ourselves on the great discovery we have made.

We are content with taking its existence as the evidence of intellectual activity, and look upon those destitute of opinions as sunk in mental atrophy.

We say “the public interest,” “the public debt,” how is it that we cannot employ the definite article in this case also, and say “*the* public opinion.” It

* “Men only differ, when they are wrong, in respect to what they know they agree.”—*Socrates*.

† There is a Greek word which we translate “opinion,” but that word is dogma, and etymologically means a thing shown. The word opinion is Latin, but it was not used in our sense, but as we have preserved it in the word “opine.” As such it was antithetical to judgment, standing as hypothesis to certainty. “*Opinio publica*” could not be said in Latin.

is that we imply something indefinite; but opinions are many, not indefinite, and opinion taken generally must include the several opinions of which it is the aggregate. The anomaly of expression is to be found in the incongruity of the process. The opinions are those of parties. There is the opinion of the Whigs, the opinion of the Tories, the opinion of the Radicals, the opinion of the Chartists. Aggregate, indefinite opinion is therefore Toryism *plus* Whiggery, *plus* Radicalism, and *plus* Chartism. Then it would take the definite article, but these are not *plus* but *minus* each other. The one neutralizes the other, just as by the addition of an alkali to an acid, there remains neither alkali nor acid, but effervescence. We bring the matter here to its real issue, as already shown in individual cases where opinion is absence of thought and pretension to it; in that case however it results from failure to conclude; in this from opposition of conclusions. Public opinion, however, is true as a label, signifying the prostration of the faculties, public and private.

No man is born a Whig or a Tory. Party is neither a belief nor an accent to be inculcated or accepted independently of the will. It is an acknowledged sitting in judgment, in the government and the history of man. You sit down to politics as to mathematics or medicine, adjust your *curriculum*, and when you have completed it are qualified to give laws to the world. No one does so pretend: but must he not, had he really gone through the process? If not, he is merely floating on the stream of fraud and guess, which has constituted the history of whatever faction he has belonged to by birth, or adhered to by design if able, by belief if weak. But after all, no private man belongs to party by attrac-

tion. He is a Tory not to be a Whig, and a Whig not to be a Tory. So in each alternation of power the one government is brought in only to drive out the other.

When Solon made it penal to abstain from taking part in the public dissensions he marked a time when to discomfit evil men it sufficed for the public not to be indifferent: to-day to attain the same end, he would hang every man who did take part in the public dissensions.

An objectless war is an endless one, but if so in arms, far more is it in dogma. If a man accepts a mass of notions and says, "these are political truths," and is pitted against another similarly situated,—can you expect other results than those which we behold around us? It would be so if the prizes of the political lottery were not at stake. But you have cast the highest distinctions of office into the arena as the crown to be won in this ignoble and unnatural strife. You exclude from office honesty because party wins it, to which no honest man can belong; and you direct the whole of the available energies, whether of faculty and genius, or of interest and ambition, to pervert and mislead the public judgment by exciting the elements of that factious war in which the chief combatants have alone the hope of triumph or the fear of defeat.

The chief use of a king is to prevent the perversion of maxims into merchandise with which to truck and barter for office; to obtain free-trade in power you have put down kingship.

But how can it be that in a whole people you find not one free from this mental thrall. The reason is, that no one can stand neuter unless he stands above, and requires that he should be free not from

the political but the metaphysical corruption of his times.

Sir W. Scott has given the rationale of party in the motives of Steenie Steenson for becoming a Tory, "just out of a kind of necessity that he might belong to some side or other."

While all are content to bend to this yoke, there are none who in their secret conscience do not loathe it. I do not mean merely "that party is for fools to believe and clever men to use," as an ex-Chancellor once said to me, but even the fools themselves are secretly aware that they are knaves. In the course of a stormy election at Sheffield I put this conjecture to a dangerous test. On a platform where no one would accompany me from bodily fear, I used these words to 3000 of as uninviting critics as could be collected from Lands End to John-a-Groats.—"There is not one here present who in professing to entertain a political opinion is not conscious to himself that he is a knave." A burst of denegation followed,—I slowly repeated my words—silence ensued—I again repeated them. Then came a burst of vehement applause; those seated rose, waving hats and handkerchiefs. A voice within tells the man that he was born for something better than to be a Tory or a Whig, a Radical or a Chartist, a Republican or a Monarchist.

To assume a designation different from that of our country is to lay down the character of Englishmen. Then comes associations with foreigners against fellow-countrymen, which is treason of the heart.*

* How Russia marks and gloats on these signs of decomposition the following extract will show :—

"Naturally enough the jealous party in every state are more sincerely and more heartily devoted to the adherents of similar

If in a discussion arising out of a faulty reckoning in a day's work on board a man-of-war—if on taking up an artery on the table of an hospital theatre—if in adjusting a difference of entry in a merchant's day-book—if on weighing the relative credibility of evidence in an Old Bailey jury-box, it was proposed to refer the decision to opinion, the hearers would stand aghast, and the proposers would be set down as insane; and to that which no man in his senses will confide a single ship,—a single limb,—a single commercial speculation,—or a single case of petty larceny, a whole people, in its sagacity, is content to confide the management of a nation.

The reader, on perusing these lines, may be startled for a moment, and then say, "very true, but——"

This "but" is a wonderful particle. It enables men to put "no" and "yes" together, and to enjoy the satisfaction of entertaining two opinions of an opposite nature; and of drawing a logical conclusion from them.

He will say, "Very true; but public are not like private matters. Private matters are ruled by private opinion, and public matters by public opinion."

Put then the case the other way. A minister has to settle a knotty point with a Turkish Ambassador—will Public Opinion serve him any more than it would serve the midshipman in a day's reckoning? He has to determine the right of search with France—will Public Opinion serve him more than the jury-

political doctrines in every other country than to their fellow-citizens, or their natural government, when these are not included in the same political creed. The consequence of this is the true wants of the state are neglected and mistaken, the indulgence of passion is even sought in the ruin of the Fatherland—the hearts of men are turned from home to foreign interests."—*Russian Memoir on Germany, Portfolio*, vol. i, p. 119.

man in the box? He has to determine on the place and manner of striking at Russia a deadly blow—will Public Opinion serve him more than the surgeon in operating on a limb? He has to determine on the means of carrying a beleaguered fortress—will Public Opinion serve him more than the merchant in the assortment of a general cargo? All these operations require knowledge of the elements and practice of Public Law—appreciations of the resources of States—dexterity in dealing with Men—capacity in the management of Business:—things that have no ratio to Public Opinion, and with which it cannot be even so much as mentioned.

Every subject must be understood in itself; every sane people must provide itself with the elements of knowledge, and, with public servants duly qualified.

The apprehension of the distinction between Public and Private is not less essential than that between judgment and opinion: it is requisite to know that there is none for a man to recover integrity. When Mr. Burke met the distinction which Lord North would have drawn between their public and their private relations by the words "*public and private*," the rebuke was taken for an epigram and would now be held to be a platitude. It is part of the education which we receive that a man has distinct characters. We are trained up to these ideas; we cannot be told that it is not so since we adapt ourselves to them. We have a public and private morality; there are public matters and private matters. Who can be made to understand that they are so merely on account of the distinction drawn in the mind which in the one case cloaks immorality under "*public*," and in the other cloaks ignorance by the same name? This distinction has destroyed the link between the in-

dividual and the community; and it is only one of the results that the Bible has become to us a sealed and incomprehensible book.* Fearful as may be those results, they will appear perfectly natural to any one who will concentrate his thoughts upon himself and work out the consequences following upon the admission into his speech of a term that is indistinct. I know that there is no use in writing on such subjects, but yet it is one's business to make the attempt; something is gained if the idea can be established that there may be diseases of the mind common to a whole people, which diseases, like those of the body, are incurable by books, and, unlike those of the body, may be propagated by means of them.

To be worth anything a man's opinion must be his own; if it is public, it is as a hack biped or quadruped, which is for hire for every one else as for you. Freedom of mind resides in private judgment.

When reason rose upon authority, the banner of human intelligence was "private judgment." Hence reformation in the church, free institutions in politics. The word private was selected to imply the effort consciously and conscientiously made by each individual, because resistance, whether to corruptions of faith, or abuses of law, could have its origin only in the "public-mindedness" of private men.† Luther and Hampden had to combat the generality, just as to-day those have who would correct error.

The systems which they combated, namely the Christian Church and the English constitution, had

* The last trace which I find of the connexion of religion with those duties which *we* distinguish from private is in the year 1782, in a sermon preached on the fast by the Rev. John Newton of Olney.

† "All nations that grew great out of little or nothing, did so merely by the public-mindedness of particular persons."—SOUTH.

themselves originally to struggle into life by means of the private faculties of great minds against practices and opinions agreeable to the public; though then spoken of in more logical manner. St. Paul overthrew the Sanhedrim, Alfred the Danes.

Every origin is great, but every origin is to be found in a single breast: every greatness is therefore private. It attains in time to that of numbers and authority, and possessing in that sense power, becomes public and corrupt, so that when a struggle arises between individuals and the mass, it is always a struggle between private judgment and public opinion.

In the present case the party in possession has no Talmud on which to take its stand, no Dannebrog to rally under, nor has it the thunders of the Vatican at its disposal, or the sentences of a Jeffries; it has merely a word: it has not anything in that word or under it; but a word which confessedly represents anything and everything, and therefore nothing, must be more powerful than all the bad powers of real existence which have exercised their despotism over man, for it is lodged in the heart of each, an imbecile inmate which assimilates the possessed to its own nature.

We say "my public rights," "my public duties;" no one says "my public opinion." We say "the public interest," "the public debt," "the Queen," "the Crown;" but no one says "*the* public opinion." It is an excommunicate word which can be linked on to nothing, possessed by no one, and attributed to nothing. It is a phantom seen everywhere, and which you can touch nowhere.

Public-mindedness is the direct opposite to public opinion. We hear of nothing but public opinion, we know nothing of public-mindedness. My life is

spent in urging individuals to efforts connected with their public welfare. I am invariably met with the expression of their unwillingness to attend to public matters, or their powerlessness to effect any thing if they did. They have got their private business to attend to, care only for that, and for the rest discharge themselves on public opinion. If we turn back to periods when men could be moved by public interests, when they could be indignant at failures, resolute to arrest abuse, and resolved to pursue and punish crimes in high functionaries, there we will find no such thing as Public Opinion: the name was not even known; it was invented only when public-mindedness was lost in each individual.

After all, the opinion of many is only the opinion of one, being the opinion of each. Numbers tell in armies, not in thoughts: a nation may be great by its numbers and little by its thoughts. The opinion of one man is nowise changed because the man next to him entertains it. Nothing is evolved by aggregation, and consequently no further meaning is adjoined by the word "public." Why then is it added? For this reason, and a very good one—the consciousness of weakness. They know that their opinions are worthless, and they wish to sustain themselves by authority. They would make it appear that the opinion of each is fortified by so many independent conclusions, whilst the one only repeats what the other says.

The man who is conscious that he is right cares not for the numbers opposed to him. He is courageous, can stand alone, and glories in his isolation. He is not a bill in Parliament. Without such consciousness, the man is a coward; wants shouldering and backing; his life is in the herd.

When two persons cannot agree it is common to say "opinions differ," "it is a matter of opinion." We use it then confessedly in the sense of difference, and of a difference insuperable: which is the recognition of reason being at fault.

This truth is illustrated in the progress of every science. While data are uncertain, while conclusions are illogical, theories are broached by active spirits and counter-hypotheses arise against them; they jostle with this good effect, that each pulls down the unsteady part of his antagonist's edifice, and, coming to the ground together, new energies are developed, a larger basis seized, a correcter method hit upon, and, at length, truth being arrived at, disciples cease to wrangle, doctors to disagree; from that field the mist of opinion is rolled off and sweeps to leeward amidst forgotten things.

But this experience does not serve, because it does not suit us. In science, passion springs from theory—in politics, opinions from interest. Nor are the procedures analogous. In science, our materials are experimental data; in politics, ambiguous terms.

Montesquieu has said, that in differences in legislative bodies, if truth be on either side, it is on that of the minority. Let us extend the field from legislatures to nations, and there will remain a not very consolatory reflection for a nation of twenty-seven millions—twenty-six millions ninety-nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine, with an odd unit of an opposite opinion, whom it has failed to convince.

When Descartes, in the midst of the squalor of a single French habitation, was struck with the thought of the richness and vastness of the land, the greatness of its dominion, the pomp of its sovereign, the brilliancy

of its literature, the energy of its faculties, the wealth of its treasury, and the numbers and discipline of its army, the chain of causation was formed in his powerful mind, and he uttered the memorable words, "*La méthode doit être mauvaise.*" To him there was nothing political, nothing military, nothing social, that was not mental. It was the mode of thinking that determined results, whether in the social condition of the people at home, or in its rivalries with nations abroad. If the French peasant was wretched, France being great, the method was bad.

Out of the chaos of the present Europe, were it possible for a great mind with a clean heart to be framed, and being so, huddled on the heights of Inker-mann, there to recal the grandeur of the British line—the splendour of her vast domain, the deep roots of law, the lofty luxuriance of her prosperity, her sway of the ocean, her supremacy in foreign lands, her inviolability at home, he would not hang between cause and effect, nor perceive a clerk's failing, nor a minister's folly, but go at once to what the people thought and said, and say, although he knew it not, "This is a people ruled by public opinion."

It was a maxim of former times, that despotism was based upon ignorance; it is now based upon knowledge. Whether is it better in its interest that men from sun-up to sun-down should talk about nothing but what concerns them, and never talk of what they do not know, or that from morning to night they should be uttering opinions upon all men and upon things? In the first case a nation holds a residue of indignation, which may explode on the occasion. In the latter it resembles the jar of an electrical battery not isolated, and through which energy runs like water through a sieve. In the

one case you have a condition which is known, in the other, one which is incomprehensible.*

This brings us to the branch of particular interest at the present moment—the Foreign. Here it has long been a complaint that there was a deficiency of activity in public opinion, the effect of which was to leave a government such as ours destitute of that impulse and control, without which its functions cannot be duly performed. Still concurrently with this view we have the same lofty assertion of its power as in domestic matters. We stand for its examination on surer grounds than heretofore, for we have that which is specific in statement and tangible in results. The preeminent man of England, twenty-six years ago, on the occasion of the war between Russia and Turkey out of which the present circumstances have grown, thus announces the principle and defines its operation;—

“There is in nature, no moving power but mind. All else is passive and inert. In human affairs this power is opinion; in political affairs it is public opinion, and he who can grasp the power with it will subdue the fleshy arm of physical strength, and compel it to work out its purpose. Those statesmen who know how to avail themselves of the passions, the interests, and the opinions of mankind, are able to gain an ascendancy, and to exercise a sway over human affairs far out of all proportion greater than belongs to the power and resources of the state over which they preside.”—(*Lord Palmerston's Speech, June 11, 1829.*)

Twenty years afterwards on the occasion of the invasion of Hungary by Russia, he expresses himself as follows,—

* “England is a nation receiving knowledge of its acts from uncertain rumours which reach it from abroad.”—*Lord Palmerston, 1829.*

“It is quite true that it may be said your opinions are but opinions, and you express them against our opinions, who have at our command large armies to back them. What are opinions against armies? Sir, my answer is—Opinions are stronger than armies.”

In reference to the first of these events his argument was, that Russia's aggressions upon Turkey did not call for the interposition of England, and could not be injurious to her, seeing that the power of opinion wielded by England was greater than the power of armies wielded by Russia. He therefore, at the head of the Opposition in the House of Commons, resisted the dispositions of the then government of the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen to support Turkey. On the second event, the Hungarian war, the argument was the same, and he was himself Minister. During the progress of the war he transmitted regularly to the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna the petitions from the towns of England in favour of Hungary. The dispatches inclosing them stated the strength and unanimity of public opinion in England, and they were the only communications to either cabinet while the matter was pending. When it was closed he wrote to St. Petersburg to state that “The English Government had nothing to say upon the subject.”

Now here is a man who in his own person wields the Public Opinion he has invented, and exercises the prerogative of the crown. Combining the power to do what he likes with that of expounding what he does, he enunciates the proposition, not as a philosopher in a garret, but as a practical statesman, declaring England's duty and representing his own conduct. According to him, opinion is stronger than the armies of Russia, that is, “I have the means through opinion

of neutralizing the triumphs of Russia." Russia triumphs without so much as his attempting to exercise that arm. This in reference to such stupendous events as the invasion of Turkey in 1828, and the intervention in Hungary in 1848. There has been however a third great event in our times, again the conquest of a nation by Russia—Poland. Here he speaks as follows;—

"The contracting parties to the Treaty of Vienna had a right to require that the constitution of Poland should not be touched. This was an *opinion which I had not concealed from the Russian Government. The Russian Government, however, took a different view of the question.*" (July 9th, 1833.) Here we have opinion no longer indefinite but definite—it is *the* opinion of the British Government against *the* opinion of the Russian; so that the power of opinion is after all on the same side as arms and triumphs. We are brought back on international opinion to the identical point where we stand in national opinion, when we say to one another "it is a matter of opinion," every man has a right to his "opinion." Why then the parade? where the discovery? The difference between the two is this,—those who speak of internal opinion as governing the nation, deceive themselves; those who speak of it externally as determining events, deceive you.

See how Lord Palmerston can dispose of opinion when it suits him.—"What is merit? It is opinion, the opinion which one man forms of another; but his opinion is sure to be disputed by a great many disinterested judges, and is certain to be denied by all friends of the persons who are unsuccessful candidates."

In domestic matters, opinion manufactures the

minister; in foreign matters the minister manufactures opinion. The process is this. A line is written in secret, a Foreign Minister is nettled, and gives a tart reply; or he responds by an act, for he has the power of responsibility. The reply and the act are outrageous to England, or are made to appear so. The blood of John Bull is up, everything on earth is forgotten, and then the Minister who has given the provocation, rides forth on the top of Public Opinion to avenge it. He is, then, "the Minister of England—not of France, or of Austria, or of Russia." This is dealing in a small way, and in times of ease; but it shadows forth the process when great methods have to be employed, and fleets and armies are in motion, empires in convulsion, and the world in alarms!

In foreign matters opinion is usually rancour and hatred. The minister does not want it in dealing with Foreign Powers, for the organization of our system is so complete, that by the stroke of a pen he can call into exercise the whole material power of this Empire. Opposition to a minister upon foreign matters has passed by in our times, and there never has been so much as an inquiry into them. Convulsions come through prior arrangements which are all secret and within the prerogative of the Crown; when a catastrophe comes, the nation holds it to be its duty to maintain what they term the honour of the country. Even in that prior stage, opinion will not serve to supply correct judgments on the conditions or relations of Foreign States, it will not give you the understanding of the institutions of Japan or of the laws of China. It is not even when announced in this frothy and pompous manner intended to represent knowledge of any kind, but merely predilections for a particular form of government, in other words

revolutionary tendencies, and these not in the people of England but of the Continent,—in fact, that very lever which Russia holds in her hand for the convulsion of the world.

If foreign relations were subject to the action of opinion, would they be secret? *Private* has officially the meaning of secret, and it is under this seal that all important business is conducted. This secrecy is not only against the Public and the Parliament, but it is also against the high functionaries of the Crown, and excludes the very transactions themselves from record in the public departments.* It follows that a country where public opinion prevails, can be disposed of by “confidential communication;” it follows also that Public Opinion has engendered Diplomacy.

Diplomacy we all recognize to be intrigue, but we have still to be enlightened as to the end and object of that intrigue. Russia has diplomacy, and so has

* From Sir J. Graham’s evidence before the Committee on the war:—

“The witness added that the letter of the 25th of October was a private letter, and he should not have felt himself at liberty to use it had it not been made a public document by being referred to in the subsequent dispatch.

“The CHAIRMAN.—Does not a private document become a public one when it bears upon the public interest?—I conceive no person has a right to allude to a private letter without the consent of the writer. I wrote that privately to Admiral Dundas and should not have used it now had it not been mentioned in the following dispatch.

“Not if it related to public matters?—Certainly not.

“Mr. LAYARD.—Do you, then, think it advisable that instructions of any kind should be sent out in private letters?—I do not think the public service could be conducted without it. The freedom of communication between heads of departments acting at a distance would be entirely destroyed without it.

“But if instructions are given in a private letter, upon which an officer acts, does not the letter then become a public one?—I conceive until it has some public shape, as I have given in this case.”

England. But the intrigue of Russia is for her own greatness, the intrigue of England for her own ruin. It is impossible that an Empire so powerful should be engaged in such an enterprise as this without success. This state of things is perfectly satisfactory to the nation; it is indeed moved to indignation by the results, but that does not signify; it acquiesces in the causes. When moved it is only to turn to some novel and monstrous expedient—"National and Constitutional Association," or for "Administrative Reform," being sick of Chartism and Parliamentary Reform. It would change the very system, or set up or pull down a dozen departments, but it will not—dares not—cannot so much as look the evil in the face—THE CRIMES OF MEN. But the matter does not go so far; energy is wanting in the emasculated race even for revolution. All that practical and safe men propose to do even when they judge the country to be "plunged in an abyss of disgrace, and to stand on the verge of ruin," is "that some members of this House may have an opportunity to express their opinion on the the present state of affairs."*

"Is it not astonishing," writes Prince Czartoryski in 1828 of diplomacy, "that nations should behold without terror this abandonment of all that in their private life they hold most sacred. How can public opinion tolerate and even consider proper this flagrant deviation from the eternal ideas of justice and morality? Have diplomatists another code of morals, another faith, and another God?"

Observe now how this works. We are told that the

* Speech of Mr. Layard, February 1855.

"He should like to know whether the noble lord would on an early day give the House an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the Conference of Vienna."—*Mr. Milner Gibson, May 14, 1855.*

present is the "people's war," and absolutely the people believe it. They have utterly forgotten that it arose from the cry of peace, not of war. It was impossible that there could be a cry of war, for no one supposed its possibility. No one attributed strength to Russia; how could they imagine a contest single-handed even with England, to say nothing of France and Turkey. The villanous cry of the autumn of 1853, which I know well, having had hour by hour to struggle against it, was, "This fighting must be put down." And so they voted three millions,—sent 25,000 men, and reckoned in the estimates of the war the expense of freight and passage home.

The cry "this fighting must be put down" was stupid, cowardly, and immoral: such were the characters then of Public Opinion. It was suggested to them, being of such a character, to enable the English minister to carry out the plan for the partition of Turkey settled with Russia in 1844. Which was again a fraud, there being no partition intended: the pretext was put forward for colleagues at the moment, for the public at a future time. Public Opinion, after having engendered Public Ignorance, brought forth Secrecy, and has finally given you Treason.

It is of Russia Lord Palmerston speaks, not England, when he tells you that the Statesmen "who can grasp the power of public opinion are able to gain an ascendancy and to exercise a sway over human affairs out of all proportion with the power and resources of the state over which they preside."

I am constantly asked how I persist in ignoring the power of Public Opinion. I acknowledge, and more than any one else acknowledge, that power, because I know it, and know it to deplore it. I join my voice to the cry, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians,"

but not in the sense of her votaries. "Great," I add, "is the idolatry of the Ephesians." There is the power of Error and the power of Truth,—ye have transposed the names. Ye say "great is our power;" I exclaim, "enormous is your servitude!" Nor is it to-day—nor after the event that I have borne this testimony. When you were madly engaged in your Cabul expedition. I wrote—"In every age of great movement it has been the secret thoughts of one or two men, unsuspected either in their tendency or power, that have done and undone, and that by using the 'opinions' that men think their own;"—again when you were sending forth your troops to perish in the Crimea, I wrote:—

"Who can constrain the Cabinet? The people or the Crown. As to the people's power, or opinion's authority, the idea is very gratifying but very preposterous. A people with opinions has the power indeed of the hurricane, or the earthquake. It is only a people with knowledge that can exercise an influence over human events. An ignorant public must be a pliable one. * * * It is not, then, Public Opinion that drives them. They have sounded that sink to the bottom: it may be a sea of mud, but at least it has no shoals."

The public having no knowledge of anything but legislative measures, which are carried by majorities, not only connect opinion with action, but cannot so much as conceive action that is not opinion. In regard to matters of legislation it is not necessary that I should deny, nor do I deny, its power: a majority will carry a law against a minority. There is, however, something besides legislation, and of more importance. We now discover that that great principle of Reform can be summarily set aside on account of matters of

which the Parliament is not cognizant, and over which it has no control,—that principles of taxation, recently triumphant, may be reversed in like manner,—that taxation may be doubled on similar unparliamentary grounds,—that the great public victory, achieved by endless toil, and agitation of cheap bread may be reversed and changed to dear corn. With the events, then, which concern the nation, Public Opinion, in an active sense, has nothing to do. These events are diplomatic, and diplomacy is secret. When this was ascertained, Public Opinion, if rational, had either to decide upon getting possession of the facts, or upon being silent in reference to them. It does not get possession of them, and leaving them enveloped in official secrecy, it exercises itself in guesses respecting them. This is in its nature.

To prevent the occurrence of the disasters to which I have referred, it was enough to have put an end to secrecy. This might appear to be the natural impulse of public opinion, but there is an intimate connexion between the two. Secrecy in public matters is a violation of the law of England : it is by the prostration of that law that public opinion has raised itself. To require that the dealings of England with Foreign states should be straightforward and above board,*—to require that no Minister should interfere in the affairs of Foreign states,—to require that he should be held responsible for his acts,—that he should be punished if he neglects his duty, and rendered incapable, by the strict observance of forms, of betraying it—would be the decisions of judgment, not the comments of

* In a letter of a prince allied on both sides to the Queen of England, I find these words :—"Turkey, it seems to me, would yet save Europe if there was one just man in power in England, who even knew enough of Vattel not to interfere."

opinion. Public opinion, if it required such things, would cease to be opinion and become judgment. Can the insane become sane? Some of the insane may be cured, and so get power into their hands, when the effects of the insanity of all may be averted, and the life of the maniac preserved from his own attempts.

It did not know the facts of the case as to the power and circumstances of the parties and as to whether or not its friend required its aid. It was not in doubt as to whether it knew them or not, the condition which Socrates describes as approaching to insanity; it did not want to know them, for it was absolutely insane. It did not know the merits of the case nor care to know them. It did not know or care to know what the conduct had been or the intentions were, of its own government. It did not know or care to know whether it had grounds of war, and did not perceive that it had not,* for all which there is but the one explanation.

This disregard of right has not evinced itself internationally until it had become habitual between man and man: matters of interest we do still bring to issue, but no longer those of honour and character. A veteran officer and a young girl will equally accept in confidence and as a "private communication," a calumny against their most esteemed friend. It is no longer shameful not to seek and state the fact to the calumniated person, but to betray the confidence of the calumniator: in a word, every thing is become gossip, and we are a nation of waiting-maids. The last remnant of the state of nature when a man being unprotected by the laws of society, risks his life to

* England had not protested against the act, and had negotiated with Russia by accepting it, and attempted to enforce on the Porte acquiescence in it, and then made war because of it!

force adjudication upon his character, even that is swept away; and the man challenged for unfair dealing, not punishable by the laws, replies that he has taken advice—of an attorney!

There is an honour of Nations, there is an honour of Individuals; that honour when it got its name consisted in the uprightness of the heart; it now consists in the success of a flag. It was then doing what is right; it is now charging a battery or sinking a vessel. When there was honour in doing right, there was no less valour to maintain the right; but when there is honour in what may be doing wrong, then honour is our shame, were it not that we cease to have honour, and to feel shame.

In our constitution, opinion is the antithesis to law. Originally for every measure unanimity was required: the operations of administration were adjusted to the rule on which they were founded, being simple, practical, and containing within themselves a self-acting power. The whole was judicial. "To obtain adjudication," says Sir Francis Palgrave, was the aim and end of all our institutions." From the lowest to the highest point we so proceeded. It was the "verdict,"—the "finding,"—the "presentment" of Courts Leet, of Juries, of Shire-motes, of Parliament. The House of Commons was the grand inquest. The House of Lords, the high Judicature, and the very term applied to the regal power, that of "court" was no other than tribunal. For all grievances the law was the remedy, and they ceased. And the remedy now is theory—that is "opinion," consequently they multiply. Opinion has however now passed from the class of remedy, and occupies the station of governor.

The word "government" which meant "steering," we now apply to the men not to render them respon-

sible but impersonal: in their stead each of us becomes an executive member of the State, for we say that Opinion rules. The ludicrous assumption makes the nation a party to acts in which it has no part, and disqualifies it from judging of the acts of its servants because it prides itself upon them as its own. In this fashion it has taken into its hands the legislative functions belonging to Parliament, and the executive functions belonging to the Crown, offices which if duly exercised, could not be combined, and which managed as it manages them, are preparing the nation to submit, first to a domestic tyrant, and then to a foreign master.

The only word of sense I ever listened to in the House of Commons was a statement of Lord John Russell, that when he first entered public life, the business of ministers was to conduct their own departments. I expected him to go on to show the necessity of reverting to the good old practice, but the conclusion was the necessity of increasing the government staff to meet legislation.

Now, if there be one maxim approved by reason, and confirmed by experience, it is the separation of the legislative and executive functions. We could have reversed it, only on the assumption that that pitch of human perfectibility had been arrived at, that every minister, is, *ipso facto*, possessed of all wisdom and all integrity. The maxim has been absolutely put in words by the present prime minister: "It is the grossest ignorance to suppose that the man who may be for the time charged with the conduct of its foreign relations *can be* influenced in the management of those affairs by *any other feeling than his conception of what is his duty according to his political opinions.*"—
(July 21, 1847.)

We have either gone too far or not far enough. If the legislative functions are to be entrusted to the executive, the legislative body has to be dispensed with; unless removed, it must prove a source of endless disquietude to the State and an obstruction to the Minister "in maturing, developing, and carrying out his objects, so as practically as well as theoretically to control and govern the legislation and internal economy," which henceforward constitutes his duty.

These are the words of the highly-gifted leader of the great party forming the present Opposition in England. I subjoin the entire passage as a picture drawn by an experienced no less than a master-hand at once of that moral and intellectual perfection, a Prime Minister, and that base and impracticable corruption, a House of Commons.*

* "My Lords, I can conceive no object of higher and nobler ambition—no object more worthy of the true patriot and lover of his country—than to stand in the high and noble position of Chief Minister of the Crown, the leader of the councils of this great empire, assisted and supported by colleagues united to him by sympathy of sentiment and personal respect—supported by parties in this and the other House of Parliament, who could give to such a minister the assurance that, except on extraordinary and unusual occasions, he would be enabled, without let or hindrance, to mature, develop, and carry out his own objects, so as practically, as well as theoretically, to control and govern the legislation and internal economy of this great nation. To hold that high and responsible situation, depending for support day by day upon precarious and uncertain majorities—compelled to cut up this measure and to pare off that—to consider, with regard to each bill, not what was for the real welfare of the country, but what would conciliate the support of some half-a-dozen men here and there—to consider it a great triumph of parliamentary skill and ministerial ingenuity to scramble through a session of Parliament, and boast of having met with only a few and insignificant defeats. My Lords, I say that this is a state of things which could not be satisfactory to any minister, and which could not, in the long run, be satisfactory to the Crown and country. But, my Lords, to enter upon the cares and duties of office—not

This is now the direction of the spirit of the age. It is true it ran till recently in an opposite direction, and was all for Parliament and Constitutional Government; but it is in the nature of opinion, as of wind, to blow one way for the reason that it has blown the other. It will be understood that Public Opinion and the Spirit of the Age are one and the same thing. Here I pause parenthetically to point out the ingenuity of this application of the word "spirit." If we connected "spirit" with "public," we would have an expression with meaning; if we connected "opinion" with "age," we would also have a phrase with meaning, for "public spirit" would imply character, and "opinion of the age" would merely indicate a fact. By giving "public" to "opinion," and "spirit" to "age," we obtain two available phrases for talk.

Three years ago the suppression of constitutional government in France aroused in England a stupid indignation. The man who performed the feat is now the idol of the British people; he is at the same time an example to those practical statesmen who have discovered that the constitutional system is a "galling servitude." Lord Palmerston, on the intelligence

with a precarious majority, but with an assured minority in the other house—to be liable day by day, at any moment, to be overwhelmed by a combination of parties, only waiting for a favourable moment when they could fairly show their united strength—to be a minister on sufferance—to hold such a position, without any security for enforcing my own views, exposing my friends to mortification, and the country to disappointment—to undertake the duties and responsibilities of office under such circumstances,—would be to have involved the party in a perpetual, intolerable, and galling servitude—a servitude to which no man of honour could voluntarily expose himself. It would be a servitude to which no man could involuntarily submit, except from motives of patriotism, and the absolute necessity of such a self-sacrifice."—*Speech of Lord Derby, Feb. 1855.*

of the event, preferred expulsion from office to the repression of the outpourings of his admiration, and recently his rival, Lord Derby, recommended him for the premiership on the ground of the confidence reposed in him by the Emperor of the French. Meanwhile the English public are calling aloud for a Dictator. Some time ago the envoy of Herat exclaimed, "I am lost in speculation as to what can have happened to this British nation!" His wonder would subside were he made acquainted with Public Opinion.

I have spent my life in endeavouring to point out the proper course to be adopted in various important public interests, and in doing so have always discovered that I was at war with Opinion, which I have always found the enemy of truth and the instrument of error.

Let us now reverse the medal. There being no Public Opinion to rule, difficulty or dangers presenting themselves, every man would say "Let us do something,"—something special, not general. They would necessarily see, not that a system was bad, but that certain men had committed wrong, and thence would come the idea of punishment, as the measure of safety. They would necessarily go back to the Laws and the Constitution.

One hour of the power of Great Britain! What might not be effected in that space of time? Yes, one hour of the honest exercise of Britain's power would still suffice to rescue the universe. And what is one hour of the uncontrolled exercise of that power to one who knows how to use, for his own ends, Public Opinion?

Opinion represents a loose manner of thinking and an idle habit of speech: therefore to entertain opinions is a shameful thing. But we know not what shame

is. Amongst nations who know it, to say that a thing is shameful, means that a thing shall not be done. It is of a slight and restricted use in the nursery still : but I speak from my own recollection ; probably it is no longer there. Shame for grown men we know only as a feeling we are not to entertain, for *we* know the fruit by the tree. It is for this reason, that the man tainted with opinion is incurable, for he will not cleanse himself until he is ashamed.

Such habits without being esteemed the palladium of liberty and the greatest of discoveries for the government of the world, has before now brought empires to the grave. Then it was sufficient that frailty should be there and be known as human. Now it is revered as divine. Then men could see themselves as faulty in their failings—now because of them they deify themselves.* Hitherto there have existed blasphemers upon earth—our existence is a blasphemy.

Whether this attempt be of service or not to others, I experience in having made it a wonderful relief. I have borne a testimony which it was incumbent on me to bear, but of which the difficulty seemed to be too great to be superable until I did address myself to it.

* CIVILIZATION.—“The union of the human and Divine mind.”—*Guizot*.

THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE.—“Power and the People are both Divine.”

Elsewhere.—“Hostile to Gods and Kings.”—*Disraeli*.

ORGANS OF PUBLIC OPINION.

WHEN we say "THE PRESS," it is with a tone very different from "Steam Engine" or "Spinning Jenny," yet the three are equally machines, worked by funds, supplied by speculation.

An improvement in machinery has enabled us to multiply copies at a cheaper rate than by hand labour, and printing is a process and a word which we apply equally to cotton and to paper. The wares are supplied to the public, the companies furnishing them are private; by the one process we clothe, by the other we teach, the nation; but in both cases the wares are adapted to the taste of the customers.

In cottons the facility of multiplying copies has not been attended with an improvement in taste, either in the designs or the colours. It is necessary, of course, to have a standard not ourselves, if we pretend to rate ourselves, but that is not difficult to find when once we have got the idea that we have to be rated. Possessed of that standard in regard to design, there can be no more afflicting spectacle than the incessant repetition of mean and unadapted figures on every spot of our apartments and our persons. This has been the result of the facility of printing, the taste of the customers progressively descending with the activity of the machine.

Still more painful is the result as regards colour. To produce pleasing forms genius is required, but in colour, as in morals and deportment, simplicity is itself excellence and perfection. The variety of tints

and shades will be always found to coincide with indistinctness of terms and multiplicity of phrases, and to stand to the time in a nation's history of true colour and simple speech, as the Nadir to the Zenith.*

The pattern and its colour are taken in by the eye, but that, which is printed on paper, by the mind: here to discover the standard is not easy, even when we have departed from the "Castle of Indolence"—our own excellence. To test the figures and tints of the intellectual patterns which we now multiply with such wonderful celerity and in such endless abundance, we have to examine—first, the language to which the words belong; secondly, the ideas prevalent amongst the customers; thirdly, the companies furnishing the wares.

By the preceding Essays I have disposed of the first two, having shown the present English language to be a web of sophisms, and the ideas to correspond therewith. Nothing more would be requisite in reason to give us the value of the ephemeral multiplication of such terms and such ideas. I have, unfortunately, not to address myself to dispassionate reason, but to inveterate habits, and have not adverse arguments to dispose of, but preconceptions to expose. It is, therefore, my business to wander into some preliminary dissertations.†

Three great historical events—the revival of literature, the Reformation of the Church, and the over-

* In Egypt, for instance, the true colours alone pervade the age of the Pharaohs, and even in these there is a distinction; blue in certain positions marking the original belief, yellow taking its place in the Sabean schism. The period of transition is distinguished by the introduction of green; purple appears in the Roman age; after that the tints follow as in modern Europe.

† Mahomet sees in hell "those who have wandered into vain disquisitions with the fallacious reasoners."

throw of despotic authority, have been achieved by the Press. No one then saw in the discovery of moveable letters, either a generality or a power. The results were attributed to the works so rendered cheap and common. The Oration of Demosthenes and of Cicero, the Epics of Homer and Virgil, the Lyrics of Pindar and Horace, the Annals of Herodotus and Thucydides, Livy and Tacitus, the Dialogues of Socrates and Epictetus, the Disquisitions of Plato and Aristotle, restored the literature of the Greeks and Romans. The Bible superseded indulgences, works of supererogation, purgatory, human interpretation, and Papal usurpations. The state-craft simultaneously brought to perfection by the kingly Triumvirate of Louis XI, Ferdinand VII, and Henry VII, and the consequent international wars cloaked by religious differences, fell before a host of indignant denunciations, varying with the circumstances and the countries, from law books to libels; amongst our liberators we reckon, a Grotius and a Suarez, a Philip* and a Hampden.

These works were in the dead languages, or in English, still unbastardized by abstractions.† The books exposed the truth, in so far at least as they combated the prevailing errors. Printing was hated by the oppressors. The Press and light were held syno-

* Two of these writers are little known. Suarez was a Spanish priest, the author of a valuable treatise on international law. The Cavalier "Fabien Philip" wrote a defence of the feudal system, entitled "Tollendo aut Fallendo." I have made large quotations from it in my lecture on Pauperism.

† "The learning of this people is very defective, consisting only in morality, history, poetry, and mathematics, wherein they must be allowed to excel. As to ideas, entities, abstractions, and transcendentals, I could never drive the least conception into their heads."
Lemuel Gulliver.

nymous. The writers were not politicians, "forging facts and opinions"* to retain or attain office, but a thinly scattered, struggling and a suffering few, who warred with the vices of their neighbours, and the errors of their age, and by the love of right and the hatred of wrong, were inspired to endure obloquy, poverty, stripes, chains, and death. The Printing Press was the weapon of patriots and martyrs, and might have excited the admiration of mankind; but mankind's admiration then extended no further than to Caxton.

Such were the effects of the multiplication of copies in the 14th and 15th centuries, differing, by reason of the English *language*, the prevailing *ideas*, and the *objects* of the publishers, from the press of *our time*. The struggle was then between the public-mindedness of particular men and the errors of a whole people; the Press being in the hands of the particular men. It is now in the hands of authority, and subdues all public-mindedness in particular men.

It is the prevailing idea that in political matters, it is facts that are important. We esteem ourselves most highly favoured by their possession, and this we owe to the Press which gives us publicity. In this lies the secret of our respect for that engine, its mechanical nature being merged in its moral and political results, and so we assume that superiority to former ages on which we pride ourselves. If the grounds were correct, the conclusion would be irrefragable. Private life has also its facts, and they are to be observed in the Police Courts, the Assizes, the Old Bailey, the Nisi Prius, Exchequer, and Chancery Courts. The man who would qualify himself to exercise

* Lord Mansfield.

judgment upon them does not take up the newspaper reports, but sits down to the study of the Law. If the legal sense were formed on the facts, the morality of England would consist in shop-lifting, horse-stealing, pocket-picking, battery, and fraud. If, on the other hand, the knowledge of the law and its applications were perfect, there would be no penal facts to observe. We have also morbid "facts," in like manner disagreeable to witness, painful to endure. The student of medicine no more commences with fingering ulcers than the student of law by accompanying housebreakers. He masters physiology, proceeds to nosology, and concludes with clinics; that is to say, he is grounded in knowledge of health and its functions before he is permitted to look at disease, for otherwise he could not comprehend it. He then studies disease as varying over all time and affecting all idiosyncracies, after which he comes to the application in the individual, and sitting at the bed-side learns the symptoms of the disorder, and the signs of the patient's powers to bear the remedies. These steps follow the one upon the other of necessity, calling neither for argument nor comment. If physicians spoke of "facts" we should be in the same condition in regard to medicine that we are in regard to politics. Two colleges would alternately possess administrative offices for the dispensing of disorders, and without their recipe men would say, as they do of the Press, "we die."

To call facts the data of our judgment of them is to prove that that quality is wanting. Politics are no more than the power of distinguishing between Right and Wrong which is born with every man. How then is study requisite? Truly it is not so with imple men; for they at once would say of each, "it

is right," or "it is wrong," and proceed to punish, if not in time to prevent.

"Facts," or "things done," are good, bad, and indifferent, supplying instruction or contamination as you use them. To include all under one name is to efface all distinctions, to substitute practice for maxim, taking our rules from our conduct, instead of guiding our conduct by our rules.

But facts cannot be known till after they are done, yet the value of publicity resides in controlling affairs ! For instance, the bombardment of Copenhagen and the battle of Navarino were "things done." These facts were subjected to publicity, having been made known to the entire mass of the British Nation. The consequences and effects of such knowledge, evinced themselves in a salute, from the Tower, of twenty-one guns, an illumination of the principal streets of London, some ships brought home in the one case, some prize money paid in the other. The causes which led to the facts remained unknown ; had they been known and disapproved of, they could no longer be prevented, as they had occurred. The consequences were not foreseen, but if foreseen and disliked, it would have been impossible to prevent them without going back upon the causes—a process incompatible with the system of judging by facts and belonging to the counter-system of acting by Law.

But if it were possible to judge by facts, still you would not get them by the Press. Newspapers were devised for the contrary purpose.

The reader since he could lisp the words "news" and "paper" has joined them together on his lips, and his lips and his mind are the same thing.

It is with that feeling which we call astonishment, and which is incredulity, not convinced but coerced,

that a European, in countries where the Press is unknown, finds out that news can travel without stamped paper, and travel too with a rapidity, which beats at times, even our "postal" method of transmission.

From these examples, which might be multiplied by the addition of every salient occurrence since the Privy Council was superseded by a close club, it will perhaps be apprehended, that those only can understand facts on their advent, who have seen them on their way. Time is three-fold. After-knowledge is like after-thought; fore-knowledge is present and future, therefore was Prometheus chained on Caucasus.

News was not invented by newspapers. It existed some thousand years before papers were heard of. I know it is unpopular to believe that man existed before type, or was born for any other purpose than reading; but I am constrained to declare that News can exist without Newspapers, and that it is only where there are no newspapers that there is publicity. In Turkey, the news of a projected excise upon tobacco led to a general resolution not to smoke. The excise was dropped. A label in MS. affixed to a mutilated Torso could strike into evil-doers, under the dark and umbrageous tyranny of the Gregorys and the Benedicts, a wholesome and restraining terror. An English impost has been refused from the dropping of a "libel," on the floor of a chapter house. For a thousand years that the press was unknown, England had no novelty in the way of taxes, and no instruction in public debt. If amidst the jumble any news could be true, and if in the whirl it could be recollected, still must the passage of that stream of uniform lines of print across the sight,

flatten the brain. Even were there conveyed thereby food for the mind, that type must kill the soul.

Journals originally were newspapers; they contained news and nothing else. The "Editor" was no statesman, and no literary character: if he did not incur the penalty of being whipped as in China for adding anything of his own, the same result was obtained in the early history of our prints, by the sense of decency of the English people, who would not have endured such insolence as that an editor should print notions of his own, and give them for pence. With such habits, papers being moreover small and published on important occasions only, facts might be multiplied without being distorted, although the expense in that case would have been thrown away.* A new era commenced with editorial comments. Intelligence mostly proceeded from the government: and the comments enabled it to turn the faculty of announcement to account. Gradually the Press became a department of government, and it has remained a chief resource of administration, not so much by the advocacy of opinions, as by the opportunity afforded of giving its own colour to the events which it announced, and of suppressing those which it had a mind to conceal.

For a century and a half after the birth of Ephemerals the government only was organized: the counter-organization dates from the eighteenth century, and of course followed the same tactics. The two organizations arose from a split within, not from a resistance from without. The two sets of journals only added contradiction to deception, and the Press acted in

* During the great rebellion they first came into serious play, both armies dragging after them a new artillery, in the shape of printing presses, to beat the enemy at their leisure after the battle was over.

common on the principle, that "the people shall know no otherwise than as we choose."

How could it be otherwise? When a trust is confided, the detail of management is ascertained only by the conditions laid down for that end. Here is a trust usurped! Since the reign of Charles II the governing men have proceeded upon concealment *as a principle*. The nation, or say the parliament, fluctuated from sufferance to severity. Assumptions or misuse of power were first encouraged and then visited with terrible vengeance. It came in the form of judicial and parliamentary procedure, so that the terrors of impeachment hung over the head of every man holding office, and prospectively over those who aspired to it. These persons, and they were the consecutive possessors of power, combined—combination was not requisite—to screen themselves. This could be effected only by effacing the evidence of their authorization to public measures, while obtaining the obedience of subordinates without the due formalities. This great revolution has been carried into effect with such perfect success that no one now considers it more than an historical "fact," that is, a step in the natural progress of society. Do you suppose that men, or parties of them, so engaged would keep printing presses at work to enlighten a people? Do you not see the triumph of irresponsibility in those very organs of publicity? If it was the practice to purchase votes, surely it must have been an object to secure newspapers?—purchase for them was not needed—they were mere dependants, and the establishment was entirely one of profit, pecuniary for the inferiors, political for the principals. If newspapers have become to-day shining globes of all virtues and all

wisdom, unquestionably they were in their origin, and during the course of their history, mere money speculations, brought into operation by the opportunity they afforded of practising on the ignorance and stupidity of mankind.

To be any thing else, the Press must have been enacted as an institution for the purpose of detecting hidden secrets, exposing public errors, restraining governing power. What guarantees were required for the due performance of such functions? It must have been in itself the whole state, rendering all other institutions superfluous. But publicity is no part of the institutions of England. There is no publication even of the Acts of Parliament; it was exactly by the opposite process that the liberties of England were secured; it was by preventing news that she was great and happy.

But then might it not have sprung from the efforts of individual men conversant with public affairs, yet not belonging to the parties; talented but not venal, and withal, industrious, rich, and generous enough to give their labour to their country without hire? Such a class of men must have existed for three centuries, and legions of them in latter times, for the press of England to be the spontaneous creation of the patriotism of her children and not to be the contrary—an emanation of venality and prostitution.

If we take the exceptional cases the rule will be made apparent. They are connected with, if they do not constitute, all that is great and glorious in modern England; for since the reign of newspapers there has been no greatness and no honour save amongst those who refuse to walk in the path of the multitude. The earliest case I can quote, from its

continuity and the distinctness of the lines of opposition is also the most remarkable for genius and power—the consecutive writings of Swift. He embraced all subjects, and was right on all. The activity of his mind, the vehemence of his indignation matched and overawed the baseness which gave it being. The intricacies of finance, the mysteries of diplomacy, the tergiversations of power, he laid bare, not failing to connect these as symptoms alone with the root of the disorder—the degradation of the public character, and that degradation—and here he stands absolutely alone—he saw to reside in that false Syntax which gave us a language of error as the vehicle of our thoughts and the instrument of our reason.* Versed in every branch of politics, he was master of every mode of speech—imagination that enlivened, sarcasm that crushed, analysis that explored, argument that confounded.

The next takes absolutely the form of a periodical, and endured from the accession of George II nearly to the accession of George III, the first essay being written by Bolingbroke, the last by Burke, and having continued for a whole generation a protest against the press, whether that press represented governing fraud or popular folly. The work I refer to is entitled "*The Craftsman*:" it has been collected into fourteen duo. volumes which in the last generation but one, would have been found in the

* "I remember it was with extreme difficulty, that I could bring my master to understand the word *Opinion*, or how a point could be disputable; because reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain: and beyond our knowledge we cannot do either. So that controversies, wranglings, disputes, and positiveness in false or dubious propositions, are evils unknown among the Houyhnhnms."—*Gulliver's Travels*, part iv, ch. viii.

library or on the table of every one connected with political life.*

With the reign of George the II, closed the resistance to malversation on the grounds of Law, and commenced the era of remedy by speculation, from which time Opinion, that is to say Talk, predominates, small and modest of course, at first. This is the work, this the triumph of the Press; this is the very Press itself—it has prevailed over the practice of taking council beforehand—it has superseded the forms which made its patrons responsible—it has made diplomacy secret, and has let in all the great evils and abuses of the State, with which it is so intimately connected, that were they to cease, newspaper shares would fall in the market, and newspaper writers be thrown out of bread. They assume for newspapers a lofty station, they call editors the fourth estate of the realm. I hold them to the admission. I conceive that as there is no truth more true, so is there no certainty so needful to be made known, as that your public condition is implicated in and entirely dependant upon the newspapers. You are also agreed; you make this a new, a magnificent, and a saving discovery; I make it an old and a rotten sore that pollutes, absorbs, and will extinguish.

Some time ago I was applied to by a friend for answers upon two subjects. The first was as to the

* When the *Portfolio* was started, it was with the *Craftsman* in view, and the *Craftsman Revived* was the name originally proposed for it. There was no element for the continuance of such a work in this age, because pre-eminent men who did not belong to Administration did belong to Opposition. Those not political had each his scheme and theory to propound, the common basis of the laws of England having been submerged.

predominant evil of our internal state, and what, if any, was the remedy I proposed. The second, what I had had to do with the *Times* newspaper. My reply was as follows:—

“To the two questions you have put to me, respecting the *Times* and our domestic policy, one answer will suffice. I contributed to the *Times* for I think about six months. There were none of the annoyances that attend contributions to other papers, the line once adopted, liberty was complete. These articles commenced, I think, at the close of 1837; at all events, it was first there, with the exception of papers, bearing the signature of individuals, or in works published by them, that Treason was alleged as extant in the British Cabinet: probably at present such a statement may appear like a discovery. Recollection can only bear on what is understood. At that time, the only documentary evidence we had to go upon was furnished by Greece, and the North American Boundary. With the latter the ball was opened. It was followed up chiefly by transatlantic matters, Mexico, Buenos Ayres, &c. all of which are now equally forgotten. Next came the Russian fleet in the Baltic, and that did touch the public mind. Lord Palmerston replied regularly in the *Chronicle*, and I attribute to his replies, the retention of the *Times*, since they proved to its conductors the importance of the matter, by the attempt to answer, and its utter failure.

“All this may seem to have no connexion with the second question, upon our own domestic system. Now here is the link. If there could be treason in the British Cabinet our domestic system of government was itself the origin of the evil, not the individual who practised it. While therefore I pointed to

the reparatory process of impeachment, as affecting the individual, I pointed also to a change of the system, as a condition of very existence. It was necessary to prevent the recurrence of the contingency as well as to punish the act.

“I strove to force attention to the distinction now lost between the acts of private and public men and between measures of foreign and domestic policy, showing in regard to the first, that while the private man may do whatever the law does not forbid, the agent of the nation can only do that which the law permits. In regard to the second ; that the government is restrained in domestic policy by the laws of the land, its active functions extending in no case beyond those of a clerk ; while in foreign matters it is permitted to overstep all bounds, knows no restraints, can exercise over foreign nations the most despotic power, and so bring back that action upon the people at home.

“The change I proposed was no new invention, it was merely the restoration of the law, to be obtained, not by a revolution, but by awakening the nation to a sense of what was right and proper. To show it in fact, that it had to apply to public matters, the rule which it never deviates from in private concerns. In all this I was indulged by the conductors of the *Times* ; they only awoke from their illusion, that I was contributing stock to mere public discussion, when I came to pronounce the words ‘PRIVY COUNCIL.’ Then indeed they took the alarm. The article was put in type but not inserted. I have it still in a slip. They said ‘We have allowed you free scope upon all matters, we have gratified your theories, we have even passed and endorsed the word Treason—Cannot you then spare us this?’ My reply was, ‘This is the

only matter for which the rest is of any avail. What signifies the diagnosis of the disease, if you will not admit the remedy.' There was one point of common concurrence between them and me. They were resolved on no consideration to admit the word Privy Council—I, not to write another line, on any other condition. So closed my connexion with the *Times*, leaving them with a considerably augmented circulation.

"Whence the alarm of the *Times* at the word 'Privy Council?' Simply this—a fall in the shares of the paper. Was it that the subject was unpopular, and the circulation would decrease? No, the subject so treated would have been most popular, and the immediate effect on the circulation would have been to augment it. But the basis of newspaper property, or circulation, is the longing for news. Now news is longed for, only when there are events, and events only exist through malversation. To strike at malversation would be to strike at all newspaper property, and the *Times* in advocating the restitution of the Privy Council would have been cutting its own throat. For clearly, if the prior concurrence of individuals not bound up with party, were requisite for public decisions, there would be few stirring events, and the tide of history would run smooth or stand still.

"The stock-in-trade of the newspaper is also the stock-in-trade of the politician: that which would prevent the doubts, alarms, and disasters which feed the press, would be for the politician, deprivation of power, the means of indulging caprices, and committing crimes: all who profit by the public calamities, whether mercenary writers, journal merchants, opinion-mongers, or government undertakers, are

endowed with a peculiar instinct of evil, to which the remainder of the nation is dead, and are combined to resist, no less any attempt to prevent guilt than to punish crime. Therefore is it that the restoration of the due authority of the Privy Council is the feature of my plans of domestic policy: I have arrived at it by experience of the present facility for committing wrong, and I have found it in the course of the researches prompted by this experience, to be the law of the land. The antipathy to it of those interested in corruption bears me out.

“The greatest living authority, Sir Francis Palgrave, who, in his writings, has shown the Privy Council to be the sheet-anchor of the State, had nevertheless, objected to my putting it forward as a remedial process, on the ground that it was so distasteful to the prevailing opinion, that I was only thereby compromising my means of usefulness. He has however recently yielded to the force of other evidence, and communicated to me his conclusion, that ‘it was the only thing that could now be attempted, and the only matter to be urged, if there still remained a chance of saving England.’ ”

From the year here referred to, 1837, down to the present, the same thing has been repeated over and over again. In almost all the daily papers have I had for a time, free scope for all other subjects,* but the common instinct of the press invariably revealed itself on this.

You go to election-agents if you wish to learn how coin and cry are transformed into constitutional

* Mr. Disraeli, in his remarkable speech of December 1854, on the Foreign Enlistment Bill, referred to the responsibility of the ministers “as members of the Privy Council.” The latter words were cut out in every report.

government, that is its dissecting-room. So for the Press you must go to the professional men; if you get answers from them, you will learn that electoral corruption is but a transient excess and a venial offence. To this knowledge however the public is not admitted, and on it no Parliamentary Committees sit and report. I am little disposed to quarrel with venality, for it remains the only rational part of public life: if for evil purposes men had to be bought, corruption would soon be bankrupt. When then I say that there is not a line that is not paid for, nor a writer that is not venal, I mean no offence. To those without, the insertion of an article for hire appears an atrocious crime; to those engaged in the business it is legitimate profit. Newspaper property is a useful interest in opinions—determined between the merchants of the commodity, and the proprietors of the establishment.

How reviews are commissioned—puffs managed—despatches fabricated—correspondents' letters cooked—Parliamentary reports garbled—disagreeable facts suppressed; how this line or that is adopted; why this contemporary is abused, and that one flattered; how the Tory is set to compose the Radical leader, and the Radical the Tory, is what must be known in order to know England, and is known only to those engaged on the different papers. The subjoined sentences expressive of this knowledge, the reader may peruse with interest and instruction.

On my first return from the East, I was pointing out to the editor of a paper the errors on which the then discussions hinged, and the ease with which they might be put down. He smiled, and after a pause, said "It is not the interest of newspapers to write down subjects."

The following sentences are from other editors :—

“The Press is bringing upon us the dark ages.”

“If the history of the Press could be written, England might yet be saved.”

“The day will come when the sign of a gentleman will be not to know how to write his name.”

For my part, if asked in turn, I should say “The press is an invention for the developement of original Sin.”

This knowledge is not however so very restricted ; it leaks out and sits gloomily on the mind of many.

In a small party comprising some of our most eminent men as historians and antiquaries, the causes of the fall of Athens were discussed in comparison with England, when it appeared to be the conclusion that she was free from the evils which had destroyed that great state. I was at last asked for my opinion. I said “If in England there are no sophists, no assemblies of paid judges, &c., there is the Press.” The inference had not to be stated ; it was anticipated and accepted.

The editorial body, in its various degrees and departments, from its natural powers—for all must be above the level of mediocrity—from its activity, from its familiarity with all details, from its intercourse with the men of highest station, and access to the public departments, is a very powerful one. If in it be generated a condition incompatible with citizenship, the effect cannot fail to tell throughout the whole mass. Chatham held the subserviency of the officer to be dangerous to public liberties : what is this to cynicism engendered in the body of the Press by the nature of its avocation ?

A man on the staff of a newspaper is required, within twelve hours, to prepare a column and a half of sentences, expository and epigrammatic, terse and attractive,

profound and popular, upon any given subject that chances to be cast up, whether it be flighty hearsay, abstract philosophy, profound law, intricate diplomacy. He writes, not according to conclusions which he may himself have formed, but to order. With what contempt must he contemplate—if able, the monstrous public he serves, if benevolent—himself? But it is his calling; on it depends his bread. Woe to the state where such is a condition of existence; ten times woe to the people who esteem it their pride.

The character developed in the writers, must gradually spread to the readers. Dexterity of expression may not be imparted, but infirmity of judgment.

In 1846 England and France were upon the point of being plunged in war for the supposed violation of a treaty which had ceased to exist for half a century. The danger arose solely from M. Guizot's not knowing the fact, and arguing the point instead of denying the application. This was the effect of converting a Journalist into a Minister. He dealt with the case *pro re natá*, and wrote a leader for a dispatch.

The evil for the reader is, however, of an opposite character. For the writer it is moral, for the public it is intellectual. The first is degraded because he does not believe what he writes; the second, because he believes what he reads. He has not even the twelve hours of the writer. On him the subject is started *ex abrupto*. The news and the comment come together; from his wet and reeking paper he learns at once the fact and the interpretation. He is called upon to admit or to deny: he cannot deny; it therefore passes, remaining unconsciously in his mind. He has his other business; he has paid for his paper. There is not a man that will not tell you

that he is not led by the *Times*; and by what else is England led?* Every individual throughout this land goes to bed with an opinion with which he had not got up in the morning, and this happens seven times in the week. Mr. Gladstone recently remarked that public men could not be held responsible for their opinions, because they could not recollect all that they had said. Here is an unfathomable gulf. Who can take in the vastness of the perversion so condensed into a sentence, not expository of the evil, but expostulatory with the wronged? In what condition must a nation be under this mass of speech, which it is impossible to retain in the memory, which consequently it is impossible to take in by the understanding, and in which is made to consist public life and political judgment? It happens to men to lose their reason, and even then to preserve their memory.

The seeking for news leads to the habit of attaching value to novelty: the consequence is, that no conclusion, however just and true, even if promulgated and adopted, proves of any service, not only because it will be replaced by the contrary to-morrow, but because the habit of change of basis destroys the faculty of action thereon.—Action requires energy: energetic minds are firm ones: they can form, and having formed they do hold a conclusion. This is judgment, which the Father of the art of curing bodily ailments long ago told us was “difficult.”—Opinion, on the contrary, is easy, and when the sup-

* The commercial class in England are spared even the reading of a leader. The *Telegraph* gives them a summary, suspended in their reading-rooms, round which they flock in successive shoals to swallow wisdom.—“First leader of the *Times* says so and so; second leader so and so; third leader so and so.” The very comment is now the news.

ply is so great, you will have Opinion in the individual unfitting him for any thing but talk, whilst he relies upon it in its abstract form for correction and protection.

Opinion we have seen is the antithesis to judgment, but if so it is the opposite to honesty. Opinion we have seen is a conclusion destitute of effort. It is a result obtained, not a source of action. Honesty is not a process; it is a condition: a condition of health implying the power of action. Organs of Public Opinion are thus instruments for the destruction of public life by the extinction of honesty.

The differences which we observe between individual men, in so far as they depend on the culture of the mind, are reproduced in different ages. There is as much difference in the bringing up of this Century and that Century, as there is between the bringing up of the children of a drunken or an industrious father, of a wise and a foolish mother; indeed it is much greater, for the individual household can rate itself with another, not so the individual Age. Now that which gives to our Age its individual character is the newspapers; and the character so given is that nothing is known, and that in consequence of the combination of comment and fact, the Opinion founded on the news of the day excludes the event which gives rise to it. The comment goes for nothing on the morrow. The mind is kept ever in movement, but it is that of the top that spins. And this was the purpose of those who instituted papers. Did you ever find a talkative man worth any thing? What can you expect of a talkative nation? What would a man be who put his talk in lieu of his conduct? What must a nation be, who holds itself to be governed by organs of talk? Even that nation

will not individually hold that its organ of speech is something different from and superior to itself.

The thing is so absurd that there is no alternative between scouting or deifying it. We had formerly domestic manufacture, we are now dependant on shops. We must be clothed: we have no resource but the shop and the fashion. We must read; we have no resource but the newspaper. We talk of being served when we go to purchase; we are only cheated unless we know the value of what we buy. We are served by our domestics, but unless we understand their duty, they are our masters, and we their slaves. In what predicament therefore do we stand in reference to those who serve us with ideas? We have no resource but to vindicate our self-love, and so we call the dealers "*Public Instructors!*"

Let us see what a Journal would have to be, to deserve that name.

Statesmen and philosophers for editors: where are they to be found? Impartiality between the factions: where would be its support? Exposure of the errors of the nation: where would be its purchasers? Ascertained facts only reported: where would be its news and its dimensions? Could such a journal exist, it would be execrated as a satire, and burnt in every lane.

The change of the name tells the whole story. The Whigs or the Tories might have an organ of print as they had of speech; but when for Whig or Tory was substituted Public Opinion, you had a false metaphor connected with a non-existent abstraction, and this vain incongruity is to you an idea, a power, and an Estate of the Realm. "What is in a name?" Everything when it is a word and an idea.

It is no light word, this word "Organ," being

on every body's lips at times, and in their mind at all times, at least at all such times as a suggestion from without, or an impulse from within, points towards the exercise of an independent thought.

We use the word "Organic," to distinguish bodies endowed with self-reproducing functions, and therefore complex and complete. When we find the fragment of an articulation or the chip of a texture containing vessels, embedded in the solid rock, and having relapsed into inert matter for thousands or millions of years, we say, here are "organic remains." We mean that the whole of the organs of animal existence, or all the parts of vegetable life coexisted with the fragment.

The part is used metaphorically for the whole, and this is poetic. Should metaphors be diverted to a logical use there would remain no poetry, but there would result no sense. No one could call the Press or Opinion an organic body, how then can the Press be an organ? It is to cover the want of organic structure in the fictitious being which we have made an idol, and call, "a power" that we adopt the term.

There is an instrument of music loud sounding and fed by air; it is called *an* "organ." Music is a science, the musician is an organist, the bellows-blower is his assistant, the keys are his instrument, the congregation his listeners. His art is derived from study, his execution from practice, the tones from the craftsman's care, the inspiration from the preparation of his hearers. Here is an organized being of music in thought, performance, and effect. Why then is this instrument not called "organ of music?" Because no metaphor is required to convey the sense, and there is no false sense to cloak by a false metaphor.

The Leading Journal assumes as its diagram the dial of a clock. A newspaper is an organ of opinion just as much as a dial-plate is an organ of time. It is true that all our dial-plates, when kept in order, indicate the same hours and minutes, because a Galileo has discovered the isochronous quality of pendulous vibrations, and Astronomy has availed itself of that means of measurement to subdivide into parts the periods of the revolutions of our globe. Had there been a Galileo of reason, and were there astronomers to fix the points of just judgment, and apply them to the periods of events, and were the public indicators bound equally to represent the judicial minutes, newspapers might stand to judgment as dials to time. But if you had the hands of every dial moved, not by machinery, but by human will, passion, and interest; if those who looked at them were not moved by their contradiction to discard all, but impelled each by his own fanaticism "to believe his own," then would dial-plates become like newspapers, and there would be no more time, that is to say, time would be no more than opinion.

Your Organ of Opinion pretends to be only speech or utterance, but where are the senses conveying to the mind its elements of judgment, its elements of knowledge, and also its very faculties; where is the sensorium where the elaboration must take place of that which is uttered? You crush eyesight, hearing, and touch, and with these brain itself, into the tongue, and all this you call that opinion of which itself is the organ.

Our idea of a nation is that of an aggregate being. The multitude of its limbs is condensed into one mighty whole, so its senses, and so its reason. The

universal hand is heavy, shoulders strong, sight clear, hearing acute, and voice loud, in proportion to the organs and senses of which it is the multiple. Must not wisdom be equally represented in its magnificent brain? And yet we take its voice only and place it in lieu of the acuteness and the clearness and the wisdom resulting from its numbers. Is not this the confession that it does not possess aggregate perceptions or aggregate sagacity in proportion to its individual powers, dexterity, and success?

It is therefore clear that the metaphor is inapplicable, and that it owes its currency to being unfathomable: this word, intended to convey the aggregate or sublimation of all individual faculty, operates by crushing in each his own faculties, every man being terrified at so much as the admission of any thought which is not in accordance with those publicly proclaimed. To the proneness to error, which on sundry occasions has evinced its deadly presence, by the ruin and extinction of empires, we have superadded awe and reverence for each several error that prevails, however contradictory these may be, by the mere fact of using a general term for what men think. Supposing that the means of acquiring facts and of correcting errors resided in following what men think, that which they think is not constituted in what each contributes, but in a generality imposing upon each an inability to resist its pressure. Having no visible form the votaries have no chance of being liberated by their own superstition. No legionary can raise a hammer upon it; the Serapis is enshrined in every man's bosom: when you endeavour to plant upon it a blow, the idol is not shivered, but the ears of the pagan tingle.

The spectator from some unperverted land, might

here meet me with the supposition that the image, ethereal as it is, is exposed nevertheless to rude and ruinous shocks from the consequences which follow; I would answer him by pointing to the present state of England—public measures universally deplored by a nation, each individual of which entirely approves of his own judgment, and is completely satisfied with his own conduct.

Events might at length be known, were there no press, and results might teach. That in this conclusion Russia agrees is evidenced from the care she bestows on the English press.

The effect of a lull in reading would not be individual only, but also corporate. Each community would think for itself; it would next proceed to act for itself; men would begin to question acts, and doing so in bodies, an answer would have to be given, and so granulation would take place, and the Corporate Bodies revive.

Not a trifling matter is the expense—not the five-pence for the copy, or now the one penny, but the charge for corrupt measures and lawless wars. When the Press commenced to run its course, the whole charges of the State were borne by the royal revenue; and by the compensations for personal service laid upon the great holders. *There were no taxes*, and consequently no anticipation of taxes. It was the Press which advocated and familiarised the nation with excises and customs, that is *taxation*. It was equally the advocate of funding the unrecognised debt—so that to its account has to be set down the dead weight of 800 millions, and the annual taxation of ninety.

“If the History of the Press could be written!” How much is there in that “if.” Who can write the History of the Press? Gossip about writers, tables

of stamps, list and date of speculations—yes. The Press knows no more of itself than England of herself! If the History of the Press could be written, the History of England could be written—it would be another England, and each of us another man. Supposing an editor about to give a history of the journal under his own guidance, what could he tell of the effects produced by his own iteration of fallacious terms which he thinks to be very fine; what of the misjudgments of his age which he has repeated, and in which for him excellence consists; what of the truths he has failed to inculcate, and which have never entered into his mind; what of the intelligence he has promulgated respecting foreign lands, of which he can know nothing; what of the impressions produced on foreign people by phrases which he has been adapting to notions of his own; what of the matters which it behoved him to deal with, and of which he had never heard? If he sat down to write the history of his journal, it must be to the total exclusion of all that in which its history consists.

The persons connected with the Press undergo no preparation, they pass through no course of constitutional or of international law; they have neither to be grounded in the literature and events of ancient States, nor are they sent to travel for years to master the present circumstances of foreign countries; yet these four branches must be severally possessed and combined for any one to judge accurately of the commonest idea or the most trivial event. It is impossible for the mind of man to conceive a more solemn and responsible duty than that of forming judgments on political matters, and judgments which he knows are to be accepted by others as truth. Destitute, however, of the requisite knowledge, he is destitute

of the sense of gravity attached to his functions, begins with being an editor or a writer, and then sets about to consider what he shall say. My connection with it has been the opposite fashion; I have come to it in reference to subjects already mastered, and thus it is that I have had the opportunity of knowing it. My meaning I will illustrate by three instances as diverse in character as it is well possible to imagine:—1st, The movement in Eastern Affairs in 1836;—2d, The Chartist Insurrection in 1839;—3d, The disposal of the Danish Crown in 1852.

In the first, we have the Press working with unanimity to arouse the nation from indifference; presenting to it duties neglected, false courses adopted, dangers in store, arguing therefrom a change of course and a recasting of our whole system of international relations. No events had given rise to this excitement. It was occasioned by print alone, and the print of the ephemeral Press. For this once, in its whole career, the Press was the opponent of the doctrines of factions and the corruptions of power—and was the instructress of the nation. The thoughts, however, were not elaborated in the respective offices, but by a solitary individual wandering in the East. The means were obtained by the calling into play of all the agencies that can assist a good cause. And here I will say, both for myself and for those men pre-eminent for capacity and station, who were engaged with me, that we never anticipated any results from public opinion as such, but had recourse to print for these two reasons:—1st, As a means of placing considerations before certain individuals whom we could not otherwise reach.—2dly, To put aside the objections of a hostile public opinion with which we were constantly met. The ends we aimed at are now

of universal acknowledgment, the difficulties we had to contend with may be understood from this, that Turkey, now only a "sick man" was then a "corpse." Here was public opinion carrying a series of measures, and what was the result? The very next year the whole of them were reversed by a diplomatic whisper or two in the dark.

The Chartist movement was nothing less than an insurrection and a revolution. The Duke of Wellington declared that there was no power of resistance in the military force. Here was the occasion, here was the last necessity for the press to show its power, if it had power, to prevent evil. It did nothing to prevent it, did everything to aggravate it. The language of the regular press exasperated the people instead of instructing them, and the Chartist press spread the disorder. Despite the inefficiency of military means of repression, despite the incentives of the press, it was arrested, and England saved from the calamity; but by a very different process from that of the printing-office. Between twenty and thirty individuals, one half of them common operatives and previously themselves the leaders, visited every district of England. The arm required was human speech. If at the time I had had that command of the press which I had in 1836, I could have done nothing through it, except indeed to say, "For Heaven's sake hold your tongue." The press knew nothing of the facts while they were in course of occurrence, and when it partially became acquainted with them, suppressed and falsified them.

The Danish matter was this: an insurrection was fomented between Denmark and the Duchies by foreign agency. By the same agency the war was prolonged, until occasion was made out of it, to intro-

duce a diplomatic arrangement, to upset the law of succession, and to cut out all the lines save one; then to forge a title for Russia, bringing her in after that last one. It was carried into effect by treaty in London, the government of Lord Derby being made to believe that they were only sanctioning what had already taken place in Denmark. This treaty was then used to coerce the Danish Diet, on the plea that it constituted "a European necessity" for Denmark to accept it. Here was a case in which there were facts not print to arouse the nation. The ultimate surrender to Russia of a crown and kingdom in Europe, together with the suppression of the constitution; and with these the Sound, and the establishment of her entire supremacy in the North. Hereditary right, public law, kingly succession, national freedom, the blood allies of the families of Coburg and of Hanover, were all assailed; and by England's own act, Russia was made mistress of the commerce and the seas of the North. A Protestant people was given over to the head of the Greek church, and a German state (Holstein) subjugated to the Emperor of Russia. Here was an occasion, if ever, for the press to manifest its power; and what did it do? Five of the London journals were indifferent upon the matter. The sixth, the leading one, was acting for Russia. Two articles in the course of the year, furnished by the Russian embassy, established public opinion upon the subject, and taught England that a great triumph of peace and civilization had been achieved. It learnt just fourteen months before the Pruth was passed, that the diplomacy of the great powers, "will see justice done and peace preserved." The facts and documents in a counter sense were suppressed. I had exposed the whole case as it is

now accepted, and as results have confirmed, eighteen months before that treaty was signed. Not a journal of the Continent or of England would accept my statement ; it was considered too monstrous for belief. The paper lay unused till after the treaty was signed ; even then, when published, as a pamphlet, there was but one single copy sold. It was the press of England which gave the Danish crown and the Sound to Russia ; but the press is responsible for nothing that it does, and consequently no sooner was the adventure achieved, than it turned round and denounced it, and reviled those who had been its own victims. This is not to undo but to confirm its work, and so absolutely is that work clinched, that we go to war with Russia, and yet maintain the Danish treaty, ensuring to her the Sound at the very moment we are pretending to prevent her from getting the Dardanelles. The causes it vehemently takes up prosper just as well as those which it sedulously extinguishes. Witness Poland, Hungary, Italy, and now at length Turkey.

The press is working for its own extinction. It has become a public nuisance. Its tendency, whether direct in its language or indirect in the system it supports, is revolution. Revolution brings a tyrant who will not fail to put it down, and will gain prestige and power by so doing. But when put down by despotism or blown up by convulsion, will the people resume its own? No. Delirious excitement will close in stupid collapse.

France was the country in which the press was peculiarly great. It was not long ago the pride of Englishmen that they were not, like Frenchmen, the slaves of newspapers and editors, and that they neither manned barricades nor conquered ministerial offices. We have seen what has been the result in France. We are following fast upon her steps.

The reader may well imagine that if I have not proved my case, I have, at least, exhausted my subject; he will be however mistaken; I have but laid grounds for what is to come—A revolution or a usurpation—a plotting for a Danish surrender—the epic of a Crimean butchery—are but tame truths to the marvellous history on the threshold of which we stand; where thrones and sceptres and continents and empires will be disposed of as if they were the very pieces on a board taken up and set down by two players at chess.

In 1851, during the frenzy about a French invasion, Lord John Russell, then Prime Minister of England, said that he had grounds for security in this, that Louis Napoleon, unlike his uncle, had lived in England and knew the press; implying that he would treat its effusions with contempt, and not identify with them the sober sense of the British nation. He gave point to this remark by stating that the rupture with France in 1803 was mainly owing to the intemperate language held at that time by the English press, and which, exasperating the French nation and its ruler, frustrated the peaceful dispositions of the English government.

In one of the ablest pamphlets ever published, "War in Disguise," and which appeared shortly after the period here referred to, that war is traced to the press of France. The writer in a passage pre-eminent for truth and eloquence, compares the press to the centaur, combining the worst natures of the man and the brute, by the use of reason for the ends of passion. These counter-statements do not controvert but confirm each other. That which has conferred on Europe irresponsible government, gives it unjust and lawless wars, even if it takes no direct part in fomenting them.

Here then the press appears exercising the prerogative of war. In this instance the effect only was external. No foreign influence acted on the press of either country; there was rancour, but no design. It is the union of these that is now before us, following as a consequence upon the break up of those parties, whose existence was the greatest of curses, until that curse came of their fall. Party has not been put down by patriotism, but by fraud.

While there were Whigs and Tories there was a certain recognised leadership. It mattered not that the Whigs of one date were the Tories of another, which or what were their opinions, or whether they had any or not—the mere fact of struggle placed in evidence certain men, and the men so placed gained their position by pre-eminent personal qualities. Under their political chiefs, the nation was ranged. If the newspapers did serve the purposes of corruption, these were docile to the rule of party. Each was subject to its master and limited to its field.

It was not for a journal to strike out plans, to indulge in caprices, to aim at independence, or to be fired with ambition; it might be learned, argumentative, epigrammatic, soft, denunciatory, but the mind was in the fingers, not in the brain. It was the intellectual slave of Rome, whom the master now trained as a philosopher, now as a gladiator, and despatched to the academy to argue or to the arena to bleed. It was indeed a monster armed with fang and claw, but it was chained. At last it was set free. Party was old, fell sick and died; and he was let loose on the populace which he had hitherto amused.

The principle of association is doing such wonders amongst us, that we are beginning to look the consequences with dread. These bodies would

indeed be too large for safety, did they not, at the same time, become too vast for management. A railway cannot travel off its own line, and for every speculation capital, or at least credit, is required. What shall we say of a company whose field is illimitable, whose capital is inexhaustible, and whose expansion of business diminishes, not increases, the necessity of business-like habits? Such are the printing companies which the demise of faction has left free to shift for themselves, and to whom England is turned over, as the field of speculation. The funds on which they draw are doubt and error; rumour their security; wars and institutions the wares in which they deal. But this charter is held upon the tenure of deadly war against each other. As they cannot be all (by all I mean the half dozen notorieties) equally dexterous, profligate, and lucky, some will sink and others rise, till at last one will extinguish and swallow up the rest. This must come as a consequence of the mere mass of news. Some morning England will awaken, if it has not done so already, absolutely in the hands of the partners of a private company, with the faces of which she is unacquainted, and whose names do not appear on their own "paper." Heretofore the people had "leaders" whom at least they knew; now they have columns of anonymous type. In other speculations things are purchased; here men are the merchandise. If they are bought cheap, they are worth still less to the purchaser. Beyond the mere sale of his paper, what does the editor care for the mind of the reader—his property? He is not himself a minister of state, nor aspires to be so, and he is no longer the servant of such. The accumulating stock can neither be exchanged for office nor bank notes. In foreign affairs an

editor can excite a nation to frenzy, misdirect its efforts, and do whatever is desirable for a conqueror or a foe; yet he neither is nor can be Emperor of the French or Czar of the Muscovites. It is not in the nature of things that such power should exist and operate without purpose. Those who have to advance particular objects have recourse, in petty matters, to individuals on the establishment, who, for favour or money, will get an article inserted. In graver matters shares are bought, and arrangements made for a certain space being devoted to the advocacy (ostensible or disguised) of certain views. This is the business side of the matter, and it is an essential part of the management of every political question. It is indeed a part of all those private speculations which are above the ordinary line, not by their own intrinsic merits. Why should not a foreign government do the same?

"This is preposterous!" even the enlightened reader will exclaim. "There is nothing of which I do not believe the Press capable; but as to betraying us to a foreign power, that is impossible, for there is Public Opinion."* This objection is perfectly correct, when we have to deal with a power on a level with ourselves, because he could be helped only by partisanship in aggression against England, in which case a journal would be lost by playing false. It is otherwise in respect to a power intellectually superior; for we are then involved in matters that we do not understand, and it will have commenced by making us adopt its interest as ours, and consequently its

* A distinguished politician, in reply to some statement of a friend of mine, said, "There is nothing of which I do not believe — capable; but as to treason, there is Public Opinion." My friend replied, "Yes, because there is Public Opinion."

organs in this country would appear to be defending the national cause; indeed, those who opposed it would be set down as traitors. M. Thiers said, in 1842, speaking of France and England, "you have adopted the interests of Russia as your own." In the first article which I wrote for a periodical I used these words:—"If Count Nesselrode were to reveal to you the purposes of his government respecting you, you would treat him as the arch-impostor of Europe." What Russia wants of you is, that you should hate her.* For instance, she wants to entrap you in the Crimea. A journal in her pay invokes the vengeance of England against her, and points its attention to the neglected point of Sebastopol, "the centre of her power." You go there; you get success, and lose an army. She has to fear that you stop short, or withdraw. She has your soldiers massacred in cold blood upon the field, to push you on by the love of vengeance. A journal in her interests raises the fact before the eyes of the nation, wins the rewards of its secret service and the credit of its ostensible patriotism. Russia has obtained her end, and the *Times* has doubled its circulation.

While there were many journals the operation was difficult and precarious, and while there were parties the same obstruction was presented in the press as in the government. What the coalition of the parties has done in respect to public men, the circulation of the *Times* has done in the nation.

* "What Russia wants is not that you should love, but that you should hate her. While you are inert, she can do nothing; that inertness she overcomes by your hatred. Through it she moves you to act; you are ignorant—she directs your action."—*Conversation with Operatives*, 1838.

The *Times* is no longer an organ of public opinion ; it is the organ of England—she sees by it—she hears by it—she speaks by it ; she thinks of doing only what it suggests to her ; she knows what is done only by what it tells her ; it is sole publicity ; what it does not insert is not published ; other nations know England only by its voice. Whoever has the *Times* holds England by the throat, can say “ your life or your purse,” and take both. Russia can have the *Times* on the ordinary conditions of purchase. She may have it without paying a groat.

The *Times* gave to the present war the name of “ the people’s war.” A contemporary replied by calling it “ the *Times* war.” For a time this was repeated with general approbation. Step by step it has urged the measures that have been adopted ; either the government followed its lead, or they acted in concert, and the *Times* prepared the public. Whilst urging a war for the protection of Turkey, it has ceaselessly heaped upon Turkey indignity and vituperation. It has taken credit to itself for the policy which England has adopted ; it has pursued this course with a vehemence, a pertinacity, a rancour, and an expenditure of talent explicable only by a deep design ; it has been proved in Parliament to have been throughout in confidential intercourse with the Russian embassy as well as with the British government, by the coincidences even of phraseology between its leaders and official documents secret at the time. I have invariably looked to the columns of the *Times* for the knowledge of the view which Russia took of any question, and for the announcement of what she was about to do. This vehemence might have been explicable had the government been following a course opposed to the views, or the assumed views of the

paper. Not so, when the government was doing exactly what the *Times* wanted, and the people accepted whatever the government did.

Now as to the results. Is it you that have made profit? Is it the State that you went to support that has made profit? For you the result is, inability to contend with Russia though backed by France and Turkey. In Turkey the result is a ruinous war with a foe over which she had already and easily triumphed. Is not your loss Russia's profit? Is not the prostration of Turkey the aim of all her efforts and accomplishment of all her ambition? Well, the *Times* made you believe that Turkey was already prostrate and Russia already in possession. The *Times*, at the very moment it was leading you to the war, told you it must end in the prostration of Turkey and the discomfiture of the allies after the sacrifice of "a million of lives." This was candid; it would have been so, in dealing with rational beings.

Although as yet but on the threshold, we have items for calculation. Even closing accounts now, you will not get out under a hundred millions. The expenditure of France is considerably greater. The armaments of Austria have not cost less than the expeditions of England. The loss to Turkey cannot well be rated in money. But England has, moreover, expended her army, on which she depends for the retention of her possessions, and for tranquillity at home. In this account we cannot neglect the paralysis of trade, the scarcity of money, the dearth of provisions, the fall and fluctuation of public and other securities, which is to be counted by hundreds of millions; but confining ourselves to the mere operations and liabilities for war, the aggregate for those four countries cannot be under 500 millions sterling.

If Russia aims at the dominion of the world, she would be stupid not to do so ; she can succeed only by making other nations exhaust themselves. These 500 millions are therefore her winnings ; meanwhile the war is carried on in a manner not only which enables her to make it, but which gives to her the necessary pecuniary resources, she having profited during the same period to an amount exceeding 20 millions sterling,* while for her the expenditure is little more than that for powder and shot.

Now supposing Opinion in England to be all-powerful, and such results to be contingent upon it, must not Russia have been the stupidest of nations if she had not secured the *Times* ? It is well known that she does not neglect the Press ; it is suspected that she cultivates it with the extremest assiduity. No one doubts that the Press of England is cultivatable. Put all this together, and then we will come to the question —“How much was it worth Russia’s while to give for the *Times* ?”

Let us put it in another shape. The *Times* is managed on profit principles ; it has no politics ; it is bound to nothing but its own gain ; it turns all things to account, and it has a control over the money market and speculation in general, which invests it with power of new creation, the fact of which no one doubts, but the mysteries of which few have sounded. It thus stands alone, capable of taking in and combining sequences of effects, and in this it is the counterpart to the Russian Cabinet. This faculty, which for Russia has created power, has resulted in the *Times* from the possession of power. The know-

* The resources furnished to Russia have been generally estimated at nine millions, by the simple process of confining our sight to the Baltic trade, and to that trade as connected with England.

ledge of it would be forced upon it, for every scheme and speculation, great and small, goes straight to its office, not with arguments only, but with money in hand.*

When the Order in Council, devised to prevent the interruption of the trade of Russia, appeared, the *Times* could not have been in ignorance of the consequences: it knew that that document was worth any sum of money to Russia, say only twenty millions: the document was, in fact, drawn up by the principal contributor to the *Times* on the Eastern question.† Now I put it to any man whether it is or is not his opinion, that the *Times* could have, if so minded, blown up the Orders in Council. If it did not do so, and yet got no consideration for its reserve, then it must have been the stupidest of papers.

Here then we have means of calculation. On one item scarcely thought of in the mass, Russia gets in twelve months ten millions direct from England in the North, and as much more through the effect of the concession elsewhere. This the *Times* has given her as part of the war, and from this the *Times* might have shut her out independently of the war. What is a million or two against such profits? She might buy the whole establishment and make money by it, and say that she only bought in shares of £150,000

* Some time ago there was a sudden shift of the *Times* in reference to the advocacy of the counter schemes of central American civilization. It was whispered that this arose from the discovery that £50,000 had been secured to the *Times*, or to some one connected with it, by one of the rival companies.

† A cabinet minister, pushed for explanation by Mr. Mitchell at a dinner-party, could only refer him to Mr. Reeves to tell him what the cabinet meant by its own order, but which that gentleman was unable to do. The incident occurred at Lansdowne House.

in May, 1852, by the increase which she has given to the paper she could now sell out for £300,000. This is, however, only in the event of purchase being requisite. The power that can get a Premier of England and a President of France without purchase, can surely get a newspaper. If by a single individual she secures a nation, may she not a commercial company? "It is always the struggle," as Gen. Valentini said of her wars with the Turks, "of a seeing man with a blind one."

On neither side have we fallen upon this condition by accident. On the one side it is the result of a natural growth, on the other the accomplishment of a long-matured design. The domination of a single journal is the end of a progress, and a final development contingent upon the withdrawal of functionary powers from our local institutions. The growth of business, thus set free from the soil to concentrate itself upon the capital, must ultimately decompose the political organs by mere plethora, and some looser mechanism will be had recourse to. The same accumulation disqualifies a man from attending to discussions or following debates, he must therefore take to and rely upon an expositor; every man is equally situated; all will ultimately take the same, and that will be the one which has the largest number of advertisements. Once in possession, that paper will command the best talent in the country, whilst its principle of business will be to confuse all judgment. The means readily present themselves: speaking in opposite senses, contradicting one day what it asserts the other, keeping up an excitement which sells its own paper, sinking the discrimination that might look for another.

The ambition of Russia is not of to-day; if its

accomplishment is to-day, it is that intermediary steps were requisite—steps to be taken, not in the East where fortune has declared against her, but in England where art has made time her friend. Her designs have been delayed until these developments in England had been successfully accomplished which prostrated opposition of party or opinion, and gave her all England in a single Printing-office: so that Egyptian bondage is now restored on the banks of the Thames, and that commissioned from those of the Neva. Thus are united in the Press the resources of rancour and those of design, not now to rupture a peace of Amiens between England and France, but to drive the human species on to self-destruction, and call it “War with Russia.”

If error prevails, it follows that favour and popularity are signs by which it may be recognized. If you see a man in power, or an author in credit, you may be sure that he panders to the dominant follies, or uses them: you may be equally certain that if any one saw and declared the truth he would be hated as a traducer, or rather that his words would pass uncomprehended as if uttered in an unknown tongue. This will be brought home to us if we revert to former incidents and consider how we know what occurred in periods of decomposition, and who the men are through whom we know it. Our admiration and respect are given, not to the leaders of states and the idols of the people, but to those who were the objects of hatred and the contempt of their contemporaries—To the Athenians Socrates was a corruptor, Demosthenes a traitor: the annals of Tacitus were not published in Rome, and we know Jerusalem nineteen centuries ago by humble operatives, the Evangelists.

Doubtless there are those who will take this in the

opposite sense, and say—these empires perished because they had not got Public Opinion and their organs. Suppose there had been a press in Athens, is it the eloquence of Demosthenes or the sophistry of Eschines it would have deprecated—is it the interests of Greece it would have represented, or the gold of Macedon?* Had there been a press in Rome, would the annals of Tacitus have appeared as leaders? “Cæsar,” says a popular French writer, “who sought to move the Senate to pity for Cataline, might have triumphed over Cicero, if only he had had journals at his disposal.”

From the time of the great Rebellion, where are we to read the history of England? Not certainly in the acts of those raised into power by their public virtue and spirit, but in the words of those who strove against the tide and were swept away by it. Even we, the successors to the inheritance of evil success, place our pride not in those who have conferred on us this ancestral rank, but in those who endeavoured to restrain its bounds and to sere its laurels. We stand mute before the figure of a Falkland; we turn the pages as in study of a Temple; we are proud of a Bolingbroke, a Carteret, a Shippen, a Swift, and a Burke, because of the words of reproof addressed to our incipient selves, as yet but patiently feeling our way to that transmission now accomplished of the Law of God unto the will of man. Now, at length protest has died out, not that unanimity reigns. The character indeed is one, but the manifestations vary, giving us discord without contrast; thence come projects of amelioration, not by a return, but by embarking in new voyages towards an unknown bourne.

* Then, indeed, the parallel between Philip and Nicolas would have been complete.

The present generation has witnessed and achieved a greater mass of historical events than any ten previous generations; perhaps indeed I might say that since England was a people, such an amount of changes produced by thought has not taken place up to 1830, as since that year. Reform—I will not say of Parliament, for that would be to undergo not to expose the error, but of the State, carried in defiance of the crown and the two first estates. The rise of a party for free exchange on a basis of restricted exchanges. A counter party for the restoration of ancient liberty by means of the principle of restriction. A general revolt of instructed capacity against all accepted ideas, without touching their origin. The extinction of the historical Parties. The elevation of a new political party assuming to be the representative of what was formerly called the “Country party,” which was a combination of those opposed to “the Court,” when the Crown still possessed power and used it arbitrarily, and lastly a metaphysical reform of the Church.

These efforts are certainly great, and prove an immense mental activity; they are moreover original, for they in no ways agree with any of our former maxims, and least of all where restoration and revival have been the proposed object. What would Sir W. Temple or Ralph have said of extending the power of the House of Commons with the view of reducing the executive to the limits of law, or restoring to the people the functions of administration? What would Swift or Locke have said of rendering free the admission of Corn, and leaving money, which fixes all values, shackled and in the hands of the moneyed interest? What the Parliament of 1640, which sent to the Tower a member who even

in reprobation had used the word *excise*, of a party who would renovate England by Custom Duties? What the grave Councillors of Edward VI, who taught that young prince "how dangerous a thing it was to move in a new matter," of the modern professors of common sense, Carlyle and Macaulay? What would Jeremy Taylor or Laud have said of a progressive scheme of Religion by developments.

This historical self-examination must reduce any dispassionate man to a serious dilemma, indeed to a compound dilemma. You applaud yourselves, yet you condemn yourselves.—You laud the men of the past who were opposed to what you have become, and you reform the past by departing further from what they have taught you as the only wisdom.

Now let us look to what our condition would be if we actually were without a Press. In treating of public opinion I have shown that if men did not rely upon it they would rely upon themselves. But public opinion exists by its organs; were they to disappear we might get men again. "The nation," said Channing, "is the tomb of the man." Nation—No!—Press. As I have had to watch day by day the effects of the papers on the people, I stand perhaps alone in the position of being able to hope great things from their removal, that is, if false data were not to be administered, false intelligence not communicated, and fallacious reasons not supplied. With the Press nothing is known. Who advises a measure, nobody knows. Who carries it into effect, nobody knows. Who writes an article, nobody knows. Everything is anonymous, everything is secret; the soul and the life of publicity is—secrecy.

NOTE.—ON THE *TIMES*.

There have been two exposures of the *Times* in Parliament. The one by Mr. Layard in February, 1854, showing its connection with Russia. That gentleman subsequently accepted the office of its correspondent in the Crimea. The other by Mr. Henry Drummond on the 26th of March, 1855. On this occasion the *Times* thought fit to defend itself. It castigated Mr. Drummond. That gentleman recanted, and was again received into favour. I give an extract from the article of the 28th March.

About the same time a barrister amused himself by writing a squib in the form of a bill for placing the government of England in the hands of the *Times*. The *Times* revenged itself by suppressing the report of the whole legal proceedings of his circuit.

Extract from the Times of the 28th of March, 1855.

“Yet we have one claim to consideration from Mr. Drummond. He says that the *Times* is a manufactory of gossip, which the people of this country will have, and with which it is our vocation to supply them. Now, if that be so, we are at any rate brother craftsmen, and should learn to deal tenderly with each other’s infirmities. The great staple of Mr. Drummond’s speech is political gossip,—the saying in the House of Commons things which, though circulated in private society, self-respect, or a consideration for the feelings of others, prevents other men from mentioning in public. Personality is the element in which he revels, and so strong is this passion in this abhorrer of gossip that he was actually at the trouble of writing down and reading to the House the

names of gentlemen whom he believed to be connected with this journal,—not to prove anything, to illustrate anything, or to explain anything, but simply because to read those names might annoy individuals and afford a momentary amusement to the House.

“We must apologize for noticing such statements or such a man, but the place where they are made and the audience to which they are delivered give them a weight which, if the position of their promulgator was better understood, they would not possess. It is said we follow, instead of leading, public opinion, and in the same breath the opinion of Napoleon is quoted that in England the newspapers form public opinion; and we are also told,—in support, we presume, of the same proposition,—that Ministers suffered themselves to be driven into war by the language of the *Times*. Mr. Drummond is kind enough to express his opinion—for which, considering his theories as to the omnipotence of the money in which he deals, we are extremely obliged—that the *Times* really does not take bribes, and in the same breath endeavours to prove the contrary by the evidence of O’Meara, the spy and double traitor, who sold Napoleon to the English Government and the English Government to Napoleon, and might well, therefore, believe that the conductors of this journal were equally venal.

“These contradictions speak for themselves, and, though they do not reflect much credit on the consistency and acumen of Mr. Drummond, they do, we think, still less honour to that state of the public taste which can tolerate such helpless and incoherent absurdity. Mr. Drummond says that the *Times* is a commercial speculation, and he is doubtless right; but when he says the *Times* is nothing else, we appeal from the opinion of Mr. Drummond to men who, free from the excitement of fanatical exaltation and the intoxication of Parliamentary laughter, can at least do what is not always granted to a jester—think clearly, and feel honourably. It was not in the spirit of a mere mercantile speculation that we unveiled those horrors of Crimean mismanagement which drew down upon us for the moment a storm of obloquy and abuse

from every one interested in concealing them. Mr. Drummond has been one among many too happy to glean the materials of his speech from the 'gossip' contained in this journal, and is now engaged day by day in the labours of a committee whose principal business seems to be to verify our assertions, and fill up the links that were wanting in our narrative. We know well that on Mr. Drummond no exposition will or can have any effect, but we respectfully submit to the House of Commons how far the encouragement given to such scenes as that of Monday night may tend to enforce that respect and abstinence from comment on individual members which they are wont to demand from the press, and how far attacks upon newspapers and their supposed contributors become the dignity or raise the character of a great legislative assembly."

THE "TIMES" AND SEBASTOPOL.*

THE event of this age, and one scarcely if at all paralleled in any other, is that of the restoration of Turkey in the last twenty-five years : a restoration to which Lord Palmerston has become a witness in words, the distinctness and energy of which rival the facts which they record. The hopes of Russia seem now blasted, and her power of endangering the world gone ; for to endanger the world, she has not only to master her neighbour, but to incorporate his empire and make it her own : she was formidable only when she possessed Turkey. But she does not abandon her purpose—she adopts another plan.

Sebastopol is a fortress as well as an arsenal for the fleet. For aggressive purposes it was a fleet that was wanted. A nation that is meditating aggressions against a "weaker" neighbour, has to erect no battlements, sink no trenches, requires no cyclopic aid to construct fortresses, and calls in no genii to store it with boundless munitions for defence. Observe now the facts. Between 1828 and 1853, not a single line-of-battle ship is added to the squadron of Russia in the Black Sea. If the empire of the Ottomans was to fall the prey of an expedition to Constantinople, must not the resources of Russia have been expended on vessels, and might she not have had for the cost otherwise expended 100 sail ready to carry 100,000 men to the shores of the Bosphorus ? Clearly, therefore the attack on Constantinople did not enter

* This sheet is revised just as the news arrives of the *Fall* of Sebastopol.

into her plan. But while she neglected her navy, she was accumulating those enormous defensive means which have discomfited our forces and overwhelmed our imaginations. Here then we have the revelation of the new course that she adopted on perceiving the recovery of the power of the Ottoman empire—a discovery which she made in that campaign of 1828 which Europe judged so differently.

Her tactics were therefore changed from attack to defence. But defence against *whom*? Against the Ottoman empire? No! Had it had the power and the thought, it never would have gone to knock its head against a fortress which covered nothing and opened the way to nothing, whilst the vulnerable parts of Russia lay exposed on the east and west. Had Russia apprehended an attack from Turkey, it is Odessa she would have fortified, not Sebastopol.

Sebastopol was then fortified against England and France. But did she apprehend that these governments would ever take up arms to attack her? No; for then in like manner she would have fortified, not Sebastopol, but Odessa. She made her preparations in the Crimea just as in London and in Paris. In those two capitals—connections; in the Crimea—batteries and stores. She planned for England and France their attack: she set in the Crimea her trap.

But this plan—a very simple one—was settled the very moment the Crimea was occupied; I have no doubt that it was one of the objects for which it was desirable to take possession of the Crimea, because there was no other point of her territory on which, however devoted her partisans in foreign cabinets, she could draw a false attack. The first mention of Sebastopol which I find is sixty-four

years ago, when the Secretary of Embassy at St. Petersburg then left in charge, writes to warn his government of the dangers to Constantinople from that fortress. The warning is given as against Russia, but the initiated will understand whence it proceeds. I quote from a secret despatch, and an unpublished one, and yet I am guilty of no violation of official confidence in inserting it :—

“ Hassan Pasha’s plan was to put the fleet on a respectable footing, and then to endeavour to reconquer the Crimea, the Liman, and the sea of Asoph ; for he did not think that the recovery of the Crimea alone was sufficient to secure Constantinople. He began by reducing Egypt, but in his absence the Porte declared war, and upset all his projects. From what has been above said it is thus evident that the Russians may, whenever they please, become masters of Constantinople. They are not, perhaps, sufficiently apprised of its weakness (!), but this cannot long be concealed from them, and its fall is probably not far distant, because the Turks themselves have not the means of retarding it, and because the interference of any European power is at least very precarious, since the event might happen before they could even have learnt the preparation of an armament at Sebastopol.”

The plan so patiently matured and so long delayed, was executed in May 1853, under a concurrence of circumstances the most felicitous : in December of the previous year she had placed an emperor over France, in the following January a Coalition over England. Having secured the “ Fourth Estate ” not of England only but of all Europe in a single organ, she then by the *Times* alarms the world with the vastness and the daring of her schemes : the long delay of the Allies maddens opinion to the point of being ready for any act that shall have the appearance of vigour. The leading journal opens upon Sebastopol with a

weight of metal, and continuity of fire, without parallel in the annals of public discussion. The banner of Public Opinion is hoisted on its walls, amidst deafening shouts, "Sebastopol is the centre of Russian power!" "Until Sebastopol is destroyed, no safety for Turkey, no security for the world, no peace with Russia." And so, "she drags your armies to her shores." Forty thousand Englishmen perish. The defeats she had incurred from the Turks are wiped off by the discomfiture of Turkey's allies, and that war which she could not maintain single-handed against Turkey, she now carries on by discomfiting the Powers of the West together with Turkey!

This is not all. Negotiations open; negotiations and war simultaneous! She has now two paths at her option. The one is to make the Crimea the common grave for the armies of England, France, Turkey,* and Sardinia; such is the minor profit secured by bringing Sebastopol within the domain of Public Opinion. But she has another and a higher game—the diplomatic.

The Allies insist on the destruction of Sebastopol. The public, gratified with this noble design, pass over the concurrence of war and of negotiation. The plenipotentiaries observe the practical difficulties and dangers connected with the military branch. Placed in the dilemma between a Sebastopol that Public Opinion has captured, and a besieging force itself besieged by the armies of Russia, they quite of their own heads, and by their own ingenuity, fall upon a project of adjustment, that of counterbalancing Sebastopol. Geography and the late catastrophe

* Whilst the Russians hold, unmolested, the north of Dobroja, the papers announce the transport of 40,000 Turks, 4000 horses, and 100 guns to Eupatoria!

point out Sinope. Throw in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and then you have Russia bitted.* But Public Opinion wanted Sebastopol destroyed. Send Public Opinion to the nursery.

If I were vain-glorious, I should propose a statue to Public Opinion. My heart ought to be overflowing with gratitude. Solemnly addressing the Turkish Government in January 1851, I predicted,—“That unless 25,000 men were stationed on the right bank of the Pruth, Turkey would become for the maritime powers what Poland had been for the territorial.” To what do I owe it but to Public Opinion that I have not to look back with shame, and that I am not held to-day a vain and presumptuous dreamer? It, and it alone, and not a Russian cabinet or a British cabinet, has, step by step, confirmed my positions, and made me the “historian of Europe before the fact.”

I have prognosticated the partition of Turkey as the end and object of this war. But I have also asserted that Russia would bear no partners. This may appear contradiction. It is a sequence; it is a matter of dates. The partition will be one of opinion, the possession one of reality. This also has been stated beforehand in these words:—

“She (Russia) must cause you to accumulate enormous forces on the Turkish territory. She must put you in possession of its seas, and its straits, and its strong places, before she can conquer the antipathy of the Turks to herself, and induce them to call her in to drive you out.”

And again:—

“Every British regiment and ship is worth to Russia ten

* This was written before the project was unrolled. It was also published in a morning journal on the 29th of March. The very next day the same journal had this from Vienna.

of her own regiments and ships. Nor will she sacrifice a man of yours without an imperative necessity."*

Russia set the trap of Sebastopol; the *Times* decoyed you into it. The *Times* then is the Organ, not of Public Opinion, but of Russia.

The method of the argumentation is itself evidence of the object. Statements were made, and nothing more. No proofs were adduced, no refutations were noticed. The statements were in reference to circumstances, to law, and to history; they were not averments of a general belief, or even of particular views which some might dispute, but which some entertained. They were perfectly original, except in so far that a remarkable parallel runs between them, and the pamphlets of Mr. Cobden, holding alike in matter and in method. These statements, it is needless to say, were false; and grant the writers to have been misled as to things in the East, that will not explain the legal and historical falsification. But the *Times* knew its power, and exerted it—the power of iteration. It operated on the English nation as a blacksmith on a caldron—punching, driving, and rivetting: having performed the feat, it then tells you, that you are done up and must be invaded.†

* The letter containing this passage was in the hands of the editors of the *Morning Advertiser* and the *Morning Herald* the morning that the news arrived of the landing at Eupatoria.

† *Times* of 21st May, where CONSCRIPTION, which I announced on the sailing of the expedition as its consequence, is first mooted.

On the 17th of June the "*Times*" says:—

"Whatever delusion the Ministers were in as to the duration of the war last year, we now know that *it is wise* to make up our minds to TWENTY YEARS AT LEAST.

SEBASTOPOL EXCERPTA.

"Within a much more recent period Sebastopol has become a place of first-rate strength and magnitude for all the purposes of war—covering on the one side the bay of Odessa, and on the other the Sea of Azoff—enabling the Russian army to carry on incessant warfare in the Caucasus, and to close the Circassian coast; enabling the Russian flotilla to occupy the mouths of the Danube, and sheltering under its gigantic fortress a fleet not brave enough to meet on equal terms the navies of France and England, but sufficiently powerful to threaten the coasts of Asia Minor with the horrors of Sinope, or to transport an army in a few hours to the mouth of the Bosphorus. As long as Russia has the Crimea, with Sebastopol for her stronghold and her naval arsenal, all these advantages are hers. It is impossible that the states bordering on the other shores of the Black Sea should oppose an effectual resistance to such an ascendancy without the protection of the great maritime Powers; but the maritime Powers themselves cannot permanently maintain a fleet of 15 sail of the line to watch Sebastopol. The grand political and military objects of the war cannot therefore be attained as long as Sebastopol and the Russian fleet are in existence; but, if that central position of the Russian Power in the south of the empire were annihilated, the whole fabric which it has cost the Czars of Russia a century to raise falls to the ground.

"We hold, therefore, that the taking of Sebastopol and the occupation of the Crimea are objects which would repay all the cost of the present war, and would permanently settle in our favour the principal questions now in dispute; and it is equally clear that these objects are to be accomplished by no other means; for a peace which should leave Russia in possession of the same means of aggression would only enable her to recommence the war at her pleasure. The Crimea is on many accounts favourable to the operations of the allied armies, supported by the fleets. The climate of the southern coast is said to be healthy, while that of the northern portion of the peninsula is marshy and pestiferous. The coast itself is indented by numerous bays, and that of Kaffa or Theodosia, on the south-eastern point of the country, is large enough to admit a fleet, and to serve as the base of operations for an army. When recently visited by Sir E. Lyons and the steam squadron, the forts and defences of this place were observed to be quite inconsiderable. Access to every part of the coast would, of course, be easy for the conveyance of supplies, reinforcements, and even the heavy train of the army. The Russians, on the contrary, would have to bring the bulk of their troops and supplies to the seat of war across the

immense steppes of the southern provinces of the empire. *Nicolaiev and Cherson could be blockaded so as to stop all communication by water, and if Sebastopol were invested by sea and land, Russia has no other place of strength in the country to fall back upon.* The conduct of a siege is an affair of art, which must be successful in a given time, unless the enemy can relieve the place in the interval by defeating the besieging army or by compelling it to retire. From the best accounts which have been obtained of Sebastopol, there is no reason to suppose that the land defences of the place are of a very formidable character, or that much had been done to them until the present hostilities gave the Emperor reason to apprehend an attack by European armies. The position of the town upon a cliff rising from the sea commands to a great extent the prodigious forts which have been erected for the protection of the harbour, and their fire would probably not touch operations commenced in the rear of the place and on higher ground. We cannot, therefore, but suppose that *forty thousand men* of the allied armies, supported by the fleets, would be able to *keep in check* any number of troops Russia can throw into the Crimea; and we are confirmed in hoping that this is the operation resolved upon by the allied Governments by the fact that very heavy battering guns have been despatched both from the English and French arsenals."—*Times*, June 15, 1854.

"Immediately after the siege of Silistria was raised (middle of June) the Government at home thought the time was come to occupy the Crimea, and to capture Sebastopol."—*Lord John Russell at Bristol*, October 28.

"From first to last, and throughout every part of these transactions, extending over more than a century, the Crimea has been the *point d'appui* on which the southern policy of Russia rested—the keystone of the arch which reached from the mouths of the Danube to the range of the Caucasus. Odessa rose into commercial importance and prosperity under this protection. The Euxine became a Russian lake, and the naval forces assembled within it awaited but the occasion or the signal to complete the subjection of Turkey, and enter upon the eastern waters of the Mediterranean. The Crimea itself was admirably suited for these purposes. Its indented shores afforded great harbours and means of defence; its extensive and fertile plains provided copious and cheap supplies for the troops; while the absence of population and of trade left the peninsula as a sort of natural fortress, which hardly attracted the curiosity of the traveller or the observation of the merchant. Such was the state of things a year ago, when first the pretensions of Russia and the approach of hostilities drove us to consider where the most severe and decisive blow against her should be aimed. These considerations sufficed to demonstrate that

the Crimea was that spot, and that a blow struck home at Sebastopol must at once paralyze and annihilate those means of external aggression in the East against which we found ourselves more particularly arrayed in arms."—*Times*, Oct. 4, 1854.

The Czar is to retire and preserve a dynasty between Moscow and Casan!

The same paper has:—

"For the moment the world is fully occupied with the great drama which is performing in the Crimea; but *as soon as the campaign is at an end* the Porte will perhaps do well to put the following straightforward question to Austria—'If the Russians should again cross the Danube into the Dobrudscha, will Austria consider such a renewed invasion a *casus belli*, and act accordingly?'"

"Having drawn the sword and thrown away the scabbard in the face of a powerful and barbarous foe, and by the side of a noble ally, we must devote everything we possess in this world to the cause we have embraced, unless we would make up our minds to retire from the front rank of nations, and take our place we know not how far behind. . . . We must make the grenadier stand for more than three savages, and the dragoon for more than three Cossacks, if we would not suffer a reverse which may be the first step in that decline and fall which has been the fate of all empires."—*Times*, Nov. 29, 1854.

"In considering the question of the expedition to the Crimea, the Government had to consider the alternatives. England and France had sent an army into Turkey. If that army had been taken back to Constantinople for the winter, it would have been a great disappointment to the people of this country. There only remained the expedition to the Crimea."—*Lord John Russell*, Dec. 12, 1854.

"The stores accumulated there could only have been accumulated *for purposes of aggression*; and the manner in which Russia, without being enabled to bring a single man or a single gun by sea, has relied solely on the defences of the place to *defend Sebastopol* for many months, *shows the danger to which TURKEY IS EXPOSED*."—*Lord Clarendon on the 25th of May*, 1855.

CONSCIENCE AND CUNNING.

A CUNNING man is one without conscience; for cunning is the antithesis to straightforwardness, and conscience implies honesty. Against this, I say, the cunning man alone is conscientious; here are my reasons.

In Latin, conscience is rendered by means of an adjective. A better example of it there cannot be than Horace's *Mens conscia recti*, the nearest approach to which in English words is, "A soul *knowing* itself to be in the right." When we say heart, it is not the anatomical organ we mean, it is the man himself; and we seize upon any term that can give *him* with another name, so as to be able to construct a phrase. Heart and conscience are the same thing: we can always use the one for the other: they vary indeed in the adjective form—hearty and conscientious not being synonymous. How, then, would you translate into English a conscientious man? It must be a man himselfish. Even with all our mistiness, Conscience can go no further than what a man really thinks of himself, independently of the disguise he may put on for others, and has nothing whatever to do with the amount of light which he possesses; it is such knowledge as he has of the right or wrong of those things which he himself does.

Cunning, from the old form to know,* has passed

* Kennen, *German*; canny, *Scotch*.

into a bad sense from our fault, not its failing; even as *wit* (wisdom) has become sharpness (so, amongst the Greeks, sophistry), as *craft* (power) has become deceit. The change in the value of this word opens one of the most essential fields of self-examination. Why do we associate cunning with knavery, and never with honesty—if not because the dishonest man will do for a purpose what the honest man will not do for the truth. The former knows that it is only on himself and his dexterity that he has to depend for success. The latter, content to rely on his good intentions, never dreams of qualifying himself to make them prevail. To this is evil indebted for its supremacy, or even for a place in the world. There would be no knaves, says a Spanish proverb, unless there were dupes; this is what I meant when I said that the cunning man only can be conscientious, for a man must be observant of others to know himself.

“Being crafty,” says St. Paul, “I have caught you with guile”—“Caught you not for my ends, but for your benefit.” Can anything be more cunning than the answers of our Saviour? was ever self-culture so inculcated as in these words:—“Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless as doves,” that is to say, “be cunning *and* innocent”? We follow the injunctions, separating them, and get wise men knavish, and honest men fools.

The absence of cunning is hateful: you cannot require from a man stature or talents which God has not given him, but for cunning all that is wanted is observation. Cunning is dexterity, not deceit. It is the art of the physician and the management of the helmsman, not the art of the quack and the management of the impostor. A people who hold cunning

in disrepute is a people where ingenuity is exerted only for evil, and where that evil triumphs.

In Greek there is a word which we translate conscience—at least in the New Testament; it is the parallel to the Latin term; *συνείδησις*, from *συν*, *with*, and *εἰδῶ*, *to see*. As a verb it is used by the best Greek writers; as a substantive we know it only in the New Testament.* We translate it conscience, because we have no parallel word, and it is evidently a corruption of the Greek language, as the translation is, of common sense. The following passages show the contradictory senses in which it is used.

Paul said, "I have lived in all good conscience before God."† "To have a conscience void of offence towards God and men."‡ "Some, with conscience of the idol unto this hour, eat it as a thing offered unto an idol; and their conscience being weak is defiled."§ "Speaking lies in hypocrisy; having their conscience seared with a hot iron."|| "No more conscience of sins."¶ "Having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience."** "If a man for conscience toward God endure grief."††

What a history of the church is there not to write with this key! The heresies of the Oriental Church did not spread to the Occidental; they hinged on Greek terms (not scriptural), not translated into Latin. Those of the Occidental Church were never known where the Greek prevailed, because they proceeded from the terms of scripture translated, and therefore dogmatic only in the translation.

* Cruden's Concordance gives it in Ecclesiastes, but in the old text it is "thought."

† Acts xxiii, 1. ‡ Acts xxiv, 16. § 1 Cor. viii, 7.
|| 1 Tim. iv, 2. ¶ Heb. x, 2. ** Heb. x, 22. †† 1 Pet. ii, 19.

While this new religious "*principle*"* is erected, the religious community has surrendered all application of it. Religion is put aside whenever we have to look at acts, confessedly criminal, and in which all men are partners, so that you have at the same time a nation acting the part of murderers or robbers, and professing a religion. This is conscience "seared with a hot iron."

By manufacturing for ourselves a something in ourselves which is to be the good and guiding part of ourselves, and which only is ourselves, we open the door for the commission of every crime for conscience' sake. The man destitute of integrity is alone free from the contamination; he merely profits by the perversion of others. The evil lies in the religious man who has the desire of doing his duty. *He believes his conscience to be God's law*, and so becomes a god unto himself: very religious in his thoughts, most heathenish in his practice. I am not here inventing or supposing; the words in italics are not mine; they are those of a teacher and a preacher—of the only man in our times of superior capacity and reputation who has laboured for God's sake, seeking neither distinction nor office, but endeavouring to see and teach what was right; I mean Dr. Arnold. He says, "He who believes his conscience to be God's law, by obeying it obeys God."† Is not the rule which he inculcates the reprobate life described by our Saviour to his apostles when he says, "Whoso killeth you will think that he doeth God service"! Men who "believe," and "think," must not understand that there is a standard of right and wrong. "If thine eye be single, thy whole body is full of

* I quote the word from a sermon I have recently heard.

† *Life*, vol. ii, 51.

light." If we had never heard these words they might touch us, but as we repeat them while practising the contrary, the Bible is unavailing to make us Christians, and is even without instruction as a rule of conduct.

INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE.

THESE are terms quite unneeded, as we have honesty and courage. A man of integrity is no other than an honest man, and one of independence is he who acts or thinks for himself. We have, however, applied them to territorial matters.

A country is a space of ground with fixed limits. If landmarks are removed, the only integrity that is called in question is that of the assailant; in one sense it is that of the assailed. "In short, it is this great plague of the world, deception, which takes wrong measures and makes false musters almost in everything; which sounds a retreat; which overthrows whole armies, and sometimes, by one lying word treacherously cast out, turns the fate and fortunes of states and empires, and lays the most flourishing monarchies in dust. A blind guide is certainly a great mischief; but a guide that blinds those whom he should lead is indubitably a greater."* Such is the effect produced on the Ottoman Empire by two words, neither of which can be rendered in the Turkish language.

Mr. Gladstone has said, "There is an integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, but it is different from the independence and integrity of England and France;" and he is quite correct. At the recent conferences at Vienna the Russian Plenipotentiaries pointed out the difference, showing that on

* South's Sermons.

the coast of Arabia and Africa the dominion of Turkey had been invaded by the forces of Great Britain and France, whereas we know that the Turkish forces have invaded no territory belonging to either. The Russian plenipotentiaries of Russia propose to leave to Turkey the disposal of her own straits and the sovereignty of her own seas; to which the Plenipotentiaries of England and France object, showing that Aden and Algiers were only the preliminaries to further illustrations of the principle.

Alone in Europe, the Turkish Government has evinced honesty or courage. It would be a sad day for Europe if the independence and integrity of Turkey did resemble those of England and France. In past times Russia has occupied portions of Turkish soil, and inflicted blows upon its government which have only awakened the honesty and courage of its people to assert their rights and regain their territory. Russia has in like manner taken territory from England (the north-west coast of the Pacific), and inflicted humiliations upon her government, as on that of France, the effect of which has only been to make them desire to encroach upon the territories and rights of other nations. Mr. Gladstone, the expounder of the philosophy of our policy, has made us acquainted with "our satisfaction," in having succeeded in establishing a system which shall reduce the "parts and corners of Europe" to settlement according to our plan.

Integrity and Independence are no more terms of international law than of private conveyancing. Their introduction into international compacts and into common speech must render rights insecure, and action uncertain. In the present case no one is deceived; we all know that we are playing a game;

and when Mr. Gladstone uttered the words I have quoted, the Manchester mill-owners did not ask him what he meant, and in what the difference resided, but they cheered the statement of that difference : Mr. Gladstone being known to be a conscientious and a religious man, they acquired henceforward courage to say one thing and to mean another. Henceforward the Government obtained the assurance, if they were in doubt respecting it before, that they would be held to be in pursuit of a British interest in betraying an ally.

Such words would nauseate if we found them in any respectable writings ; classical diction would cease, and antiquity would become contemptible even to us, if its records were burdened with such trash. If, instead of "Accursed be he who removes his neighbour's landmark," it was "Accursed be he who violates his neighbour's integrity," would we be reading the Bible ?

But it will be said, "This is captious ; everybody knows that when the Integrity of a country is spoken of, it is its dimensions that are meant, and not its character." Why, then, not say so ? Why speak differently of the possessions of a sovereign and the possessions of a subject ? What do you gain by using a word that is superfluous ? What, at least, does the honest man gain ?

In the Turkish declaration of war, the Provinces of the Danube are designated an "integral portion of the Ottoman Empire." Our "avowed object in this war," says Sir James Graham, "and so far as I can see, our sole and only object, is the maintenance of the Independence and Integrity of Turkey." Again, "The settlement of the point respecting the occupation of the Principalities was the *immediate* object of

the War." It follows that the First Point "did secure the perfect Independence of the Principalities," so that the "Independence" of the Principalities is secured by the sacrifice of the "Integrity" of Turkey, for which you go to War. Is not this a play upon words? And is it not with such dice that Russia gambles with the World? There are further explanations given by this ex-minister remarkably illustrative of the actual progress of Government, and of the value to that end of convertible terms.

"In the main, the first point, as agreed to by Russia, did secure the perfect independence of the Principalities, because, instead of placing them under the protectorate of Russia, it placed them under the protectorate of the four Great Powers."

"However anxious they might be to maintain the independence of Turkey, they should bear in mind that she called for the assistance of powerful auxiliaries; and in proportion to the length of time which she depended for that support on other countries, she became more dependent and could not subsist without it."

Our dictionaries give another interpretation. Johnson explains Independence as "exemption from reliance or control."

If we want a word to designate the whole of a territory in the form of an abstraction, why not say "wholeness"? Why substitute independence for sovereignty? There is more here at stake than our own morality in regard to an Ally.

Integer is a mathematical term; the parts of the integer are co-efficients; by detaching any one the integer itself disappears. To apply Integrity in this sense to states is a very archaic notion. No doubt it did once exist, for we find traces of it still in the

Lebanon, which is divided into carats or twenty-fourths: all measurements have equally reference to the unit, and are relative, not absolute. A man sells not so many acres of his land, but so many carats of his property. Now the system of aggregation prevails; people look back to a Brittany, to a Languedoc, to a Burgundy, or a Navarre, as states which had not yet taken their place in the great unity of France. So also the ancient Kingdoms of Scotland and of Ireland were during their "independent" existence but in an amorphous state. What is to protect England and France from the centripetal tendencies of "Integrity and Independence"? Why should not the one and the other be merely in process of agglomeration? Guizot has illustrated the principle of "great states," what end can there be to all this save *one State*? This conclusion has at once the merit of being logical and illogical, being the just application of a false maxim.

PRINCIPLE AND INTEREST.

PRINCIPLE is made out of the Latin word "principia," and is equivalent to axiom, though we understand it as essence. When we say "the principle of a bill," we mean the essential object of a bill, and so far there is no harm in the word; yet there is not a more virulent poison in the whole pharmacopœia of philology, because it used to envelop and render passable noxious doses which the stomach would otherwise reject. One instance will suffice. Intervention passed from a crime insufferable in the eyes of Englishmen, to a practice sanctioned by them, through speaking of "the principle of intervention." Had the word Essence been retained in Parliamentary language for bills, this could not have happened; for if any one spoke of the essence of intervention, he would be expected to say what it was; when he would say "principle," nothing more was required. Accredited as a doctrine, it was no more a crime. The object of all indistinct speech is to withdraw acts from the control of judgment,* and amongst words of this description, principle takes the highest stand.

We talk of principle in a good sense—"a man of principle" is a good man, "a man without principle" is a bad man; so that every thing is good to which we apply the word principle. Then follow the contradictions. A bill has its principle, and is also "an

* "NYM. The good humour is to steal at a minute's rest.

"PISTOL. *Convey*—the wise call it. Steal! A fiao for the phrase!"

an unprincipled bill." Then by the transposition of an *a* and an *e*, for which there is no warrant in etymology, we have "principal," meaning Chief, so that here we are furnished with a nice little labyrinth which every one enters whether he will or no, and out of which no one can emerge without the thread of etymology, which there is no Ariadne to furnish.

Interest is a sentence, not a word; it is composed of a preposition and a verb, meaning "he is in," or "amongst;" that is, "takes part in." Using it as a substantive we displace ourselves, and transfer the action to the object. It is no longer, "I take part in such a thing," but "such a thing takes part in me." How very strange that a people take pleasure in the classical languages because of their clearness and beauty, and fabricates for itself speech which renders them incapable of framing a sentence that is not confused and hideous!

The word "Interest" is, like "Principle," a staple of politics; as the one is substituted for duty, so is the other for profit; but it mixes together the mental attractions of a subject, and the gain of a measure, and then we limit it, and speak of "material interests," "moral interests,"* and "well-understood interests," as if there were "immaterial interests," "immoral interests," and "ill-understood interests."

This word, like all the others, has these two effects: it puts aside the proper term, and it confounds the judgment; it thus causes speech to multiply, and facilitates the construction of sentences which mean nothing. Every such term brings a host of others, negative, disjunctive, contradictory, relative, correla-

* "The undersigned has a material as well as a moral interest in promoting the circulation of the *Atlas*."

tive, antithetical. Interest gives you "interested," "interesting," "disinterested," then "uninterested," "uninteresting." An "interested" person is not the same as an "interesting" person, and is not an interesting person. To be interested in a subject is highly commendable; to be uninterested in a subject, or interested without one, is the reverse.* An interested act is a gainful one; a disinterested act is not an ungainful one, but something else. Each term implying not uncertainty only, but speculation, we go slipping about on ice, and floundering in mire. As there was no "interest" in Latin, so is there no "interested," "interesting," "uninteresting," "disinterested." In former ages, say Greece for instance, it required depth and capacity to use terms deceptively; now you may have a stupid man, a pre-eminent sophist; he requires but to be in earnest, and believe what he says, to surpass the achievements of practised cunning and art.

Logicians call our attention to the necessity of fixing, by specifying the particular sense which shall be attributed to paronymous words, when used in varying inflections or in differing parts of speech. This is all very well for an argument; but how is it that the logician does not argue from the argument to the language, and perceive that, if rectification there is to be, it is in the mind of the person and in the speech which forms it? But so far from this, the tracing back to the original sense, that is to say, the putting the original or the "etymologi-

* "It is interesting to observe that Louis Napoleon told the Lord Mayor that the oppressed of the world looked to England and France."—*Morning Paper*.

† The wonderful Lord Granville says that this war is "undertaken with disinterested objects." This would be a stroke of genius in Lord Palmerston.

cal" against the corrupted and "customary" use, is held to be a disturbance leading to fallacy in argument and to error in history. I cannot resist the temptation of giving the following example:—

"Perhaps no example of the branch of fallacy founded on etymology is more extensive or mischievous than the word '*representative*.' Assuming its right meaning to correspond with the verb '*represent*,' the sophist persuades the multitude that the member is bound by the opinion of his constituents; whereas law and custom, which in this case may be considered as fixing the meaning of the term, enjoin him to act on his own judgment and responsibility."*

This passage will show that it is impossible to attach to words definite meanings unless they be true, and that the true meaning can only be got at by the knowledge of the original term in the original language, and of our own law. When, then, a logician, knowing the true value of the term, disregards it, and knowing nothing of the law, introduces it, and then takes the custom, as a means of testing which the word is examined, as "fixing the meaning of that term," and pronounces on the whole authoritatively, why, then, all one can say is, Thank God there is an Emperor of Russia; this is past cure; such a people ought not to exist, even if it could.

Spirit is a word which we employ synonymously with principle. We say the spirit as well as the principle of a bill; the spirit of an instruction, the spirit of the age; it equally serves to shut out intention and to present our own acts as a law of nature.

Another synonym is policy, as I have elsewhere shown. The principle, the spirit, or the policy, can be equally predicated of a measure, a treaty, a speech, or a bill; and these three words, with interest, are

* Whately's Logic, p. 118.

the "four points" of the "Eastern question." The *Times* has said that, according to me, the "Eastern question" is not to be found at all in the East. This is a very grave inquiry, and if I should happen to be right, a most important discovery. To test it, it is not necessary to travel to the East. The evidence is within the reach of every man who hears his neighbour talk. I offer a few quotations.

The turning point was the Vienna Note. The Powers undertook to arbitrate, and by their award gave more to Russia than she had claimed. What you gave her was the word "spirit":—

"The Government of the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and the SPIRIT of the stipulations of the treaties of Kaniardji," &c.

This addition brought the war in the East.

According to Mr. Sidney Herbert, our policy has been successful in preventing the application to Turkey of "loose Asiatic principles."*

* "Russia has been in the habit of treating Turkey as an Asiatic power. How do we treat an Asiatic power? (Cheers.) How does France treat an African power? We know that when a civilized nation comes in contact with a barbarous nation, seemingly, by a law of Providence, the one absorbs the other. But what do we do in Asia? We make a treaty; and the moment a sovereign puts his hand to a treaty, be he sultan, nabob, rajah, or ameer, his power has departed from him. We take an early opportunity of declaring that the conditions have been broken; it is a *casus belli*; we pounce upon him, and there is an end. (Cheers.) That is the way France treats in Africa with the uncivilized nations next to her. That is the way Russia treats with the uncivilized nations next to her. The mistake Russia committed was—she applied this *system of treaty* to a European power; for though by nature Asiatic, Turkey, by her geographical situation, is European. Europe cannot afford to have these loose Asiatic principles obtaining in the case of Turkey. We, therefore, England, France, and Austria—Austria chiefly—are interested in preventing this aggression."—*Mr. Sidney Herbert, June 7, 1855.*

The most arduous enterprise of the English Government was the composition of the despatch replying to the Porte's rejection of their award. They thus employ their great allies:—

“If the English and French Governments had not concurred in thinking that those *interests* were protected (the reverse of which appeared), and that the *principle* for which we had all along been contending was maintained (the very thing to be deplored), neither of the Governments would have assented to the Note.”

On this the war runs its course, we taking part with the power that had rejected our award, and against the power that had accepted it. On the principle for which we had all along been contending, our navies are despatched to the Baltic and the Black Sea, and our armies to the Crimea, by means of which we have seen those “interests” effectually “protected;” and consequently, as the reward of our efforts, sacrifices, and glorious achievements, “*Russia abandons the principle of covering with an official protectorate the Christian subjects of the Sultan of the Oriental Rite.*” On this the Conference assembles at Vienna, when an unexpected obstacle arises in the Turkish language. That tongue is barbarous to the degree of being destitute of synonyms for “integrity,” “independence,” “opinion,” “civilization,” “complication,” “principle,” and “interest.” It now became necessary to continue the war until schoolmasters were sent out for the primary instruction of the Ottoman Empire, and until a new generation arose, qualified in philology.* The obstruction was

* “The course of this negotiation has abundantly proved to me the tenacity of the Turks with regard to their peculiar modes of expression, and the difficulty of making them comprehend the superiority of those simple *formulae* in use among Christian States in all

with bland simplicity detailed as follows by Mr. Sidney Herbert, on the 7th of June :—

“I will not enter on the question of the right of interference with regard to the protection of the Christians in Turkey, except in passing to say, that I was struck by a remark of the noble lord (J. Russell), who stated, as a reason for not having entered upon the fourth point, that he found, in conversation with the Turkish Ambassador, that he objected to a stipulation which would infringe on the rights of the suzerain of Turkey, by giving a vested right in interference, not to one nation, but to several, in the internal concerns of Turkey. Well, that was not an unnatural observation for the Ambassador of Turkey to make; but there was this singularity in it—that after the enemy had agreed, there was one party that had not given in a similar agreement, and that party was our ally. Now, that complicated the negotiations considerably.”

It strikes me that there is in this another singularity—that the meek whisper of an illiterate barbarian should have upset a Conference of all Christendom and Civilization, opened under the auspices of “Divine Providence,” and in which Heaven is implored in enlightening them to “decree that the union of Europe, so necessary to progress and civilization, shall become more consolidated than ever from these negotiations.”*

There is another singularity. We now know, from the lips of Mr. Sidney Herbert, that Lord J. Russell, from the beginning, was too sincere and upright to have any intention to lend himself to the conclusion of this infamous peace: how, then, did

solemn transactions of business. The genius of their language, and the impossibility (almost) of conveying the sense of it through a literal translation, contribute greatly to their obstinacy on this point.”—*Adair's Correspondence*, p. 104.

* Opening address of Count Buol.

he not stop at once—how, not to inform us of this fact?*

The negotiations being a farce, the Plenipotentiaries, to look one another in the face, wore masks, and laughed behind them; those masks were “PRINCIPLE” and “INTEREST.” Here are a few specimens:—

INTEREST.

“To guarantee in common the existence of this state of things in the *general* interests of public order and civilization.”

“Interests apparently contradictory will be brought forward.”

“Russia will be obliged to consider any act hostile to the territorial integrity as a *question of European interest.*”

“Beyond the four guarantees, such special condition as may appear to it called for by the *general interests of Europe.*”

“The *common interest* of the Porte, Principalities, and Europe.”

“That all misunderstandings between the Sublime Porte and any of the contracting Powers should be considered a question of *European interest.*”

PRINCIPLE.

“The re-establishment of peace cannot be sought for beyond the four *principles*” (the four points).

“The development of these *principles* will form the object of our negotiations.”

* Lord John Russell does say (Prot. No. 9) :—“As, however, the questions raised by the fourth point nearly affected the rights and sovereignty of the Sultan, and must be discussed by a power actually at war with the Ottoman Empire.” From this the inference to be expected was that it was inadmissible; yet it is the proposal of the enemies of Russia, and especially of England, whose representative he was. He continues :—“The discussion would necessarily be of a delicate nature, and that is one of the reasons that his Government persisted in refusing to allow the fourth point to be entered upon ere the third one should have been completely exhausted.”

"It is in the name of European interest that his Government has undertaken to make those *principles* prevail."

"The *principle* of watching the mouths of the Danube."

"Two *principles* are established—that of attaching the Ottoman Empire to the balance of power in Europe; that of coming to an understanding respecting a just equalization of the naval forces in the Black Sea."

But the Russian Plenipotentiary laughs right out. He says:—

"I* hold to the record of a common design; we are here as serious men, met together upon a serious matter, the most arduous which has occurred in our times, and we must all heartily endeavour to avoid generalities."

I cannot dismiss the Conference without mentioning that they had commenced with agreeing in the principle that they were to alter their four principles "according to the chances of the war," and that the war was undergoing the process of development, concurrently with the development of the principles of these negotiations.†

We first had "four points," then "four cases," then "four guarantees;" now we have arrived at the climax, and they are "four principles."

When your expedition sailed to the Crimea I told you all this. You now see that it was sent to force upon Turkey the "four points."‡

Your "spirit" is Russian, your "policy" is

* Prince Gortschakoff, like Count Buol, is given in the first person. M. Bourqueney and Lord John Russell, like the "small fry" of the House of Commons, are given in the third person.

† "It is now pretty plainly admitted that the celebrated Four Points were the result of a compromise, and, even if adopted by Russia, would have turned out little better than a delusion. * * We have escaped a peace, which would have withdrawn our army from the Crimea."—*Times*, June 11.

‡ See "Spider and Fly."

Russian, your "principle" is Russian, and your "interest" is Russian. You have gone to war in order that the "spirit," the "principle," the "interest," and the "policy" of *Turkey* should be the same as yours.

You might have had a traitor in the English councils, and Russia benefited little thereby, had each of you not had a thousand traitors on his own lips. If a private man is sold by words, why should not a nation be disposed of in the same manner?*

* "In the first place, let me say I feel as every body else feels, in the utmost difficulty, arising from the great confusion into which the subject has been thrown—the confusion of opinions beyond the power of human ingenuity to understand."—*Mr. S. Herbert, June 7, 1855.*

DIPLOMACY AND LAW.

IF Politicians sat on the bench, or at the bar; no man could walk the streets in safety, or call his land, his life, his honour his own. When Politicians occupy the judgment-seat of nations, what People can call its territory, its honour, or its life its own? The result of confiding to such loose hands your destiny now appears, but the condition remains unknown, for the cause is veiled under a Greek name. Magnitude does not alter right; the law of nations is no other than the civil and criminal code. To proceed otherwise than according to the forms of law is a crime against which our laws have provided, not only for the protection of foreign states from our injustice, but also for the protection of ourselves from malversation and its consequences. In private life no agent can open proceedings for his principal, unless specially instructed to that end; in like manner, no servant of the Crown can, without special warrant, so much as hold intercourse with a foreign minister on any matter. Now, international relations are carried on in private conversations at the Foreign Office, and in private letters to the Queen's representatives abroad.

The question, then, lies between Diplomacy and Law; you are placed in the alternative of accepting Diplomacy, because you are not men equal to enforcing the Law. People say there is no tribunal over nations; and, of course, when they say so, there is none, for the tribunal exists in the nation's purpose

that it shall exist. A nation which has the sense of right is itself a tribunal ; when it has not, every tribunal is a form only. Did we use a term antithetical to Law in our private relations, we should have the Home Secretary replacing the Lord Chancellor and the twelve judges, as the Foreign Secretary replaces the Lord Chancellor and the King's Council.

This word is of recent introduction. It belongs to the Byzantine empire ; its meaning is "double," that is, "copy : " a Diploma is a copy. In the Byzantine empire, however, it was not used in connection with foreign affairs ; even in that perverted age and country the monstrosity of a "foreign minister" had not been devised. A "*diplomatist*" was an *archivist*. This is not a mere verbal etymology ; it is also historical and administrative. We must bring back the word to its proper sense before any man can apprehend that the "*Foreign Office*" is not an organ of the empire absolutely requisite for the maintenance of the *British* Laws against the violence of foreign states.

This word once introduced, it became a comparatively easy task to pervert all the subordinate proceedings, to invalidate instruments by their wording, to alter the value of the terms, and to dispense with the necessary forms. *War* exists only by the declaration ; we make it without specification (the present war with Russia), or dispense with the form altogether (the Afghan and Chinese wars). It consequently becomes piracy, and every man engaged is liable to be hung by your own courts. A *treaty* receives its validity from its ratification ; you make treaties (July 1840), stipulating for their own execution before ratification. These become acts of treason, being the assumption of the royal prerogative : the

word treaty henceforth becomes unmeaning. *Blockade* is an act of war; we institute it without being at war, which is piracy in the subordinates, and treason in the principals: blockade becomes an unmeaning word. You pass next to war without blockade, which is "serving the enemies of the Queen." A *protest* is a formal and necessary instrument to save your rights; we protest (against the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi—against the confiscation of Cracow) not according to form: protest becomes an unmeaning word. We then suffer acts to pass without protest, to the sacrifice of all subsequent right (extinction of Poland; usurpation of the Danube, 1836; the passage of the Pruth, July 1853). Within a quarter of a century we have smitten with idiocy every legal term in the English language; we no longer know what we are about when we act, nor what we mean when we speak. Some further instances may not be useless.

A *protocol*, meaning "first page," is a record of discussion; a *note* (*nota*) is a mere communication. Neither has any binding power; they contain but arguments; they are not steps of procedure. Having deprived treaty of its authentication, we now give to notes and protocols the value of treaties. *Status quo* is a term applied to territorial possession. In our Eastern negotiations it is made to apply to the treaties existing before the war, but abrogated thereby. *Guarantee* is the power guaranteeing; now it is applied to a stipulation. The "four points" are called the "four guarantees."

War is made to restrain a wrong, and to obtain redress: these must be specified for war to exist. Making it without specification, we must substitute something else for redress. We let in "*Limitation.*" What would be said in a private action, of proceedings

taken for the limitation of the possessions or the reduction of the wealth of the adverse party?

RIGHT OF SEARCH applied to the claim put forward in the second armed neutrality to prevent the search of vessels under convoy of a man of war, and afterwards to the visiting of American vessels to search for British subjects among the crews, is now substituted for the right of seizing and confiscating enemies' goods! *Rights of Neutrals* is a pure invention substituted for *duties* of neutrals: these are "not to do for your enemy what he cannot do for himself." We so give to neutrals a faculty which formerly if they attempted to seize would have been met by war. This is the key of the present "complications." By seizing her goods, you hold Russia by the throat; by your "right-of-search" theory, she holds you by the throat. By your cruisers you would have reduced Russia in a month; now your line-of-battle ships are powerless against her, and she can combine the world as the "war" progresses against you in an unarmed neutrality. There is no escape save in the restoration of the law, now to be effected only by the impeachment, that is to say, the *stopping*,* of those who violated it.

We have *Neutralisation* on land as well as at sea. Austria is neutral, not by taking part with neither, but with both; she is thereby put in possession of the provinces of Turkey.

The *Dictionnaire de l'Académie* has the following definitions of Neutralization in different editions:—

EDITION OF 1798.

"Neutralization; to neutralise an acid by an alkali, term of chemistry."

* Impeachment, from *empêchement*, being applied to criminals in session of the power of the state.

EDITION OF 1835.

“Neutralization also signifies the rendering neuter a territory, a town, a vessel. The neutralization of a country is a preliminary to negotiations.”

A future edition may give us—

“Neutralization also means the enabling of a country to take part in a war by negotiations, to occupy a foreign territory with which it is at peace, to convey enemies’ goods, and generally to apply the ‘humanizing principle’ to institutions, and the warlike principle to negotiations for the common interest of Europe.”

But “Public Opinion” is now about to settle these matters. When it was alleged beforehand that Treason was preparing this catastrophe, Public Opinion said, “Nay, an English Nobleman cannot betray his country.” The event does occur, and Public Opinion teaches this, “The Nobleman did not do it; it was the Aristocracy—therefore I will make the nobleman Premier.” Again, says the oracle, “Treason is all right, but piracy is incorrect. I am going to popularise it as *Public Diplomacy*, having told my Premier that he is to have no more *secret* diplomacy.”

A third time the sibylline leaves are turned, and we read “ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM!” The spectacle is tragic and burlesque. Thus a people of false speech, when smitten, like a wounded viper, stings itself to death.

By Diplomacy Russia has risen to what she is. By Diplomacy England has sunk to what she is. That Diplomacy is a concerted system of chicanery carried on in common by all powers—Russia using it against them, they against themselves.

One proposition lent to me is the "infallibility of Muscovite diplomacy." Infallibility is the quality of not falling. I have never known a man to stand who is not ever on his guard lest he fall. If Russia is right, others are not vigilant. Her system is therefore based upon fallibility, whilst that of the other governments, rests on infallibility, or ignorance and self-sufficiency.

If you see a chess-player pitted against a tyro, you will say the one infallibly will win, and the other will infallibly be beaten: of both the weak man, that is to say the generaliser, may predicate—infallibility. In the game now being played there is infallibility on both sides—of defeat for England, of success for Russia. The theory of infallibility is gathered out of my assertion of Russia's capacity; but capacity works not by a momentary exercise of will. Your troops must have been disciplined, your treasury filled, your system organized, and your men formed long beforehand, to win a victory.

Why did Russia wait till July, 1853, to cross the Pruth—till July, 1854, to sign a neutral convention with the United States—till the subsequent October, to cage the armies of England and France in the Crimea, but because each of these schemes had proved unsuccessful during every minute of time of the antecedent years?

This time has been employed in perverting you. She guided you to Cabul, to Hong Kong, to Acre—taught you to blockade without war, to submit to blockade when there was no war—inaugurated conclaves, conferences and protocols, that nations, like minor constituencies, might be sold by their representatives. She untaught you the Law of Nations,

and gave you a new English dictionary,* so rendering your power available only for your own undoing.

She has been toiling while you have been asleep. Day by day has she seen hopes frustrated, plans overthrown, instruments broken; but in this there was no discouragement, nor can there be till there appears somewhere in Europe a mind equal to her mind. Russia's history is a history of discomfitures,—the years and months, and weeks and days, and hours of unfruitful labour are interrupted only at long and rare intervals, by moments of fruition. Time stands still for you, while she does not torture you—you see her only when she sweeps the board.

* "Before the Barbarian (Philip) had done with them, they (the Athenians) had some difficulty in comprehending the Greek tongue."—*Letter on "German Unity,"* 1842.

REFORM AND REMEDY.

WHEN you speak of "restoring," you indicate the existence of an evil, the will of remedying it, the knowledge of its cause, and the specification of its remedy. It is equivalent to saying, "We suffer, and we must do something; the suffering comes from departure from a rule; we must return to it." This is complete and logical. When we say "Reform," we enunciate the presence of an evil and the design of remedying it, but nothing more. There is the negative implication, that you shall not restore, for otherwise that word would be used, and that you shall not invent, because you are limited to a change of form. You exclude knowledge and originality; for the past is the domain of knowledge, and invention is original.

In dealing with a diseased constitution, the physician proposes to restore it to health by assisting nature, that is, by enabling the original law to recover; he must for that purpose be able to separate in his own mind, disease from the original law, or the state of health. He could not apply to the operation the word "reform," because he has no pretension to recast the natural functions of the body, and no desire to remodel the disorders to which it is subject. If a physician on entering a sick chamber said, "I am come to reform your colic," the patient would say, "I had rather not," and the friends would show him to the door. Those who expect to cure, must propose to cure; if proposing something else, you

take them for doctors, you at least have no grounds of complaint if they perform their promise.

The Philologist, therefore, had not to wait until the measure of 1830 had arrested the progressive reduction of the expenditure of the state, and had increased the annual expenses of the military and naval establishments by eleven millions, to understand the meaning of the cry, "The bill, the whole bill, and nothing but the bill." By the title alone, he knew "that the measure was an imposture and its advocates sycophants."*

But let us assume that the title was a mistake, and that they meant to say restoration of the past, or, at least, cure of the present. But look at its adjunct, "*Parliamentary*." We speak of the reform of a man, meaning his correction and his restoration to integrity; no doubt the word is incorrect, but that matters little, because our meaning is correct, for we take in the man's whole conduct. It would be otherwise if we said "monetary reform," "street reform," "counting-house reform," as if a man were to become honest again, only in respect to coin or pocket-handkerchiefs, or ledgers. In like manner if you said, "Reform of the State," you might be proposing a very desirable end, although using an illogical term. But when you say "*Parliamentary Reform*," you exclude the whole case. If the state requires rectifying, you must determine in what the wrong consists, and not select a limb and proceed to practise thereon, far less apply the name of more than one limb to that upon which you do practise.

The State in England is composed of the Crown and the People, the executive belonging to the one,

* Words of my own to my constituents.

the control to the other: rectification must bear upon their several functions. The abuse consisted in an intermediary usurpation, the Parliamentary, which had grown up, and which had appropriated the executive functions of the Crown, and extinguished the control, and therein the rights of the people.

Parliament consists of three estates—the Lords spiritual, the Lords temporal, and the Communities (communes). These three branches are distinct, and placed in wholly dissimilar circumstances: the first two having been virtually extinguished; the last having usurped over them, whilst, in the words of a great judge, “it had committed parricide,” by destroying the Corporations out of which it sprung. In your Parliamentary Reform, you do not touch the first two estates; and in respect to the third, instead of reducing it to its due functions, in which alone a rectification could exist, you positively extend its authority, and multiply the numbers of those corrupted by the process of the suffrage. No one thought of restoring corporate rights to the communities represented in Parliament, for no one knew anything of what England had been; they revolved merely in the vicious circle of the corrupted thoughts which have made England what she is; they dealt in old clothes, and had no needles or thread but for patch-work.

When people exclude the case upon which they have to reason, they fight their battles on abstractions. Here it was put in the shape of Progress—asserted or denied. I cannot give a better example of the perplexity into which the most earnest and able men were cast than that of Dr. Arnold; he accepted the Reform Bill, not for its merits, but for what he called

its principle, and not again for its principle, but as controverting the principle which he imagined to stand opposed to it. He, connecting reform in the State with reform in individuals, would support any measure of that character, however little it might meet his special views, because not to do so would imply an admission of the principle of all evil—that things were not to be improved. Alas! alas! those false analogies.

I have referred to an expression used to my own constituents, viz. that Reform was a delusion, and Reformers sycophants; that expression, when uttered, was received with a burst of cheering, which was no less unanimous than vehement. Amongst the assembly there was no lack of liberals, chartists, and democrats. The reader may be curious to know how their assent was obtained to such a proposition, and especially how one party could be conciliated without the other being offended. It was because I had succeeded in explaining to them what the Constitution of England was, and consequently showing them that the existing opinions on both sides were nonsensical; but I did not content myself with theory: I had recourse to practice. On every case that arose, I returned to them and called for a public expression of their judgment, according to which I should vote. When they said to me, "We elected you, and we trust in you," I answered, "I will not be trusted in; I am your servant, and it is your duty to form your judgment yourselves upon each particular case." I made no distinction between elector and non-electors: I looked to the Borough. I was not slow to tell them, that their opinion was of no worth, but that it had to be made of worth by substituting for it judgment, of which the sign is

unanimity. They were ready enough to perceive that this was the mode of reforming, not Parliament, but *England*. Had the Reformers in Parliament pursued a similar course, there would have been no armies sacrificed in the Crimea.

What now shall we say of Administrative Reform? In Parliamentary Reform, there was at least a proposal,—the suffrage was to be extended. But in Administrative Reform there is absolutely nothing after the sound. It springs from the disasters of war, as the former cry from the burdens of peace. The difference between them is this: that the first was a contrivance for attaining office, the second a device for escaping punishment. For the Nation too there is a difference: when they cried out because of hunger, they were served with a stone; when now they wail because of fear, they are pelted with mud. Why not try something new, if merely for fun? To be always reasonable, is stupid as well as profitless.

Reform and Remedy are terms antithetical, just as Diplomacy and Law. The people that speak of the one cannot have the other.

MAJORITY AND MINORITY.

MAJOR is the comparative term of *magnus*, the superlative being *maximus*. *Minor* is the comparative of *parvus*, the superlative being *minimus*. If we endow our language with the abstraction of the comparative degree, we should enrich it with that of the two others, thus—magnusity, majority, and maximity; parvusity, minority, and minimusity. Then we could choose something more rational than middle terms to imply contrast, and take the positive or superlative degrees. But why employ Latin at all? This is the reason. Our constitution knows nothing of numbers, no man being bound to what he has not assented to; such a right could never have been filched from him, by straightforward and English speech.

SELF AND IDEA.

SELF is that conscious, thinking thing, which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself in far as that consciousness extends.

On such a definition the following comment might not be inappropriate.

The ordinary words of language, and our common use of them, would have given no light into the nature of our idea, if considered with attention.

The definition and the comment are equally the work of Locke.

The self of each is the man of all, which is other than idea, when we take it mentally.

In Latin the pronoun *ipse* is self; in Greek, *ἑαυτοῦ*; the latter we have adopted at once for idea, identity and idiot. Identity is, then, the abstraction of self as is selfishness. So true is it that the ordinary words of a language give no light as to the nature of our ideas.

If self be each man, we cannot speak of it but with reference to the particular individual; you must ask what that self is. But we use the word only to get rid of the object; making it general, it becomes nonsense, and so affords the materials for constructing sentences. I subjoin a few, and shall be obliged to any scholar to put them into Latin or into Greek.

“Self-love, my liege, is not so vile a sin as self-neglecting.”

Shakespeare, “*Henry V.*”

"The fondness we have for self, and the relations which other things have to ourselves, furnish another long branch of prejudice."—*Watts*.

"What could the most aspiring selfish man desire more, were he to form the notions of a Being to whom he could recommend himself?"—*Addison*.

"Ofttimes nothing profits more
Than self-esteem, grounded on just and right,
Well managed."—*Milton*.

"Unless *self-charity* be sometimes a vice,
And to defend ourselves it be a sin."

Shakespeare, "Othello."

"Alas! while we are wrapt in foggy mist
Of our *self-love*."—*Sidney*.

"A fatal self-importance, such as defeats the design and destroys the force of religion."—*South*.

"Are not these strange self-delusions, and yet attested by common experience?"—*South*.

"He walks with that self-chain about his neck
Which he foreswore."—*Shakespeare*.

"Confidence, as opposed to modesty and distinguished from decent assurance, proceeds from self-opinion occasioned by ignorance."—*Collier on Confidence*.

"Self-sufficiency proceeds from inexperience."—*Addison*.

"It may be thought that Ulysses here is too ostentatious, and that he dwells more than modesty allows upon his own accomplishments; but self-praise is sometimes no fault."—*Broome*.

We have "self-culture," as implying the highest duty; "self-government," as implying the best condition of society. We speak of a person who has

“another self” as the person least selfish, whereas he is a person doubly selfish, or would be, unless we apply to the word two opposite meanings. Where would we be in mathematics, if a single figure represented two numbers? Where are we in morals, when every sign represents two meanings, and when we go on multiplying these signs, and esteem ourselves rich in their multiplicity?

The display of that character to which we apply the word selfish principally occurs in the irritation manifested by people when they are found to be wrong, or said to be in the wrong: there their self-love is wounded. But why should we call this *self-love*? Love is an affection of the mind which we esteem pure and holy; it cannot exist without respect; here it is distrust that is awakened, and contempt that is exhibited. If we really loved ourselves, that love would be excited in an opposite sense by the discovery of error—excited to gratitude and filled with satisfaction; what benefit so great as the discovery of an error? What benefactor like him who shows us we are wrong?

A pronoun—for self does not stand for more—converted into an adjective, and then that adjective converted into a substantive, is certainly a wonderfully dexterous feat, more befitting a clown in a pantomime than a philologist or a philosopher; we repeat the performance twenty times a day, without claiming fee, or exciting merriment.

Every man is of course himself, and no one else; each “self” is different, and the “self” of to-day may be another “self” to-morrow, yea, the next moment; for a man may be entirely altered by a reflection, or a word. His “selfishness” surely goes with his “self,” and therefore his “selfishness” is a

different selfishness from hour to hour, and so is each other man's selfishness.

The word is of puritanical origin. It is a specimen of their logic, and has preserved to us a trait of their character. With them it was a dexterous implication of their moroseness to the doctrinal taint of human nature. We apply it not to the nature of man, but to particular acts. When we say "a man is selfish" we mean that he is ungenerous; but we express ourselves with the vagueness and incorrectness which belong to our habits, of which the word is a sign.

A synonym for selfishness is egotism, which in English is I-ism or I-ishness. Why then do we not say manism or manishness? Why again do you not say heishness or youishness? It would be the proper word if we applied it to others. If we spoke of plantishness and treeishness, we would know little of botany, and be unable to cut beams for our houses: it is only when we are dealing with our own souls that we give loose to these propensities.

The Latins had their "self," "*ipse*," and they constructed a word out of it by carrying it to the superlative degree. It was to them a logical joke. It meant "very." "*Ipsissima verba*," we translate "the very words."

What is the meaning of abusing a man because he is himself? If he has done wrong, specify it. Do not allow him to escape upon a generality, and do not descend yourself to Abigail gossip. It would be to degrade language to call such an expression—erroneous. All we can say is, it is silly. Error is a respectable word, for it implies the counterpart to what is true.

Sir William Temple rebuked the term in this

fashion: "You reproach the man as selfish who cares only for one person, how much more reprehensible must I be who care for thousands!"

Let any one put himself back a couple of centuries while this word was as yet unspoken: at that time indeed none of the words had been spoken with which we have been dealing. Let him then imagine the difference in the conversation of neighbours—vulgarity gone from talk, charitable and neighbourly feelings unobliterated, at least by unconscious slander.

REALIZE.

It is a necessity, a painful one indeed, to include verbs in this dismal catalogue. The verb is essentially the word of man, where he lingers, after being expelled from the substantive. Latterly we have converted by the cheap addition of a Greek termination many of the substantives of our invention into verbs; and simultaneously we have given to neuter verbs an active sense, and conceive there is neither absurdity nor solecism in saying "to fraternize," or "to originate."

"Real" is an adjective formed out of "thing" (*res*), and which, if we could but use our native language in so disrespectful a manner, would be "thing-ish" or "thing-al," making the verb "thing-ize." Our meaning, when we employ it, is "true." "Really" and "truly" are synonymous. Why then do we not say "true-lize?" It is always the same story. The ludicrous and the false must be disguised in a foreign garb—the homage, if you like, of vice to virtue, but homage and assassination at once.

"Real," to suit our eclectic fancies, comes into play as antithesis to "ideal," and so you get distinction between the thing and the idea of the thing: a disjunction between the substance and the sign two manners of speaking of the same object, and the delightful flightiness to which such a laxity of expression gives birth.

Graver spirits however frown upon this light-

mindedness, and logic, no longer rejecting the false, reduces it into due order. There you have "real" contradistinguished from "verbal" (formerly the distinction was with "nominal"), which is admitting that "verbal" is not real: a conclusion which cannot be controverted, but a condition which it was the object of logic to cause to cease. Logic itself is the verbal science, the knowledge of the use of words, in which of course consists the right use of reason.

When we say "assets to realize," "let me realize that," we have to do with a mad language, but not necessarily with individuals who are mad, because their meaning, though absurdly expressed, is unmistakable. They mean to pocket or to understand. It is quite different when it comes to reaction on their own thoughts, and when boarding-school misses prate about "realizing their ideas," or when clergymen preach about "man's realizing God," there you have full-blown imbecility, if not blasphemy.

We are now told, and of course we believe, that we are in an age of reality, or, as the French say, of "actuality,"—"an age palpitating" therewith. I turn for assistance in this dilemma to a logical archbishop, and I find, on his authority, that the reality of the age springs from a total ambiguity of the tongue. Here are specimens:—

**"CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LIABLE
TO BE USED AMBIGUOUSLY.**

"Argument	Case	Expect
Authority	Cause	Experience
Can	Certain	Falsehood
Capable	Church	God
Capital	Election	Gospel

Hence	Pay	Sin
Identical	Person	Sincerity
Impossibility	Possible	Sincere
Indifference	Preach	Tendency
Labour	Priest	Truth
Law	Profits	Value
May	Reason	Wealth
Necessary	Regeneration	Why
Old	Rent	Whence
One	Same	Wages."

Archbishop Whately deals however only in captious matters, and has no thought of what lies beyond. But if, according to him, "one," "sin," and "same," are ambiguous expressions, what must be the ambiguity inherent in all the "ties," "ises," "ions," "enses," "isms," and "ites"?

TO GENERALIZE.

GENIUS is the class superior to species. We say "special" or "specific," and "specially," as meaning to particularize, that is, to exclude everything but what is before us. To generalize must therefore be to exclude the case that is before us, and in that consists all reasonings at this time.

Out of "general" it will be impossible to make the verb if you follow the sense, because "general" itself includes all that you can say. No operation of the mind can alter the words general or particular. The verb "to generalize" implies the making of something general which was not so before, which is impossible—yet you do it. No, you say you do it.

Take it by the results. Your grand process must have been applied to your great affairs. Into what condition have you generalized yourselves in Europe?

I knew that that condition would come; and how did I know it?—By knowing your process of generalization. I knew not only that the nation as an aggregate could be so misled, but that there would not be found five individuals within it to perceive the process or to combine to resist it. The habit of looking away from the matter presented to him is as inveterate and as universal as speech; and no more can a distinct proposition be accepted by a people so situated than a grammatical phrase be uttered where solecism prevails. Both are here enjoined—false method, false grammar, and with

these false terms. If Russia has you in her hands, it is not because of her dexterity of dealing, but because of her simplicity of perception. She does not generalize. She has men capable of planning and executing,* because, on the one hand, she has a tongue in which that word could not be rendered; because, on the other, she has men who have sounded the depths of European *reason*, and know how to use it.

* "Lord John Russell has that degree of imagination which, though evinced rather in sentiment than expression, still enables him to generalize from the details of his reading and experience, and to take those comprehensive views, &c."—*Coningsby*. (See *Negotiations at Vienna, passim*.)

"Refuse to bow before shadows and worship phrases; denounce to a perplexed and disheartened world the frigid theories of a generalizing age that have destroyed the individuality of man."—*Coningsby*, last paragraph.

FORMULAS FOR TESTING WORDS.

IN chronic diseases the first principle is to reverse habits. In regard to words, we are not aware that we have any : try to detect them, and you will find them. Then do you follow the same method, and reverse habits.

Our habit is to ascertain the meaning of a word, and then use it ; the reverse is, to ascertain whether that meaning be correct, and if not so, not to use it.

This point conceded, we enter into an entirely new field of research. The terms of our language are instantly converted into historical monuments, metaphysical reagents, philosophical tests, political engines, and keys to individual character. These are the active elements which we have drawn forth from the slough of phrases, maxims, principles, dogmas, and opinions. The occasion of study is presented to us in every sound that vibrates. This is logic, the first of sciences, the knowledge of words.

Our language is the Saxon and the Norman French.* The discriminating point between them is, the adoption of classical terms into the latter, so that the English is composed partly of quickened, partly of dead matter : it is a living body joined to a corpse. The first point therefore to ascertain is whether a term be Saxon or Norman. In the first case you may trust to it if its functions have not

* The Norman and the Saxon were the same language. The former received in its passage through Normandy the classical conluent which has given it its peculiar character.

been deranged by the introduction of a Norman synonym, or if it has not been subjugated to modifications by the habits of Norman syntax: as, for instance, freedom associated with liberty; self with egotism, and changed to selfish and selfishness. In the second case it has immediately to be laid on the dissecting-table. It either has a Saxon synonym, or it has not: it is either a superfluous term, or it is not. On either affirmative you cast it aside; you only proceed further on the double negative; then you have to trace it back to the Greek or Latin from which it is derived, and you will invariably find it to be a forgery. It will be understood that I am speaking not of objects known, and for which a new term is sought, but of ideas existing in and by the word.

This sifting will at once exclude all substantives ending in *ion* and *ce*; all those terminating in *ism* and *ite*; all substantives originally metaphorical, and then used absolutely; and all verbs neuter rendered active by *ize*. You will further discard all words transferred from one class to another of the parts of speech: such as verbs made out of substantives, or *vice versa*; adjectives made out of substantives and adverbs; substantives remanufactured out of the so-formed adjectives.

The clearance thus effected may appear at first sight to amount to a paralysis of the language itself; but I am here proposing precautions in reference to terms that our own thoughts may not be misled. Once a man is secure against being mastered by terms in himself, he can freely use any terms he likes in speaking to others. Besides, in discarding, this rule will cover all. To dispense only with what is superfluous—for every fallacy is a superfluity—in

no case will sense suffer from "laconism." Our prevailing sin is volubility, and that includes all the others.

Once at a country-house, where several persons of literary distinction were assembled, it was proposed, that every evening one of the party should bring a remarkable passage from some author to read. One evening the passage selected was the letter of Sir W. Johns on the American war, in the form of a letter to the *Athenians*, during the war of the allies. It was judged that the first portion of it was a happy imitation of the ancient style, but that the spirit was lost in the continuation. I begged to be allowed to read the letter with some alteration the next evening. The sense appeared to the listeners precisely the same; but it was acknowledged, with surprise, that the character of the first portion of the letter was preserved throughout. I had merely substituted a few Saxon words in lieu of the Norman or classical, and so restored to an imitation of Greek its Greek character by the exclusion of Greek terms. The resemblance of noble tongues is in their own simplicity and originality; nothing can make the one look less like the other than caricatures and masks, which foreign words must always be, and more especially when borrowed from themselves.

There is but one class of my fellow-countrymen, and that an infinitely minute one, prepared by their previous studies to accept my distinction—those who have mastered the Currency laws. They understand how a nation can be befooled by unmeaning terms; they know the effects of mixing two kinds of Currency, and passing them off as one. The Saxon stands to the Norman, as in our circulation, the metal to the rags; and we, in like manner,

pretend that the two are convertible. The persons I refer to know that they are not, and that an emergency calling for this performance would lay prostrate the empire; so the performance of this impossible convertibility in regard to speech has made bankrupt the common sense of each individual.

Archbishop Whately has hit upon but not improved this point; he has however shown the *non-sequitur* of reasonings when the terms derived from these two languages are interwoven and made to appear to float through each other:—

“ The English language is, perhaps, the more suitable for the fallacy of *petitio principii*, from its being formed from two distinct languages, and thus abounding in synonymous expressions, which have no resemblance in sound, and no connection in etymology; so that a sophist may bring forward a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin; *e. g.* to allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech, must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State; for it is highly conducive to the interests of the community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited of expressing his sentiments.”*

Whilst this writer points out this double refraction of our tongue as favourable to the sophist, another writer, who appears to have occupied the field of the English language, considers it as its beauty and its excellence; according to Mr. Trench, the Latin furnishes “ the goodly and polished hewn stones to the spiritual building,” whilst the Saxon furnishes “ the mortar to the house.”

I was first startled into the consciousness of the

inanity of these same polished and hewn stones, by being called upon to explain to a Turk a discussion that was going on between two Europeans. After making the attempt in vain, and attributing my failure to ignorance of the language, I applied to a learned Orientalist, and discovered that the language had no synonyms for the words employed in the discussion. I then began to consider what they really meant in English, and I saw that the Turkish was a language available only to clothe a positive meaning. Turning then to our best modern authors (it was a volume of Robertson I began with), and dissecting the parts of each sentence, it was at once wonderful, ludicrous, and lamentable, to view the wide waste of words spread before me. There can be no more extraordinary sight or instructive study than an English sentence, as at present written and read. Even as I write, a passage meets my eye, inserted in a newspaper as a notable thing, under the head of "Thought and Action." It is a quotation from Mrs. Jamieson's *Commonplace Book*, and runs as follows :—

"Those who have the largest horizon of thought, the most extended vision in regard to the relation of things, are not remarkable for self-reliance and ready judgment. A man who sees limitedly and clearly is more sure of himself, and more direct in his dealings with circumstances and with others, than a man whose many-sided capacity embraces an immense extent of objects and *objections*—just as, they say, a horse with blinkers more surely chooses his path, and is less likely to shy."

Surely a nation must be smitten with madness, when amongst it a single individual can be found to hold up judgment to contempt; yet this is a type, and no exception.

Our habits of thought, even half a century ago, were thus described by one of our few valuable writers, Smollet:—

“By our present mode of education we are forcibly warped from the bias of nature, until even our thinking faculty is diverted into an unnatural channel. We are changed into creatures of art and affectation; our perception is abused; our senses perverted; our minds lose their force and flavour—till the soul sinks into a kind of idiotism, and is diverted by toys and baubles, enlivened by a quick succession of trivial objects, that glisten, glance, and dance before the eye—like an infant kept awake and inspirited by the sound of a rattle.”

The cause of this imbecile condition he refers to a word, “education,” that is to say, to a nonentity. The young, of course, become like the old, as they are brought up—in other words—as they grow up. So far as he is concerned—*causa latet*. If you have silly speech, you must have silly men; for silly is the word.

To prevent misprision, I have a final remark to make upon the verb. I have pointed out, on the one hand, the energy of that part of speech, as marking the excellence of a tongue; and on the other, the substitution of abstract nouns for it, as destroying the perception in the speaker and the hearer of that which is being done. I would not be understood, however, as saying this absolutely, but only as indicating a means to an end, in reference to the languages in use in the West. That end may be attained by other means, and is so throughout one half of the human family, whose language is mono-syllabic. Having no syntax, they have no conjugations, and no verbs, but then they have no abstractions. Their language, or rather their writing, is the coun-

terpart of external nature. The juxtaposition supplies the clue, and the connection is worked out by a mental process almost mathematical, suggested on the spur of the moment; and to this cause I would refer the longevity of China.

Whoever will for a time put in practice the above simple rules, cannot fail to make the discovery, that the value of a tongue lies in anything but its richness; that it is no less important to obtain simplicity and distinctness in the terms of speech than in the signs of number; and that a tongue approaches to perfection in proportion as it ceases to be a vehicle for fallacy.

TO THE READER.

No one has followed me thus far without some degree of assent or concurrence, and to him I may address myself no longer impersonally.

The task which I have undertaken is one not to be performed by means of type. Theories may be promulgated by writing. They can be undone only by speech. You must have the man before you, so as to be able to judge by all the aids which Nature has afforded us in countenance, configuration, expression, and intonation, no less than by the absolute enunciation of thought, to adjust yourself to his state, or pursue his train of reasoning. As well might you treat a patient labouring under a bodily disease by a book. When similar attempts have been made, the pen has not been used: it has always been interchange of speech, the record of which only has reached us through the pen.

My attempt is not one of choice. I am impelled not only by the sight of the disease, but also by the prospect of its consequent ruin: if it can do no good, at least it can do no harm. There are chronic ailments where cure is possible only by making the patient his own physician. In these it is not medicaments that have to be administered, but aliments that have to be avoided, and a discipline that has to be adopted. In such cases an exposition in print may supersede clinical practice and a pharmacopœia. That is our case. Then it requires, in the first instance, that the individual should be aware that he

is in a suffering state, and know that his craving for food is not a sign of health. The first point can be achieved only by the voice. That gained, print may be of service, because the man is then looking out for what he can get to supply his need.

Something may further be done where curiosity is active, and I am not without hope that the perusal of these pages may lead to a partial perception of error, by which the mind may be launched on the voyage of research, in a direction the reverse of that in which has hitherto been considered to lie the goal of discovery.

The nets which I have endeavoured to untie for my countrymen are not formed of those distinct strands which the acute fingers of sophists have spun, and the difficulty of untying them is increased by the rottenness of the material. Against this is however to be placed an advantage, so far as the supplying of motive goes, in this, that the nets wove by domestic dialecticians have passed into the hands of foreign fishermen. It is not the clearness of our judicial sight that is at stake, but the well-being of our domestic hearths. Life and property are for each of us contingent on the clearing of our terms.

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
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
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